Daily Papers

We conduct a systematic audit of three widely used reasoning benchmarks, SocialIQa, FauxPas-EAI, and ToMi, and uncover pervasive flaws in both benchmark items and evaluation methodology. Using five LLMs (GPT-{3, 3.5, 4, o1}, and LLaMA 3.1) as diagnostic tools, we identify structural, semantic, and pragmatic issues in benchmark design (e.g., duplicated items, ambiguous wording, and implausible answers), as well as scoring procedures that prioritize output form over reasoning process. Through systematic human annotation and re-evaluation on cleaned benchmark subsets, we find that model scores often improve not due to due to erratic surface wording variations and not to improved reasoning. Infact, further analyses show that model performance is highly sensitive to minor input variations such as context availability and phrasing, revealing that high scores may reflect alignment with format-specific cues rather than consistent inference based on the input. These findings challenge the validity of current benchmark-based claims about reasoning in LLMs, and highlight the need for evaluation protocols that assess reasoning as a process of drawing inference from available information, rather than as static output selection. We release audited data and evaluation tools to support more interpretable and diagnostic assessments of model reasoning.

Naturally occurring information-seeking questions often contain questionable assumptions -- assumptions that are false or unverifiable. Questions containing questionable assumptions are challenging because they require a distinct answer strategy that deviates from typical answers for information-seeking questions. For instance, the question "When did Marie Curie discover Uranium?" cannot be answered as a typical "when" question without addressing the false assumption "Marie Curie discovered Uranium". In this work, we propose (QA)^2 (Question Answering with Questionable Assumptions), an open-domain evaluation dataset consisting of naturally occurring search engine queries that may or may not contain questionable assumptions. To be successful on (QA)^2, systems must be able to detect questionable assumptions and also be able to produce adequate responses for both typical information-seeking questions and ones with questionable assumptions. Through human rater acceptability on end-to-end QA with (QA)^2, we find that current models do struggle with handling questionable assumptions, leaving substantial headroom for progress.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

We propose that benchmarking LLMs on questions which have no reasonable answer actually isn't as silly as it sounds. We also present a benchmark that allows such testing and a method to modify the existing datasets, and discover that existing models demonstrate a performance far from the perfect on such questions. Our code and data artifacts are available at https://github.com/L3G5/impossible-bench

Reasoning quality in large language models depends not only on producing correct answers but also on generating valid intermediate steps. We study this through multiple-choice question answering (MCQA), which provides a controlled setting with fixed answer options. Our analysis shows that when questions are effectively unsolvable for a model, spurious chains of thought (CoTs) are more likely to appear, leading to false positives. By estimating the solvability of each question, we uncover an intermediate regime where learning is most effective. Building on this insight, we adapt outcome-supervised reward models and reinforcement learning with group-relative advantage to incorporate solvability into their objectives. Across experiments on math and multimodal datasets, these modifications consistently yield higher rates of process-correct reasoning and, in reinforcement learning, improved answer accuracy as well. Our results highlight solvability as a key factor for reducing hallucinations and increasing reliability in CoT reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown substantial capacity for generating fluent, contextually appropriate responses. However, they can produce hallucinated outputs, especially when a user query includes one or more false premises-claims that contradict established facts. Such premises can mislead LLMs into offering fabricated or misleading details. Existing approaches include pretraining, fine-tuning, and inference-time techniques that often rely on access to logits or address hallucinations after they occur. These methods tend to be computationally expensive, require extensive training data, or lack proactive mechanisms to prevent hallucination before generation, limiting their efficiency in real-time applications. We propose a retrieval-based framework that identifies and addresses false premises before generation. Our method first transforms a user's query into a logical representation, then applies retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to assess the validity of each premise using factual sources. Finally, we incorporate the verification results into the LLM's prompt to maintain factual consistency in the final output. Experiments show that this approach effectively reduces hallucinations, improves factual accuracy, and does not require access to model logits or large-scale fine-tuning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are revolutionizing information retrieval, with chatbots becoming an important source for answering user queries. As by their design, LLMs prioritize generating correct answers, the value of highly plausible yet incorrect answers (candidate answers) tends to be overlooked. However, such answers can still prove useful, for example, they can play a crucial role in tasks like Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) and QA Robustness Assessment (QARA). Existing QA datasets primarily focus on correct answers without explicit consideration of the plausibility of other candidate answers, limiting opportunity for more nuanced evaluations of models. To address this gap, we introduce PlausibleQA, a large-scale dataset comprising 10,000 questions and 100,000 candidate answers, each annotated with plausibility scores and justifications for their selection. Additionally, the dataset includes 900,000 justifications for pairwise comparisons between candidate answers, further refining plausibility assessments. We evaluate PlausibleQA through human assessments and empirical experiments, demonstrating its utility in MCQA and QARA analysis. Our findings show that plausibility-aware approaches are effective for MCQA distractor generation and QARA. We release PlausibleQA as a resource for advancing QA research and enhancing LLM performance in distinguishing plausible distractors from correct answers.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

Sensitivity to false assumptions (or false premises) in information-seeking questions is critical for robust question-answering (QA) systems. Recent work has shown that false assumptions in naturally occurring questions pose challenges to current models, with low performance on both generative QA and simple detection tasks (Kim et al. 2023). However, the focus of existing work on naturally occurring questions leads to a gap in the analysis of model behavior on the long tail of the distribution of possible questions. To this end, we introduce Syn-(QA)^2, a set of two synthetically generated QA datasets: one generated using perturbed relations from Wikidata, and the other by perturbing HotpotQA (Yang et al. 2018). Our findings from evaluating a range of large language models are threefold: (1) false assumptions in QA are challenging, echoing the findings of prior work, (2) the binary detection task is challenging even compared to the difficulty of generative QA itself, possibly due to the linguistic structure of the problem, and (3) the detection task is more challenging with long-tail questions compared to naturally occurring questions, highlighting the utility of our synthetic datasets and generation method.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

We propose a benchmark to measure whether a language model is truthful in generating answers to questions. The benchmark comprises 817 questions that span 38 categories, including health, law, finance and politics. We crafted questions that some humans would answer falsely due to a false belief or misconception. To perform well, models must avoid generating false answers learned from imitating human texts. We tested GPT-3, GPT-Neo/J, GPT-2 and a T5-based model. The best model was truthful on 58% of questions, while human performance was 94%. Models generated many false answers that mimic popular misconceptions and have the potential to deceive humans. The largest models were generally the least truthful. This contrasts with other NLP tasks, where performance improves with model size. However, this result is expected if false answers are learned from the training distribution. We suggest that scaling up models alone is less promising for improving truthfulness than fine-tuning using training objectives other than imitation of text from the web.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

Probabilistic text generators have been used to produce fake scientific papers for more than a decade. Such nonsensical papers are easily detected by both human and machine. Now more complex AI-powered generation techniques produce texts indistinguishable from that of humans and the generation of scientific texts from a few keywords has been documented. Our study introduces the concept of tortured phrases: unexpected weird phrases in lieu of established ones, such as 'counterfeit consciousness' instead of 'artificial intelligence.' We combed the literature for tortured phrases and study one reputable journal where these concentrated en masse. Hypothesising the use of advanced language models we ran a detector on the abstracts of recent articles of this journal and on several control sets. The pairwise comparisons reveal a concentration of abstracts flagged as 'synthetic' in the journal. We also highlight irregularities in its operation, such as abrupt changes in editorial timelines. We substantiate our call for investigation by analysing several individual dubious articles, stressing questionable features: tortured writing style, citation of non-existent literature, and unacknowledged image reuse. Surprisingly, some websites offer to rewrite texts for free, generating gobbledegook full of tortured phrases. We believe some authors used rewritten texts to pad their manuscripts. We wish to raise the awareness on publications containing such questionable AI-generated or rewritten texts that passed (poor) peer review. Deception with synthetic texts threatens the integrity of the scientific literature.

Much recent work seeks to evaluate values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) using multiple-choice surveys and questionnaires. Most of this work is motivated by concerns around real-world LLM applications. For example, politically-biased LLMs may subtly influence society when they are used by millions of people. Such real-world concerns, however, stand in stark contrast to the artificiality of current evaluations: real users do not typically ask LLMs survey questions. Motivated by this discrepancy, we challenge the prevailing constrained evaluation paradigm for values and opinions in LLMs and explore more realistic unconstrained evaluations. As a case study, we focus on the popular Political Compass Test (PCT). In a systematic review, we find that most prior work using the PCT forces models to comply with the PCT's multiple-choice format. We show that models give substantively different answers when not forced; that answers change depending on how models are forced; and that answers lack paraphrase robustness. Then, we demonstrate that models give different answers yet again in a more realistic open-ended answer setting. We distill these findings into recommendations and open challenges in evaluating values and opinions in LLMs.

Prior work has shown that presupposition in generated questions can introduce unverified assumptions, leading to inconsistencies in claim verification. Additionally, prompt sensitivity remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs), resulting in performance variance as high as 3-6%. While recent advancements have reduced this gap, our study demonstrates that prompt sensitivity remains a persistent issue. To address this, we propose a structured and robust claim verification framework that reasons through presupposition-free, decomposed questions. Extensive experiments across multiple prompts, datasets, and LLMs reveal that even state-of-the-art models remain susceptible to prompt variance and presupposition. Our method consistently mitigates these issues, achieving up to a 2-5% improvement.

Automated answer matching, which leverages LLMs to evaluate free-text responses by comparing them to a reference answer, shows substantial promise as a scalable and aligned alternative to human evaluation. However, its reliability requires robustness against strategic attacks such as guesswork or verbosity that may artificially inflate scores without improving actual correctness. In this work, we systematically investigate whether such tactics deceive answer matching models by prompting examinee models to: (1) generate verbose responses, (2) provide multiple answers when unconfident, and (3) embed conflicting answers with the correct answer near the start of their response. Our results show that these manipulations do not increase scores and often reduce them. Additionally, binary scoring (which requires a matcher to answer with a definitive "correct" or "incorrect") is more robust to attacks than continuous scoring (which requires a matcher to determine partial correctness). These findings show that answer matching is generally robust to inexpensive text manipulation and is a viable alternative to traditional LLM-as-a-judge or human evaluation when reference answers are available.

Recent advancements in language models have led to significant improvements in mathematical reasoning across various benchmarks. However, most of these benchmarks rely on automatic evaluation methods that only compare final answers using heuristics, without verifying the underlying reasoning steps. This limitation results in false positive solutions, where models may produce correct final answers but with flawed deduction paths. In this paper, we systematically examine the prevalence of false positive solutions in mathematical problem solving for language models. We analyze the characteristics and extent of this issue across different open-source models, datasets of varying difficulty levels, and decoding strategies. Specifically, we explore how false positives influence the inference time scaling behavior of language models. Our experimental results reveal that: (1) false positive solutions persist across different models, datasets, and decoding methods, (2) sampling-based inference time scaling methods do not alleviate the problem, and (3) the pass@N evaluation metric is more susceptible to false positives, suggesting a significantly lower scaling ceiling than what automatic evaluations indicate. Additionally, we analyze specific instances of false positives and discuss potential limitations in self-improvement techniques and synthetic data generation under such conditions. Our data and code are publicly available at https://github.com/Wloner0809/False-Positives-in-Math.

It has been shown that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not *say what they think*: they do not always volunteer information about how certain parts of the input influence their reasoning. But it is one thing for a model to *omit* such information and another, worse thing to *lie* about it. Here, we extend the work of Chen et al. (2025) to show that LRMs will do just this: they will flatly deny relying on hints provided in the prompt in answering multiple choice questions -- even when directly asked to reflect on unusual (i.e. hinted) prompt content, even when allowed to use hints, and even though experiments *show* them to be using the hints. Our results thus have discouraging implications for CoT monitoring and interpretability.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

Large language models (LLMs) can produce erroneous responses that sound fluent and convincing, raising the risk that users will rely on these responses as if they were correct. Mitigating such overreliance is a key challenge. Through a think-aloud study in which participants use an LLM-infused application to answer objective questions, we identify several features of LLM responses that shape users' reliance: explanations (supporting details for answers), inconsistencies in explanations, and sources. Through a large-scale, pre-registered, controlled experiment (N=308), we isolate and study the effects of these features on users' reliance, accuracy, and other measures. We find that the presence of explanations increases reliance on both correct and incorrect responses. However, we observe less reliance on incorrect responses when sources are provided or when explanations exhibit inconsistencies. We discuss the implications of these findings for fostering appropriate reliance on LLMs.

Driven by the growing capacity and training scale, Text-to-Video (T2V) generation models have recently achieved substantial progress in video quality, length, and instruction-following capability. However, whether these models can understand physics and generate physically plausible videos remains a question. While Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have been widely used as general-purpose evaluators in various applications, they struggle to identify the physically impossible content from generated videos. To investigate this issue, we construct a PID (Physical Implausibility Detection) dataset, which consists of a test split of 500 manually annotated videos and a train split of 2,588 paired videos, where each implausible video is generated by carefully rewriting the caption of its corresponding real-world video to induce T2V models producing physically implausible content. With the constructed dataset, we introduce a lightweight fine-tuning approach, enabling VLMs to not only detect physically implausible events but also generate textual explanations on the violated physical principles. Taking the fine-tuned VLM as a physical plausibility detector and explainer, namely PhyDetEx, we benchmark a series of state-of-the-art T2V models to assess their adherence to physical laws. Our findings show that although recent T2V models have made notable progress toward generating physically plausible content, understanding and adhering to physical laws remains a challenging issue, especially for open-source models. Our dataset, training code, and checkpoints are available at https://github.com/Zeqing-Wang/PhyDetEx{https://github.com/Zeqing-Wang/PhyDetEx}.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown unprecedented potential in various fields, especially as the backbones for question-answering (QA) systems. However, they tend to be easily deceived by tricky questions such as "How many eyes does the sun have?". Such frailties of PLMs often allude to the lack of knowledge within them. In this paper, we find that the PLMs already possess the knowledge required to rebut such questions, and the key is how to activate the knowledge. To systematize this observation, we investigate the PLMs' responses to one kind of tricky questions, i.e., the false premises questions (FPQs). We annotate a FalseQA dataset containing 2365 human-written FPQs, with the corresponding explanations for the false premises and the revised true premise questions. Using FalseQA, we discover that PLMs are capable of discriminating FPQs by fine-tuning on moderate numbers (e.g., 256) of examples. PLMs also generate reasonable explanations for the false premise, which serve as rebuttals. Further replaying a few general questions during training allows PLMs to excel on FPQs and general questions simultaneously. Our work suggests that once the rebuttal ability is stimulated, knowledge inside the PLMs can be effectively utilized to handle FPQs, which incentivizes the research on PLM-based QA systems.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase impressive reasoning capabilities when coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, the robustness of this approach warrants further investigation. In this paper, we introduce a novel scenario termed preemptive answers, where the LLM obtains an answer before engaging in reasoning. This situation can arise inadvertently or induced by malicious users by prompt injection attacks. Experiments reveal that preemptive answers significantly impair the model's reasoning capability across various CoT methods and a broad spectrum of datasets. To bolster the robustness of reasoning, we propose two measures aimed at mitigating this issue to some extent.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs -- e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)" -- which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations supporting those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. CoT is promising for explainability, but our results highlight the need for targeted efforts to evaluate and improve explanation faithfulness.

Information seeking users often pose questions with false presuppositions, especially when asking about unfamiliar topics. Most existing question answering (QA) datasets, in contrast, assume all questions have well defined answers. We introduce CREPE, a QA dataset containing a natural distribution of presupposition failures from online information-seeking forums. We find that 25% of questions contain false presuppositions, and provide annotations for these presuppositions and their corrections. Through extensive baseline experiments, we show that adaptations of existing open-domain QA models can find presuppositions moderately well, but struggle when predicting whether a presupposition is factually correct. This is in large part due to difficulty in retrieving relevant evidence passages from a large text corpus. CREPE provides a benchmark to study question answering in the wild, and our analyses provide avenues for future work in better modeling and further studying the task.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Retrieval-augmented language models are being increasingly tasked with subjective, contentious, and conflicting queries such as "is aspartame linked to cancer". To resolve these ambiguous queries, one must search through a large range of websites and consider "which, if any, of this evidence do I find convincing?". In this work, we study how LLMs answer this question. In particular, we construct ConflictingQA, a dataset that pairs controversial queries with a series of real-world evidence documents that contain different facts (e.g., quantitative results), argument styles (e.g., appeals to authority), and answers (Yes or No). We use this dataset to perform sensitivity and counterfactual analyses to explore which text features most affect LLM predictions. Overall, we find that current models rely heavily on the relevance of a website to the query, while largely ignoring stylistic features that humans find important such as whether a text contains scientific references or is written with a neutral tone. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of RAG corpus quality (e.g., the need to filter misinformation), and possibly even a shift in how LLMs are trained to better align with human judgements.

With a rise in false, inaccurate, and misleading information in propaganda, news, and social media, real-world Question Answering (QA) systems face the challenges of synthesizing and reasoning over contradicting information to derive correct answers. This urgency gives rise to the need to make QA systems robust to misinformation, a topic previously unexplored. We study the risk of misinformation to QA models by investigating the behavior of the QA model under contradicting contexts that are mixed with both real and fake information. We create the first large-scale dataset for this problem, namely Contra-QA, which contains over 10K human-written and model-generated contradicting pairs of contexts. Experiments show that QA models are vulnerable under contradicting contexts brought by misinformation. To defend against such a threat, we build a misinformation-aware QA system as a counter-measure that integrates question answering and misinformation detection in a joint fashion.

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to transform the practice of law, but this potential is threatened by the presence of legal hallucinations -- responses from these models that are not consistent with legal facts. We investigate the extent of these hallucinations using an original suite of legal queries, comparing LLMs' responses to structured legal metadata and examining their consistency. Our work makes four key contributions: (1) We develop a typology of legal hallucinations, providing a conceptual framework for future research in this area. (2) We find that legal hallucinations are alarmingly prevalent, occurring between 69% of the time with ChatGPT 3.5 and 88% with Llama 2, when these models are asked specific, verifiable questions about random federal court cases. (3) We illustrate that LLMs often fail to correct a user's incorrect legal assumptions in a contra-factual question setup. (4) We provide evidence that LLMs cannot always predict, or do not always know, when they are producing legal hallucinations. Taken together, these findings caution against the rapid and unsupervised integration of popular LLMs into legal tasks. Even experienced lawyers must remain wary of legal hallucinations, and the risks are highest for those who stand to benefit from LLMs the most -- pro se litigants or those without access to traditional legal resources.

Large language models (LLMs) appear to bias their survey answers toward certain values. Nonetheless, some argue that LLMs are too inconsistent to simulate particular values. Are they? To answer, we first define value consistency as the similarity of answers across (1) paraphrases of one question, (2) related questions under one topic, (3) multiple-choice and open-ended use-cases of one question, and (4) multilingual translations of a question to English, Chinese, German, and Japanese. We apply these measures to a few large (>=34b), open LLMs including llama-3, as well as gpt-4o, using eight thousand questions spanning more than 300 topics. Unlike prior work, we find that models are relatively consistent across paraphrases, use-cases, translations, and within a topic. Still, some inconsistencies remain. Models are more consistent on uncontroversial topics (e.g., in the U.S., "Thanksgiving") than on controversial ones ("euthanasia"). Base models are both more consistent compared to fine-tuned models and are uniform in their consistency across topics, while fine-tuned models are more inconsistent about some topics ("euthanasia") than others ("women's rights") like our human subjects (n=165).

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

Language Models [LMs] are now playing an increasingly large role in information generation and synthesis; the representation of scientific knowledge in these systems needs to be highly accurate. A prime challenge is hallucination; that is, generating apparently plausible but actually false information, including invented citations and nonexistent research papers. This kind of inaccuracy is dangerous in all the domains that require high levels of factual correctness, such as academia and education. This work presents a pipeline for evaluating the frequency with which language models hallucinate in generating responses in the scientific literature. We propose ArxEval, an evaluation pipeline with two tasks using ArXiv as a repository: Jumbled Titles and Mixed Titles. Our evaluation includes fifteen widely used language models and provides comparative insights into their reliability in handling scientific literature.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

We present the surprising finding that a language model's reasoning capabilities can be improved by training on synthetic datasets of chain-of-thought (CoT) traces from more capable models, even when all of those traces lead to an incorrect final answer. Our experiments show this approach can yield better performance on reasoning tasks than training on human-annotated datasets. We hypothesize that two key factors explain this phenomenon: first, the distribution of synthetic data is inherently closer to the language model's own distribution, making it more amenable to learning. Second, these `incorrect' traces are often only partially flawed and contain valid reasoning steps from which the model can learn. To further test the first hypothesis, we use a language model to paraphrase human-annotated traces -- shifting their distribution closer to the model's own distribution -- and show that this improves performance. For the second hypothesis, we introduce increasingly flawed CoT traces and study to what extent models are tolerant to these flaws. We demonstrate our findings across various reasoning domains like math, algorithmic reasoning and code generation using MATH, GSM8K, Countdown and MBPP datasets on various language models ranging from 1.5B to 9B across Qwen, Llama, and Gemma models. Our study shows that curating datasets that are closer to the model's distribution is a critical aspect to consider. We also show that a correct final answer is not always a reliable indicator of a faithful reasoning process.

The rapid propagation of misinformation poses substantial risks to public interest. To combat misinformation, large language models (LLMs) are adapted to automatically verify claim credibility. Nevertheless, existing methods heavily rely on the embedded knowledge within LLMs and / or black-box APIs for evidence collection, leading to subpar performance with smaller LLMs or upon unreliable context. In this paper, we propose retrieval augmented fact verification through the synthesis of contrasting arguments (RAFTS). Upon input claims, RAFTS starts with evidence retrieval, where we design a retrieval pipeline to collect and re-rank relevant documents from verifiable sources. Then, RAFTS forms contrastive arguments (i.e., supporting or refuting) conditioned on the retrieved evidence. In addition, RAFTS leverages an embedding model to identify informative demonstrations, followed by in-context prompting to generate the prediction and explanation. Our method effectively retrieves relevant documents as evidence and evaluates arguments from varying perspectives, incorporating nuanced information for fine-grained decision-making. Combined with informative in-context examples as prior, RAFTS achieves significant improvements to supervised and LLM baselines without complex prompts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method through extensive experiments, where RAFTS can outperform GPT-based methods with a significantly smaller 7B LLM.

Ambiguous questions are a challenge for Question Answering models, as they require answers that cover multiple interpretations of the original query. To this end, these models are required to generate long-form answers that often combine conflicting pieces of information. Although recent advances in the field have shown strong capabilities in generating fluent responses, certain research questions remain unanswered. Does model/data scaling improve the answers' quality? Do automated metrics align with human judgment? To what extent do these models ground their answers in evidence? In this study, we aim to thoroughly investigate these aspects, and provide valuable insights into the limitations of the current approaches. To aid in reproducibility and further extension of our work, we open-source our code at https://github.com/din0s/ambig_lfqa.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Cancer patients are increasingly turning to large language models (LLMs) as a new form of internet search for medical information, making it critical to assess how well these models handle complex, personalized questions. However, current medical benchmarks focus on medical exams or consumer-searched questions and do not evaluate LLMs on real patient questions with detailed clinical contexts. In this paper, we first evaluate LLMs on cancer-related questions drawn from real patients, reviewed by three hematology oncology physicians. While responses are generally accurate, with GPT-4-Turbo scoring 4.13 out of 5, the models frequently fail to recognize or address false presuppositions in the questions-posing risks to safe medical decision-making. To study this limitation systematically, we introduce Cancer-Myth, an expert-verified adversarial dataset of 585 cancer-related questions with false presuppositions. On this benchmark, no frontier LLM -- including GPT-4o, Gemini-1.Pro, and Claude-3.5-Sonnet -- corrects these false presuppositions more than 30% of the time. Even advanced medical agentic methods do not prevent LLMs from ignoring false presuppositions. These findings expose a critical gap in the clinical reliability of LLMs and underscore the need for more robust safeguards in medical AI systems.

Verifying complex political claims is a challenging task, especially when politicians use various tactics to subtly misrepresent the facts. Automatic fact-checking systems fall short here, and their predictions like "half-true" are not very useful in isolation, since we have no idea which parts of the claim are true and which are not. In this work, we focus on decomposing a complex claim into a comprehensive set of yes-no subquestions whose answers influence the veracity of the claim. We present ClaimDecomp, a dataset of decompositions for over 1000 claims. Given a claim and its verification paragraph written by fact-checkers, our trained annotators write subquestions covering both explicit propositions of the original claim and its implicit facets, such as asking about additional political context that changes our view of the claim's veracity. We study whether state-of-the-art models can generate such subquestions, showing that these models generate reasonable questions to ask, but predicting the comprehensive set of subquestions from the original claim without evidence remains challenging. We further show that these subquestions can help identify relevant evidence to fact-check the full claim and derive the veracity through their answers, suggesting that they can be useful pieces of a fact-checking pipeline.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Hoaxes are a recognised form of disinformation created deliberately, with potential serious implications in the credibility of reference knowledge resources such as Wikipedia. What makes detecting Wikipedia hoaxes hard is that they often are written according to the official style guidelines. In this work, we first provide a systematic analysis of the similarities and discrepancies between legitimate and hoax Wikipedia articles, and introduce Hoaxpedia, a collection of 311 Hoax articles (from existing literature as well as official Wikipedia lists) alongside semantically similar real articles. We report results of binary classification experiments in the task of predicting whether a Wikipedia article is real or hoax, and analyze several settings as well as a range of language models. Our results suggest that detecting deceitful content in Wikipedia based on content alone, despite not having been explored much in the past, is a promising direction.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

As corporations rush to integrate large language models (LLMs) to their search offerings, it is critical that they provide factually accurate information that is robust to any presuppositions that a user may express. In this work, we introduce UPHILL, a dataset consisting of health-related queries with varying degrees of presuppositions. Using UPHILL, we evaluate the factual accuracy and consistency of InstructGPT, ChatGPT, and BingChat models. We find that while model responses rarely disagree with true health claims (posed as questions), they often fail to challenge false claims: responses from InstructGPT agree with 32% of the false claims, ChatGPT 26% and BingChat 23%. As we increase the extent of presupposition in input queries, the responses from InstructGPT and ChatGPT agree with the claim considerably more often, regardless of its veracity. Responses from BingChat, which rely on retrieved webpages, are not as susceptible. Given the moderate factual accuracy, and the inability of models to consistently correct false assumptions, our work calls for a careful assessment of current LLMs for use in high-stakes scenarios.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

A major risk of using language models in practical applications is their tendency to hallucinate incorrect statements. Hallucinations are often attributed to knowledge gaps in LMs, but we hypothesize that in some cases, when justifying previously generated hallucinations, LMs output false claims that they can separately recognize as incorrect. We construct three question-answering datasets where ChatGPT and GPT-4 often state an incorrect answer and offer an explanation with at least one incorrect claim. Crucially, we find that ChatGPT and GPT-4 can identify 67% and 87% of their own mistakes, respectively. We refer to this phenomenon as hallucination snowballing: an LM over-commits to early mistakes, leading to more mistakes that it otherwise would not make.

As language models are adapted by a more sophisticated and diverse set of users, the importance of guaranteeing that they provide factually correct information supported by verifiable sources is critical across fields of study & professions. This is especially the case for high-stakes fields, such as medicine and law, where the risk of propagating false information is high and can lead to undesirable societal consequences. Previous work studying factuality and attribution has not focused on analyzing these characteristics of language model outputs in domain-specific scenarios. In this work, we present an evaluation study analyzing various axes of factuality and attribution provided in responses from a few systems, by bringing domain experts in the loop. Specifically, we first collect expert-curated questions from 484 participants across 32 fields of study, and then ask the same experts to evaluate generated responses to their own questions. We also ask experts to revise answers produced by language models, which leads to ExpertQA, a high-quality long-form QA dataset with 2177 questions spanning 32 fields, along with verified answers and attributions for claims in the answers.

Existing question answering (QA) datasets are no longer challenging to most powerful Large Language Models (LLMs). Traditional QA benchmarks like TriviaQA, NaturalQuestions, ELI5 and HotpotQA mainly study ``known unknowns'' with clear indications of both what information is missing, and how to find it to answer the question. Hence, good performance on these benchmarks provides a false sense of security. A yet unmet need of the NLP community is a bank of non-factoid, multi-perspective questions involving a great deal of unclear information needs, i.e. ``unknown uknowns''. We claim we can find such questions in search engine logs, which is surprising because most question-intent queries are indeed factoid. We present Researchy Questions, a dataset of search engine queries tediously filtered to be non-factoid, ``decompositional'' and multi-perspective. We show that users spend a lot of ``effort'' on these questions in terms of signals like clicks and session length, and that they are also challenging for GPT-4. We also show that ``slow thinking'' answering techniques, like decomposition into sub-questions shows benefit over answering directly. We release sim 100k Researchy Questions, along with the Clueweb22 URLs that were clicked.

Generation of plausible yet incorrect factual information, termed hallucination, is an unsolved issue in large language models. We study the ability of language models to deliberate on the responses they give in order to correct their mistakes. We develop the Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) method whereby the model first (i) drafts an initial response; then (ii) plans verification questions to fact-check its draft; (iii) answers those questions independently so the answers are not biased by other responses; and (iv) generates its final verified response. In experiments, we show CoVe decreases hallucinations across a variety of tasks, from list-based questions from Wikidata, closed book MultiSpanQA and longform text generation.

For Large Language Models (LLMs) to be reliably deployed in both everyday and high-stakes domains, knowing when not to answer is equally critical as answering correctly. Real-world user queries, which can be underspecified, ill-posed, or fundamentally unanswerable, require LLMs to reason about uncertainty and selectively abstain -- i.e., refuse to answer definitively. However, abstention remains understudied, without a systematic evaluation framework for modern LLMs. In this work, we introduce AbstentionBench, a large-scale benchmark for holistically evaluating abstention across 20 diverse datasets, including questions with unknown answers, underspecification, false premises, subjective interpretations, and outdated information. Evaluating 20 frontier LLMs reveals abstention is an unsolved problem, and one where scaling models is of little use. While recent reasoning LLMs have shown impressive results in complex problem solving, surprisingly, we find that reasoning fine-tuning degrades abstention (by 24% on average), even for math and science domains on which reasoning models are explicitly trained. We find that while a carefully crafted system prompt can boost abstention in practice, it does not resolve models' fundamental inability to reason about uncertainty. We release AbstentionBench to foster research into advancing LLM reliability.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Large language models for mathematical reasoning are typically trained with outcome-based rewards, which credit only the final answer. In our experiments, we observe that this paradigm is highly susceptible to reward hacking, leading to a substantial overestimation of a model's reasoning ability. This is evidenced by a high incidence of false positives - solutions that reach the correct final answer through an unsound reasoning process. Through a systematic analysis with human verification, we establish a taxonomy of these failure modes, identifying patterns like Miracle Steps - abrupt jumps to a correct output without a valid preceding derivation. Probing experiments suggest a strong association between these Miracle Steps and memorization, where the model appears to recall the answer directly rather than deriving it. To mitigate this systemic issue, we introduce the Rubric Reward Model (RRM), a process-oriented reward function that evaluates the entire reasoning trajectory against problem-specific rubrics. The generative RRM provides fine-grained, calibrated rewards (0-1) that explicitly penalize logical flaws and encourage rigorous deduction. When integrated into a reinforcement learning pipeline, RRM-based training consistently outperforms outcome-only supervision across four math benchmarks. Notably, it boosts Verified Pass@1024 on AIME2024 from 26.7% to 62.6% and reduces the incidence of Miracle Steps by 71%. Our work demonstrates that rewarding the solution process is crucial for building models that are not only more accurate but also more reliable.

The rapid proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly contributed to the development of equitable AI systems capable of factual question-answering (QA). However, no known study tests the LLMs' robustness when presented with obfuscated versions of questions. To systematically evaluate these limitations, we propose a novel technique, ObfusQAte and, leveraging the same, introduce ObfusQA, a comprehensive, first of its kind, framework with multi-tiered obfuscation levels designed to examine LLM capabilities across three distinct dimensions: (i) Named-Entity Indirection, (ii) Distractor Indirection, and (iii) Contextual Overload. By capturing these fine-grained distinctions in language, ObfusQA provides a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM robustness and adaptability. Our study observes that LLMs exhibit a tendency to fail or generate hallucinated responses when confronted with these increasingly nuanced variations. To foster research in this direction, we make ObfusQAte publicly available.

Health-related misinformation is very prevalent and potentially harmful. It is difficult to identify, especially when claims distort or misinterpret scientific findings. We investigate the impact of synthetic data generation and lightweight fine-tuning techniques on the ability of large language models (LLMs) to recognize fallacious arguments using the MISSCI dataset and framework. In this work, we propose MisSynth, a pipeline that applies retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to produce synthetic fallacy samples, which are then used to fine-tune an LLM model. Our results show substantial accuracy gains with fine-tuned models compared to vanilla baselines. For instance, the LLaMA 3.1 8B fine-tuned model achieved an over 35% F1-score absolute improvement on the MISSCI test split over its vanilla baseline. We demonstrate that introducing synthetic fallacy data to augment limited annotated resources can significantly enhance zero-shot LLM classification performance on real-world scientific misinformation tasks, even with limited computational resources. The code and synthetic dataset are available on https://github.com/mxpoliakov/MisSynth.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Large language models (LLMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step, "Chain-of-Thought" (CoT) reasoning before answering a question, but it is unclear if the stated reasoning is a faithful explanation of the model's actual reasoning (i.e., its process for answering the question). We investigate hypotheses for how CoT reasoning may be unfaithful, by examining how the model predictions change when we intervene on the CoT (e.g., by adding mistakes or paraphrasing it). Models show large variation across tasks in how strongly they condition on the CoT when predicting their answer, sometimes relying heavily on the CoT and other times primarily ignoring it. CoT's performance boost does not seem to come from CoT's added test-time compute alone or from information encoded via the particular phrasing of the CoT. As models become larger and more capable, they produce less faithful reasoning on most tasks we study. Overall, our results suggest that CoT can be faithful if the circumstances such as the model size and task are carefully chosen.

State-of-the-art language models (LMs) are notoriously susceptible to generating hallucinated information. Such inaccurate outputs not only undermine the reliability of these models but also limit their use and raise serious concerns about misinformation and propaganda. In this work, we focus on hallucinated book and article references and present them as the "model organism" of language model hallucination research, due to their frequent and easy-to-discern nature. We posit that if a language model cites a particular reference in its output, then it should ideally possess sufficient information about its authors and content, among other relevant details. Using this basic insight, we illustrate that one can identify hallucinated references without ever consulting any external resources, by asking a set of direct or indirect queries to the language model about the references. These queries can be considered as "consistency checks." Our findings highlight that while LMs, including GPT-4, often produce inconsistent author lists for hallucinated references, they also often accurately recall the authors of real references. In this sense, the LM can be said to "know" when it is hallucinating references. Furthermore, these findings show how hallucinated references can be dissected to shed light on their nature. Replication code and results can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/hallucinated-references.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

The reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have been a longstanding focus of research. Recent works have further enhanced these capabilities using reinforcement learning (RL), with many new methods claiming significant improvements with minimal or no external supervision. Surprisingly, some studies even suggest that random or incorrect reward signals can enhance reasoning performance. However, these breakthroughs are mostly reported on the Qwen2.5 model family and evaluated on well-known benchmarks such as MATH-500, AMC, and AIME, while failing to achieve similar gains on other models like Llama, which warrants further investigation. Our analysis shows that although Qwen2.5 achieves strong mathematical reasoning performance, its pretraining on large-scale web corpora makes it vulnerable to data contamination in popular benchmarks. As a result, results derived from these benchmarks may be unreliable. To address this, we introduce a generator that produces fully synthetic arithmetic problems of arbitrary length and difficulty, yielding a clean dataset we call RandomCalculation. Using these leakage-free datasets, we show that only accurate reward signals consistently improve performance, while noisy or incorrect signals do not. We advocate for evaluating RL methods on uncontaminated benchmarks and across diverse model families to ensure trustworthy conclusions.

While models for Visual Question Answering (VQA) have steadily improved over the years, interacting with one quickly reveals that these models lack consistency. For instance, if a model answers "red" to "What color is the balloon?", it might answer "no" if asked, "Is the balloon red?". These responses violate simple notions of entailment and raise questions about how effectively VQA models ground language. In this work, we introduce a dataset, ConVQA, and metrics that enable quantitative evaluation of consistency in VQA. For a given observable fact in an image (e.g. the balloon's color), we generate a set of logically consistent question-answer (QA) pairs (e.g. Is the balloon red?) and also collect a human-annotated set of common-sense based consistent QA pairs (e.g. Is the balloon the same color as tomato sauce?). Further, we propose a consistency-improving data augmentation module, a Consistency Teacher Module (CTM). CTM automatically generates entailed (or similar-intent) questions for a source QA pair and fine-tunes the VQA model if the VQA's answer to the entailed question is consistent with the source QA pair. We demonstrate that our CTM-based training improves the consistency of VQA models on the ConVQA datasets and is a strong baseline for further research.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

There is growing excitement about the potential of Language Models (LMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. Falsifying hypotheses is key to scientific progress, as it allows claims to be iteratively refined over time. This process requires significant researcher effort, reasoning, and ingenuity. Yet current benchmarks for LMs predominantly assess their ability to generate solutions rather than challenge them. We advocate for developing benchmarks that evaluate this inverse capability - creating counterexamples for subtly incorrect solutions. To demonstrate this approach, we start with the domain of algorithmic problem solving, where counterexamples can be evaluated automatically using code execution. Specifically, we introduce REFUTE, a dynamically updating benchmark that includes recent problems and incorrect submissions from programming competitions, where human experts successfully identified counterexamples. Our analysis finds that the best reasoning agents, even OpenAI o3-mini (high) with code execution feedback, can create counterexamples for only <9% of incorrect solutions in REFUTE, even though ratings indicate its ability to solve up to 48% of these problems from scratch. We hope our work spurs progress in evaluating and enhancing LMs' ability to falsify incorrect solutions - a capability that is crucial for both accelerating research and making models self-improve through reliable reflective reasoning.

This article proposes a new approach for assessing the quality of answers in political question-and-answer sessions. We measure the quality of an answer based on how easily and accurately it can be recognized in a random set of candidate answers given the question's text. This measure reflects the answer's relevance and depth of engagement with the question. Like semantic search, we can implement this approach by training a language model on the corpus of observed questions and answers without additional human-labeled data. We showcase and validate our methodology within the context of the Question Period in the Canadian House of Commons. Our analysis reveals that while some answers have a weak semantic connection to questions, hinting at some evasion or obfuscation, they are generally at least moderately relevant, far exceeding what we would expect from random replies. We also find a meaningful correlation between answer quality and the party affiliation of the members of Parliament asking the questions.

The spread of online misinformation threatens public health, democracy, and the broader society. While professional fact-checkers form the first line of defense by fact-checking popular false claims, they do not engage directly in conversations with misinformation spreaders. On the other hand, non-expert ordinary users act as eyes-on-the-ground who proactively counter misinformation -- recent research has shown that 96% counter-misinformation responses are made by ordinary users. However, research also found that 2/3 times, these responses are rude and lack evidence. This work seeks to create a counter-misinformation response generation model to empower users to effectively correct misinformation. This objective is challenging due to the absence of datasets containing ground-truth of ideal counter-misinformation responses, and the lack of models that can generate responses backed by communication theories. In this work, we create two novel datasets of misinformation and counter-misinformation response pairs from in-the-wild social media and crowdsourcing from college-educated students. We annotate the collected data to distinguish poor from ideal responses that are factual, polite, and refute misinformation. We propose MisinfoCorrect, a reinforcement learning-based framework that learns to generate counter-misinformation responses for an input misinformation post. The model rewards the generator to increase the politeness, factuality, and refutation attitude while retaining text fluency and relevancy. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation shows that our model outperforms several baselines by generating high-quality counter-responses. This work illustrates the promise of generative text models for social good -- here, to help create a safe and reliable information ecosystem. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/MisinfoCorrect.

Recently, AI assistants based on large language models (LLMs) show surprising performance in many tasks, such as dialogue, solving math problems, writing code, and using tools. Although LLMs possess intensive world knowledge, they still make factual errors when facing some knowledge intensive tasks, like open-domain question answering. These untruthful responses from the AI assistant may cause significant risks in practical applications. We believe that an AI assistant's refusal to answer questions it does not know is a crucial method for reducing hallucinations and making the assistant truthful. Therefore, in this paper, we ask the question "Can AI assistants know what they don't know and express them through natural language?" To answer this question, we construct a model-specific "I don't know" (Idk) dataset for an assistant, which contains its known and unknown questions, based on existing open-domain question answering datasets. Then we align the assistant with its corresponding Idk dataset and observe whether it can refuse to answer its unknown questions after alignment. Experimental results show that after alignment with Idk datasets, the assistant can refuse to answer most its unknown questions. For questions they attempt to answer, the accuracy is significantly higher than before the alignment.

Scientists and practitioners are aggressively moving to deploy digital twins - LLM-based models of real individuals - across social science and policy research. We conducted 19 pre-registered studies with 164 diverse outcomes (e.g., attitudes towards hiring algorithms, intention to share misinformation) and compared human responses to those of their digital twins (trained on each person's previous answers to over 500 questions). We find that digital twins' answers are only modestly more accurate than those from the homogeneous base LLM and correlate weakly with human responses (average r = 0.20). We document five ways in which digital twins distort human behavior: (i) stereotyping, (ii) insufficient individuation, (iii) representation bias, (iv) ideological biases, and (v) hyper-rationality. Together, our results caution against the premature deployment of digital twins, which may systematically misrepresent human cognition and undermine both scientific understanding and practical applications.

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) now achieve near-human performance on standard math word problem benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K), yet their true reasoning ability remains disputed. A key concern is that models often produce confident, yet unfounded, answers to unanswerable problems. We introduce TreeCut, a synthetic dataset that systematically generates infinite unanswerable math word problems and their answerable counterparts, by representing each question as a tree and removing chosen necessary conditions. Experiments show TreeCut effectively induce hallucinations in large language models, including GPT-4o and o3-mini, with rates of 64% and 44% in their respective worst-case scenarios under zero-shot setting. Further analysis highlights that deeper or more complex trees, composite item names, and removing necessary condition near the middle of a path all increase the likelihood of hallucinations, underscoring the persistent challenges LLMs face in identifying unanswerable math problems. The dataset generation code and sample data are available at https://github.com/j-bagel/treecut-math.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Recent advances in reasoning-centric models promise improved robustness through mechanisms such as chain-of-thought prompting and test-time scaling. However, their ability to withstand misleading user input remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of three state-of-the-art reasoning models, i.e., OpenAI's o4-mini, Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across three multimodal benchmarks: MMMU, MathVista, and CharXiv. Our evaluation reveals significant accuracy drops (25-29% on average) following gaslighting negation prompts, indicating that even top-tier reasoning models struggle to preserve correct answers under manipulative user feedback. Built upon the insights of the evaluation and to further probe this vulnerability, we introduce GaslightingBench-R, a new diagnostic benchmark specifically designed to evaluate reasoning models' susceptibility to defend their belief under gaslighting negation prompt. Constructed by filtering and curating 1,025 challenging samples from the existing benchmarks, GaslightingBench-R induces even more dramatic failures, with accuracy drops exceeding 53% on average. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in the robustness of reasoning models, highlighting the gap between step-by-step reasoning and belief persistence.

A prominent weakness of modern language models (LMs) is their tendency to generate factually incorrect text, which hinders their usability. A natural question is whether such factual errors can be detected automatically. Inspired by truth-seeking mechanisms in law, we propose a factuality evaluation framework for LMs that is based on cross-examination. Our key idea is that an incorrect claim is likely to result in inconsistency with other claims that the model generates. To discover such inconsistencies, we facilitate a multi-turn interaction between the LM that generated the claim and another LM (acting as an examiner) which introduces questions to discover inconsistencies. We empirically evaluate our method on factual claims made by multiple recent LMs on four benchmarks, finding that it outperforms existing methods and baselines, often by a large gap. Our results demonstrate the potential of using interacting LMs for capturing factual errors.

Recent observations have underscored a disparity between the inflated benchmark scores and the actual performance of LLMs, raising concerns about potential contamination of evaluation benchmarks. This issue is especially critical for closed-source models and certain open-source models where training data transparency is lacking. In this paper we study data contamination by proposing two methods tailored for both open-source and proprietary LLMs. We first introduce a retrieval-based system to explore potential overlaps between evaluation benchmarks and pretraining corpora. We further present a novel investigation protocol named Testset Slot Guessing (TS-Guessing), applicable to both open and proprietary models. This approach entails masking a wrong answer in a multiple-choice question and prompting the model to fill in the gap. Additionally, it involves obscuring an unlikely word in an evaluation example and asking the model to produce it. We find that certain commercial LLMs could surprisingly guess the missing option in various test sets. Specifically, in the TruthfulQA benchmark, we find that LLMs exhibit notable performance improvement when provided with additional metadata in the benchmark. Further, in the MMLU benchmark, ChatGPT and GPT-4 demonstrated an exact match rate of 52\% and 57\%, respectively, in guessing the missing options in benchmark test data. We hope these results underscore the need for more robust evaluation methodologies and benchmarks in the field.

When deploying machine learning models in high-stakes real-world environments such as health care, it is crucial to accurately assess the uncertainty concerning a model's prediction on abnormal inputs. However, there is a scarcity of literature analyzing this problem on medical data, especially on mixed-type tabular data such as Electronic Health Records. We close this gap by presenting a series of tests including a large variety of contemporary uncertainty estimation techniques, in order to determine whether they are able to identify out-of-distribution (OOD) patients. In contrast to previous work, we design tests on realistic and clinically relevant OOD groups, and run experiments on real-world medical data. We find that almost all techniques fail to achieve convincing results, partly disagreeing with earlier findings.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) leverage step-by-step reasoning to solve complex problems. Standard evaluation practice involves generating a complete reasoning trace and assessing the correctness of the final answer presented at its conclusion. In this paper, we challenge the reliance on the final answer by posing the following two questions: Does the final answer reliably represent the model's optimal conclusion? Can alternative reasoning paths yield different results? To answer these questions, we analyze intermediate reasoning steps, termed subthoughts, and propose a method based on our findings. Our approach involves segmenting a reasoning trace into sequential subthoughts based on linguistic cues. We start by prompting the model to generate continuations from the end-point of each intermediate subthought. We extract a potential answer from every completed continuation originating from different subthoughts. We find that aggregating these answers by selecting the most frequent one (the mode) often yields significantly higher accuracy compared to relying solely on the answer derived from the original complete trace. Analyzing the consistency among the answers derived from different subthoughts reveals characteristics that correlate with the model's confidence and correctness, suggesting potential for identifying less reliable answers. Our experiments across various LLMs and challenging mathematical reasoning datasets (AIME2024 and AIME2025) show consistent accuracy improvements, with gains reaching up to 13\% and 10\% respectively. Implementation is available at: https://github.com/hammoudhasan/SubthoughtReasoner.

The capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason is fundamental to their application in complex, knowledge-intensive domains. In real-world scenarios, LLMs are often augmented with external information that can be helpful, irrelevant, or even misleading. This paper investigates the causal impact of such auxiliary information on the reasoning process of LLMs with explicit step-by-step thinking capabilities. We introduce SciAux, a new dataset derived from ScienceQA, to systematically test the robustness of the model against these types of information. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability: the model's deliberative "thinking mode" is a double-edged sword. While helpful context improves accuracy, misleading information causes a catastrophic drop in performance, which is amplified by the thinking process. Instead of conferring robustness, thinking reinforces the degree of error when provided with misinformation. This highlights that the challenge is not merely to make models "think", but to endow them with the critical faculty to evaluate the information upon which their reasoning is based. The SciAux dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/billhdzhao/SciAux.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has shown impressive capabilities in mitigating hallucinations in large language models (LLMs). However, LLMs struggle to handle misleading retrievals and often fail to maintain their own reasoning when exposed to conflicting or selectively-framed evidence, making them vulnerable to real-world misinformation. In such real-world retrieval scenarios, misleading and conflicting information is rampant, particularly in the political domain, where evidence is often selectively framed, incomplete, or polarized. However, existing RAG benchmarks largely assume a clean retrieval setting, where models succeed by accurately retrieving and generating answers from gold-standard documents. This assumption fails to align with real-world conditions, leading to an overestimation of RAG system performance. To bridge this gap, we introduce RAGuard, a fact-checking dataset designed to evaluate the robustness of RAG systems against misleading retrievals. Unlike prior benchmarks that rely on synthetic noise, our dataset constructs its retrieval corpus from Reddit discussions, capturing naturally occurring misinformation. It categorizes retrieved evidence into three types: supporting, misleading, and irrelevant, providing a realistic and challenging testbed for assessing how well RAG systems navigate different retrieval information. Our benchmark experiments reveal that when exposed to misleading retrievals, all tested LLM-powered RAG systems perform worse than their zero-shot baselines (i.e., no retrieval at all), highlighting their susceptibility to noisy environments. To the best of our knowledge, RAGuard is the first benchmark to systematically assess RAG robustness against misleading evidence. We expect this benchmark will drive future research toward improving RAG systems beyond idealized datasets, making them more reliable for real-world applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

The proliferation of online misinformation has posed significant threats to public interest. While numerous online users actively participate in the combat against misinformation, many of such responses can be characterized by the lack of politeness and supporting facts. As a solution, text generation approaches are proposed to automatically produce counter-misinformation responses. Nevertheless, existing methods are often trained end-to-end without leveraging external knowledge, resulting in subpar text quality and excessively repetitive responses. In this paper, we propose retrieval augmented response generation for online misinformation (RARG), which collects supporting evidence from scientific sources and generates counter-misinformation responses based on the evidences. In particular, our RARG consists of two stages: (1) evidence collection, where we design a retrieval pipeline to retrieve and rerank evidence documents using a database comprising over 1M academic articles; (2) response generation, in which we align large language models (LLMs) to generate evidence-based responses via reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). We propose a reward function to maximize the utilization of the retrieved evidence while maintaining the quality of the generated text, which yields polite and factual responses that clearly refutes misinformation. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, we study the case of COVID-19 and perform extensive experiments with both in- and cross-domain datasets, where RARG consistently outperforms baselines by generating high-quality counter-misinformation responses.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Understanding natural language requires common sense, one aspect of which is the ability to discern the plausibility of events. While distributional models -- most recently pre-trained, Transformer language models -- have demonstrated improvements in modeling event plausibility, their performance still falls short of humans'. In this work, we show that Transformer-based plausibility models are markedly inconsistent across the conceptual classes of a lexical hierarchy, inferring that "a person breathing" is plausible while "a dentist breathing" is not, for example. We find this inconsistency persists even when models are softly injected with lexical knowledge, and we present a simple post-hoc method of forcing model consistency that improves correlation with human plausibility judgements.

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Noise plagues many numerical datasets, where the recorded values in the data may fail to match the true underlying values due to reasons including: erroneous sensors, data entry/processing mistakes, or imperfect human estimates. We consider general regression settings with covariates and a potentially corrupted response whose observed values may contain errors. By accounting for various uncertainties, we introduced veracity scores that distinguish between genuine errors and natural data fluctuations, conditioned on the available covariate information in the dataset. We propose a simple yet efficient filtering procedure for eliminating potential errors, and establish theoretical guarantees for our method. We also contribute a new error detection benchmark involving 5 regression datasets with real-world numerical errors (for which the true values are also known). In this benchmark and additional simulation studies, our method identifies incorrect values with better precision/recall than other approaches.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities given chain-of-thought prompts (examples with intermediate reasoning steps). Existing benchmarks measure reasoning ability indirectly, by evaluating accuracy on downstream tasks such as mathematical reasoning. However, it is unclear how these models obtain the answers and whether they rely on simple heuristics rather than the generated chain-of-thought. To enable systematic exploration of the reasoning ability of LLMs, we present a new synthetic question-answering dataset called PrOntoQA, where each example is generated from a synthetic world model represented in first-order logic. This allows us to parse the generated chain-of-thought into symbolic proofs for formal analysis. Our analysis on InstructGPT and GPT-3 shows that LLMs are quite capable of making correct individual deduction steps, and so are generally capable of reasoning, even in fictional contexts. However, they have difficulty with proof planning: When multiple valid deduction steps are available, they are not able to systematically explore the different options.

Large language models (LLMs) have become mainstream technology with their versatile use cases and impressive performance. Despite the countless out-of-the-box applications, LLMs are still not reliable. A lot of work is being done to improve the factual accuracy, consistency, and ethical standards of these models through fine-tuning, prompting, and Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), but no systematic analysis of the responses of these models to different categories of statements, or on their potential vulnerabilities to simple prompting changes is available. In this work, we analyze what confuses GPT-3: how the model responds to certain sensitive topics and what effects the prompt wording has on the model response. We find that GPT-3 correctly disagrees with obvious Conspiracies and Stereotypes but makes mistakes with common Misconceptions and Controversies. The model responses are inconsistent across prompts and settings, highlighting GPT-3's unreliability. Dataset and code of our analysis is available in https://github.com/tanny411/GPT3-Reliability-Check.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Retrieval-augmented language models (RALMs) represent a substantial advancement in the capabilities of large language models, notably in reducing factual hallucination by leveraging external knowledge sources. However, the reliability of the retrieved information is not always guaranteed. The retrieval of irrelevant data can lead to misguided responses, and potentially causing the model to overlook its inherent knowledge, even when it possesses adequate information to address the query. Moreover, standard RALMs often struggle to assess whether they possess adequate knowledge, both intrinsic and retrieved, to provide an accurate answer. In situations where knowledge is lacking, these systems should ideally respond with "unknown" when the answer is unattainable. In response to these challenges, we introduces Chain-of-Noting (CoN), a novel approach aimed at improving the robustness of RALMs in facing noisy, irrelevant documents and in handling unknown scenarios. The core idea of CoN is to generate sequential reading notes for retrieved documents, enabling a thorough evaluation of their relevance to the given question and integrating this information to formulate the final answer. We employed ChatGPT to create training data for CoN, which was subsequently trained on an LLaMa-2 7B model. Our experiments across four open-domain QA benchmarks show that RALMs equipped with CoN significantly outperform standard RALMs. Notably, CoN achieves an average improvement of +7.9 in EM score given entirely noisy retrieved documents and +10.5 in rejection rates for real-time questions that fall outside the pre-training knowledge scope.

Counterfactual explanations are attracting significant attention due to the flourishing applications of machine learning models in consequential domains. A counterfactual plan consists of multiple possibilities to modify a given instance so that the model's prediction will be altered. As the predictive model can be updated subject to the future arrival of new data, a counterfactual plan may become ineffective or infeasible with respect to the future values of the model parameters. In this work, we study the counterfactual plans under model uncertainty, in which the distribution of the model parameters is partially prescribed using only the first- and second-moment information. First, we propose an uncertainty quantification tool to compute the lower and upper bounds of the probability of validity for any given counterfactual plan. We then provide corrective methods to adjust the counterfactual plan to improve the validity measure. The numerical experiments validate our bounds and demonstrate that our correction increases the robustness of the counterfactual plans in different real-world datasets.

Automated scoring engines are increasingly being used to score the free-form text responses that students give to questions. Such engines are not designed to appropriately deal with responses that a human reader would find alarming such as those that indicate an intention to self-harm or harm others, responses that allude to drug abuse or sexual abuse or any response that would elicit concern for the student writing the response. Our neural network models have been designed to help identify these anomalous responses from a large collection of typical responses that students give. The responses identified by the neural network can be assessed for urgency, severity, and validity more quickly by a team of reviewers than otherwise possible. Given the anomalous nature of these types of responses, our goal is to maximize the chance of flagging these responses for review given the constraint that only a fixed percentage of responses can viably be assessed by a team of reviewers.

Machine learning systems are known to be sensitive to spurious correlations between biased features of the inputs (e.g., background, texture, and secondary objects) and the corresponding labels. These features and their correlations with the labels are known as "spurious" because they tend to change with shifts in real-world data distributions, which can negatively impact the model's generalization and robustness. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of this issue, along with a taxonomy of current state-of-the-art methods for addressing spurious correlations in machine learning models. Additionally, we summarize existing datasets, benchmarks, and metrics to aid future research. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent advancements and future research challenges in this field, aiming to provide valuable insights for researchers in the related domains.

When language models correctly parse "The cat that the dog chased meowed," are they analyzing syntax or simply familiar with dogs chasing cats? Despite extensive benchmarking, we lack methods to distinguish structural understanding from semantic pattern matching. We introduce CenterBench, a dataset of 9,720 comprehension questions on center-embedded sentences (like "The cat [that the dog chased] meowed") where relative clauses nest recursively, creating processing demands from simple to deeply nested structures. Each sentence has a syntactically identical but semantically implausible counterpart (e.g., mailmen prescribe medicine, doctors deliver mail) and six comprehension questions testing surface understanding, syntactic dependencies, and causal reasoning. Testing six models reveals that performance gaps between plausible and implausible sentences widen systematically with complexity, with models showing median gaps up to 26.8 percentage points, quantifying when they abandon structural analysis for semantic associations. Notably, semantic plausibility harms performance on questions about resulting actions, where following causal relationships matters more than semantic coherence. Reasoning models improve accuracy but their traces show semantic shortcuts, overthinking, and answer refusal. Unlike models whose plausibility advantage systematically widens with complexity, humans shows variable semantic effects. CenterBench provides the first framework to identify when models shift from structural analysis to pattern matching.

Large language models (LLM) have achieved impressive performance on medical question-answering benchmarks. However, high benchmark accuracy does not imply that the performance generalizes to real-world clinical settings. Medical question-answering benchmarks rely on assumptions consistent with quantifying LLM performance but that may not hold in the open world of the clinic. Yet LLMs learn broad knowledge that can help the LLM generalize to practical conditions regardless of unrealistic assumptions in celebrated benchmarks. We seek to quantify how well LLM medical question-answering benchmark performance generalizes when benchmark assumptions are violated. Specifically, we present an adversarial method that we call MedFuzz (for medical fuzzing). MedFuzz attempts to modify benchmark questions in ways aimed at confounding the LLM. We demonstrate the approach by targeting strong assumptions about patient characteristics presented in the MedQA benchmark. Successful "attacks" modify a benchmark item in ways that would be unlikely to fool a medical expert but nonetheless "trick" the LLM into changing from a correct to an incorrect answer. Further, we present a permutation test technique that can ensure a successful attack is statistically significant. We show how to use performance on a "MedFuzzed" benchmark, as well as individual successful attacks. The methods show promise at providing insights into the ability of an LLM to operate robustly in more realistic settings.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Benchmarks shape progress in AI research. A useful benchmark should be both difficult and realistic: questions should challenge frontier models while also reflecting real-world usage. Yet, current paradigms face a difficulty-realism tension: exam-style benchmarks are often made artificially difficult with limited real-world value, while benchmarks based on real user interaction often skew toward easy, high-frequency problems. In this work, we explore a radically different paradigm: assessing models on unsolved questions. Rather than a static benchmark scored once, we curate unsolved questions and evaluate models asynchronously over time with validator-assisted screening and community verification. We introduce UQ, a testbed of 500 challenging, diverse questions sourced from Stack Exchange, spanning topics from CS theory and math to sci-fi and history, probing capabilities including reasoning, factuality, and browsing. UQ is difficult and realistic by construction: unsolved questions are often hard and naturally arise when humans seek answers, thus solving them yields direct real-world value. Our contributions are threefold: (1) UQ-Dataset and its collection pipeline combining rule-based filters, LLM judges, and human review to ensure question quality (e.g., well-defined and difficult); (2) UQ-Validators, compound validation strategies that leverage the generator-validator gap to provide evaluation signals and pre-screen candidate solutions for human review; and (3) UQ-Platform, an open platform where experts collectively verify questions and solutions. The top model passes UQ-validation on only 15% of questions, and preliminary human verification has already identified correct answers among those that passed. UQ charts a path for evaluating frontier models on real-world, open-ended challenges, where success pushes the frontier of human knowledge. We release UQ at https://uq.stanford.edu.

The remarkable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have not rendered them immune to challenges, particularly in the context of handling deceptive information in prompts, thus producing hallucinated responses under such conditions. To quantitatively assess this vulnerability, we present MAD-Bench, a carefully curated benchmark that contains 850 test samples divided into 6 categories, such as non-existent objects, count of objects, spatial relationship, and visual confusion. We provide a comprehensive analysis of popular MLLMs, ranging from GPT-4V, Gemini-Pro, to open-sourced models, such as LLaVA-1.5 and CogVLM. Empirically, we observe significant performance gaps between GPT-4V and other models; and previous robust instruction-tuned models, such as LRV-Instruction and LLaVA-RLHF, are not effective on this new benchmark. While GPT-4V achieves 75.02% accuracy on MAD-Bench, the accuracy of any other model in our experiments ranges from 5% to 35%. We further propose a remedy that adds an additional paragraph to the deceptive prompts to encourage models to think twice before answering the question. Surprisingly, this simple method can even double the accuracy; however, the absolute numbers are still too low to be satisfactory. We hope MAD-Bench can serve as a valuable benchmark to stimulate further research to enhance models' resilience against deceptive prompts.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance on tasks ranging from visual question answering to video understanding. However, existing studies have concentrated mainly on visual-textual misalignment, leaving largely unexplored the MLLMs' ability to preserve an originally correct answer when confronted with misleading information. We reveal a response uncertainty phenomenon: across nine standard datasets, twelve state-of-the-art open-source MLLMs overturn a previously correct answer in 65% of cases after receiving a single deceptive cue. To systematically quantify this vulnerability, we propose a two-stage evaluation pipeline: (1) elicit each model's original response on unperturbed inputs; (2) inject explicit (false-answer hints) and implicit (contextual contradictions) misleading instructions, and compute the misleading rate - the fraction of correct-to-incorrect flips. Leveraging the most susceptible examples, we curate the Multimodal Uncertainty Benchmark (MUB), a collection of image-question pairs stratified into low, medium, and high difficulty based on how many of twelve state-of-the-art MLLMs they mislead. Extensive evaluation on twelve open-source and five closed-source models reveals a high uncertainty: average misleading rates exceed 86%, with explicit cues over 67.19% and implicit cues over 80.67%. To reduce the misleading rate, we then fine-tune all open-source MLLMs on a compact 2000-sample mixed-instruction dataset, reducing misleading rates to 6.97% (explicit) and 32.77% (implicit), boosting consistency by nearly 29.37% on highly deceptive inputs, and slightly improving accuracy on standard benchmarks. Our code is available at https://github.com/Yunkaidang/uncertainty

Language model users often issue queries that lack specification, where the context under which a query was issued -- such as the user's identity, the query's intent, and the criteria for a response to be useful -- is not explicit. For instance, a good response to a subjective query like "What book should I read next?" would depend on the user's preferences, and a good response to an open-ended query like "How do antibiotics work against bacteria?" would depend on the user's expertise. This makes evaluation of responses to such queries an ill-posed task, as evaluators may make arbitrary judgments about the response quality. To remedy this, we present contextualized evaluations, a protocol that synthetically constructs context surrounding an underspecified query and provides it during evaluation. We find that the presence of context can 1) alter conclusions drawn from evaluation, even flipping win rates between model pairs, 2) nudge evaluators to make fewer judgments based on surface-level criteria, like style, and 3) provide new insights about model behavior across diverse contexts. Specifically, our procedure uncovers an implicit bias towards WEIRD contexts in models' "default" responses and we find that models are not equally sensitive to following different contexts, even when they are provided in prompts.

A major issue with using deep learning models in sensitive applications is that they provide no explanation for their output. To address this problem, unsupervised selective rationalization produces rationales alongside predictions by chaining two jointly-trained components, a rationale generator and a predictor. Although this architecture guarantees that the prediction relies solely on the rationale, it does not ensure that the rationale contains a plausible explanation for the prediction. We introduce a novel training technique that effectively limits generation of implausible rationales by injecting noise between the generator and the predictor. Furthermore, we propose a new benchmark for evaluating unsupervised selective rationalization models using movie reviews from existing datasets. We achieve sizeable improvements in rationale plausibility and task accuracy over the state-of-the-art across a variety of tasks, including our new benchmark, while maintaining or improving model faithfulness.

Large language models (LLMs) are notorious for hallucinating, i.e., producing erroneous claims in their output. Such hallucinations can be dangerous, as occasional factual inaccuracies in the generated text might be obscured by the rest of the output being generally factual, making it extremely hard for the users to spot them. Current services that leverage LLMs usually do not provide any means for detecting unreliable generations. Here, we aim to bridge this gap. In particular, we propose a novel fact-checking and hallucination detection pipeline based on token-level uncertainty quantification. Uncertainty scores leverage information encapsulated in the output of a neural network or its layers to detect unreliable predictions, and we show that they can be used to fact-check the atomic claims in the LLM output. Moreover, we present a novel token-level uncertainty quantification method that removes the impact of uncertainty about what claim to generate on the current step and what surface form to use. Our method Claim Conditioned Probability (CCP) measures only the uncertainty of particular claim value expressed by the model. Experiments on the task of biography generation demonstrate strong improvements for CCP compared to the baselines for six different LLMs and three languages. Human evaluation reveals that the fact-checking pipeline based on uncertainty quantification is competitive with a fact-checking tool that leverages external knowledge.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

When AI systems explain their reasoning step-by-step, practitioners often assume these explanations reveal what actually influenced the AI's answer. We tested this assumption by embedding hints into questions and measuring whether models mentioned them. In a study of over 9,000 test cases across 11 leading AI models, we found a troubling pattern: models almost never mention hints spontaneously, yet when asked directly, they admit noticing them. This suggests models see influential information but choose not to report it. Telling models they are being watched does not help. Forcing models to report hints works, but causes them to report hints even when none exist and reduces their accuracy. We also found that hints appealing to user preferences are especially dangerous-models follow them most often while reporting them least. These findings suggest that simply watching AI reasoning is not enough to catch hidden influences.

As large language models (LLMs) have been deployed in various real-world settings, concerns about the harm they may propagate have grown. Various jailbreaking techniques have been developed to expose the vulnerabilities of these models and improve their safety. This work reveals that many state-of-the-art LLMs are vulnerable to malicious requests hidden behind scientific language. Specifically, our experiments with GPT4o, GPT4o-mini, GPT-4, LLama3-405B-Instruct, Llama3-70B-Instruct, Cohere, Gemini models demonstrate that, the models' biases and toxicity substantially increase when prompted with requests that deliberately misinterpret social science and psychological studies as evidence supporting the benefits of stereotypical biases. Alarmingly, these models can also be manipulated to generate fabricated scientific arguments claiming that biases are beneficial, which can be used by ill-intended actors to systematically jailbreak these strong LLMs. Our analysis studies various factors that contribute to the models' vulnerabilities to malicious requests in academic language. Mentioning author names and venues enhances the persuasiveness of models, and the bias scores increase as dialogues progress. Our findings call for a more careful investigation on the use of scientific data for training LLMs.

Crowdsourcing has emerged as an effective platform for labeling large amounts of data in a cost- and time-efficient manner. Most previous work has focused on designing an efficient algorithm to recover only the ground-truth labels of the data. In this paper, we consider multi-choice crowdsourcing tasks with the goal of recovering not only the ground truth, but also the most confusing answer and the confusion probability. The most confusing answer provides useful information about the task by revealing the most plausible answer other than the ground truth and how plausible it is. To theoretically analyze such scenarios, we propose a model in which there are the top two plausible answers for each task, distinguished from the rest of the choices. Task difficulty is quantified by the probability of confusion between the top two, and worker reliability is quantified by the probability of giving an answer among the top two. Under this model, we propose a two-stage inference algorithm to infer both the top two answers and the confusion probability. We show that our algorithm achieves the minimax optimal convergence rate. We conduct both synthetic and real data experiments and demonstrate that our algorithm outperforms other recent algorithms. We also show the applicability of our algorithms in inferring the difficulty of tasks and in training neural networks with top-two soft labels.

Despite the recent proliferation of large language models (LLMs), their training recipes -- model architecture, pre-training data and optimization algorithm -- are often very similar. This naturally raises the question of the similarity among the resulting models. In this paper, we propose a novel setting, imaginary question answering (IQA), to better understand model similarity. In IQA, we ask one model to generate purely imaginary questions (e.g., on completely made-up concepts in physics) and prompt another model to answer. Surprisingly, despite the total fictionality of these questions, all models can answer each other's questions with remarkable success, suggesting a "shared imagination space" in which these models operate during such hallucinations. We conduct a series of investigations into this phenomenon and discuss implications on model homogeneity, hallucination, and computational creativity.

In this study, we tackle a growing concern around the safety and ethical use of large language models (LLMs). Despite their potential, these models can be tricked into producing harmful or unethical content through various sophisticated methods, including 'jailbreaking' techniques and targeted manipulation. Our work zeroes in on a specific issue: to what extent LLMs can be led astray by asking them to generate responses that are instruction-centric such as a pseudocode, a program or a software snippet as opposed to vanilla text. To investigate this question, we introduce TechHazardQA, a dataset containing complex queries which should be answered in both text and instruction-centric formats (e.g., pseudocodes), aimed at identifying triggers for unethical responses. We query a series of LLMs -- Llama-2-13b, Llama-2-7b, Mistral-V2 and Mistral 8X7B -- and ask them to generate both text and instruction-centric responses. For evaluation we report the harmfulness score metric as well as judgements from GPT-4 and humans. Overall, we observe that asking LLMs to produce instruction-centric responses enhances the unethical response generation by ~2-38% across the models. As an additional objective, we investigate the impact of model editing using the ROME technique, which further increases the propensity for generating undesirable content. In particular, asking edited LLMs to generate instruction-centric responses further increases the unethical response generation by ~3-16% across the different models.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.