Daily Papers

Drone detection is a challenging object detection task where visibility conditions and quality of the images may be unfavorable, and detections might become difficult due to complex backgrounds, small visible objects, and hard to distinguish objects. Both provide high confidence for drone detections, and eliminating false detections requires efficient algorithms and approaches. Our previous work, which uses YOLOv5, uses both real and synthetic data and a Kalman-based tracker to track the detections and increase their confidence using temporal information. Our current work improves on the previous approach by combining several improvements. We used a more diverse dataset combining multiple sources and combined with synthetic samples chosen from a large synthetic dataset based on the error analysis of the base model. Also, to obtain more resilient confidence scores for objects, we introduced a classification component that discriminates whether the object is a drone or not. Finally, we developed a more advanced scoring algorithm for object tracking that we use to adjust localization confidence. Furthermore, the proposed technique won 1st Place in the Drone vs. Bird Challenge (Workshop on Small-Drone Surveillance, Detection and Counteraction Techniques at ICIAP 2021).

The burgeoning capabilities of advanced large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have led to an increase in synthetic content generation with implications across a variety of sectors, including media, cybersecurity, public discourse, and education. As such, the ability to detect LLMs-generated content has become of paramount importance. We aim to provide a detailed overview of existing detection strategies and benchmarks, scrutinizing their differences and identifying key challenges and prospects in the field, advocating for more adaptable and robust models to enhance detection accuracy. We also posit the necessity for a multi-faceted approach to defend against various attacks to counter the rapidly advancing capabilities of LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first comprehensive survey on the detection in the era of LLMs. We hope it will provide a broad understanding of the current landscape of LLMs-generated content detection, offering a guiding reference for researchers and practitioners striving to uphold the integrity of digital information in an era increasingly dominated by synthetic content. The relevant papers are summarized and will be consistently updated at https://github.com/Xianjun-Yang/Awesome_papers_on_LLMs_detection.git.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with [email protected] as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

Detecting text generated by large language models (LLMs) is of great recent interest. With zero-shot methods like DetectGPT, detection capabilities have reached impressive levels. However, the reliability of existing detectors in real-world applications remains underexplored. In this study, we present a new benchmark, DetectRL, highlighting that even state-of-the-art (SOTA) detection techniques still underperformed in this task. We collected human-written datasets from domains where LLMs are particularly prone to misuse. Using popular LLMs, we generated data that better aligns with real-world applications. Unlike previous studies, we employed heuristic rules to create adversarial LLM-generated text, simulating advanced prompt usages, human revisions like word substitutions, and writing errors. Our development of DetectRL reveals the strengths and limitations of current SOTA detectors. More importantly, we analyzed the potential impact of writing styles, model types, attack methods, the text lengths, and real-world human writing factors on different types of detectors. We believe DetectRL could serve as an effective benchmark for assessing detectors in real-world scenarios, evolving with advanced attack methods, thus providing more stressful evaluation to drive the development of more efficient detectors. Data and code are publicly available at: https://github.com/NLP2CT/DetectRL.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

The misuse of large language models (LLMs), such as academic plagiarism, has driven the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. To bypass these detectors, paraphrase attacks have emerged to purposely rewrite these texts to evade detection. Despite the success, existing methods require substantial data and computational budgets to train a specialized paraphraser, and their attack efficacy greatly reduces when faced with advanced detection algorithms. To address this, we propose Contrastive Paraphrase Attack (CoPA), a training-free method that effectively deceives text detectors using off-the-shelf LLMs. The first step is to carefully craft instructions that encourage LLMs to produce more human-like texts. Nonetheless, we observe that the inherent statistical biases of LLMs can still result in some generated texts carrying certain machine-like attributes that can be captured by detectors. To overcome this, CoPA constructs an auxiliary machine-like word distribution as a contrast to the human-like distribution generated by the LLM. By subtracting the machine-like patterns from the human-like distribution during the decoding process, CoPA is able to produce sentences that are less discernible by text detectors. Our theoretical analysis suggests the superiority of the proposed attack. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of CoPA in fooling text detectors across various scenarios.

Search agents connect LLMs to the Internet, enabling access to broader and more up-to-date information. However, unreliable search results may also pose safety threats to end users, establishing a new threat surface. In this work, we conduct two in-the-wild experiments to demonstrate both the prevalence of low-quality search results and their potential to misguide agent behaviors. To counter this threat, we introduce an automated red-teaming framework that is systematic, scalable, and cost-efficient, enabling lightweight and harmless safety assessments of search agents. Building on this framework, we construct the SafeSearch benchmark, which includes 300 test cases covering five categories of risks (e.g., misinformation and indirect prompt injection). Using this benchmark, we evaluate three representative search agent scaffolds, covering search workflow, tool-calling, and deep research, across 7 proprietary and 8 open-source backend LLMs. Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities of LLM-based search agents: when exposed to unreliable websites, the highest ASR reached 90.5% for GPT-4.1-mini under a search workflow setting. Moreover, our analysis highlights the limited effectiveness of common defense practices, such as reminder prompting. This emphasizes the value of our framework in promoting transparency for safer agent development. Our codebase and test cases are publicly available: https://github.com/jianshuod/SafeSearch.

Since the proliferation of LLMs, there have been concerns about their misuse for harmful content creation and spreading. Recent studies justify such fears, providing evidence of LLM vulnerabilities and high potential of their misuse. Humans are no longer able to distinguish between high-quality machine-generated and authentic human-written texts. Therefore, it is crucial to develop automated means to accurately detect machine-generated content. It would enable to identify such content in online information space, thus providing an additional information about its credibility. This work addresses the problem by proposing a robust fine-tuning process of LLMs for the detection task, making the detectors more robust against obfuscation and more generalizable to out-of-distribution data.

Visual counterfeits are increasingly causing an existential conundrum in mainstream media with rapid evolution in neural image synthesis methods. Though detection of such counterfeits has been a taxing problem in the image forensics community, a recent class of forensic detectors -- universal detectors -- are able to surprisingly spot counterfeit images regardless of generator architectures, loss functions, training datasets, and resolutions. This intriguing property suggests the possible existence of transferable forensic features (T-FF) in universal detectors. In this work, we conduct the first analytical study to discover and understand T-FF in universal detectors. Our contributions are 2-fold: 1) We propose a novel forensic feature relevance statistic (FF-RS) to quantify and discover T-FF in universal detectors and, 2) Our qualitative and quantitative investigations uncover an unexpected finding: color is a critical T-FF in universal detectors. Code and models are available at https://keshik6.github.io/transferable-forensic-features/

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

Generative models are rapidly gaining popularity and being integrated into everyday applications, raising concerns over their safe use as various vulnerabilities are exposed. In light of this, the field of red teaming is undergoing fast-paced growth, highlighting the need for a comprehensive survey covering the entire pipeline and addressing emerging topics. Our extensive survey, which examines over 120 papers, introduces a taxonomy of fine-grained attack strategies grounded in the inherent capabilities of language models. Additionally, we have developed the "searcher" framework to unify various automatic red teaming approaches. Moreover, our survey covers novel areas including multimodal attacks and defenses, risks around LLM-based agents, overkill of harmless queries, and the balance between harmlessness and helpfulness.

Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) was shown to be vulnerable to patch-based data poisoning backdoor attacks. It was shown that an adversary can poison a small part of the unlabeled data so that when a victim trains an SSL model on it, the final model will have a backdoor that the adversary can exploit. This work aims to defend self-supervised learning against such attacks. We use a three-step defense pipeline, where we first train a model on the poisoned data. In the second step, our proposed defense algorithm (PatchSearch) uses the trained model to search the training data for poisoned samples and removes them from the training set. In the third step, a final model is trained on the cleaned-up training set. Our results show that PatchSearch is an effective defense. As an example, it improves a model's accuracy on images containing the trigger from 38.2% to 63.7% which is very close to the clean model's accuracy, 64.6%. Moreover, we show that PatchSearch outperforms baselines and state-of-the-art defense approaches including those using additional clean, trusted data. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCDvision/PatchSearch

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

Dense retrieval systems have been widely used in various NLP applications. However, their vulnerabilities to potential attacks have been underexplored. This paper investigates a novel attack scenario where the attackers aim to mislead the retrieval system into retrieving the attacker-specified contents. Those contents, injected into the retrieval corpus by attackers, can include harmful text like hate speech or spam. Unlike prior methods that rely on model weights and generate conspicuous, unnatural outputs, we propose a covert backdoor attack triggered by grammar errors. Our approach ensures that the attacked models can function normally for standard queries while covertly triggering the retrieval of the attacker's contents in response to minor linguistic mistakes. Specifically, dense retrievers are trained with contrastive loss and hard negative sampling. Surprisingly, our findings demonstrate that contrastive loss is notably sensitive to grammatical errors, and hard negative sampling can exacerbate susceptibility to backdoor attacks. Our proposed method achieves a high attack success rate with a minimal corpus poisoning rate of only 0.048\%, while preserving normal retrieval performance. This indicates that the method has negligible impact on user experience for error-free queries. Furthermore, evaluations across three real-world defense strategies reveal that the malicious passages embedded within the corpus remain highly resistant to detection and filtering, underscoring the robustness and subtlety of the proposed attack Codes of this work are available at https://github.com/ruyue0001/Backdoor_DPR..

The increasing popularity of large language models has not only led to widespread use but has also brought various risks, including the potential for systematically spreading fake news. Consequently, the development of classification systems such as DetectGPT has become vital. These detectors are vulnerable to evasion techniques, as demonstrated in an experimental series: Systematic changes of the generative models' temperature proofed shallow learning-detectors to be the least reliable. Fine-tuning the generative model via reinforcement learning circumvented BERT-based-detectors. Finally, rephrasing led to a >90\% evasion of zero-shot-detectors like DetectGPT, although texts stayed highly similar to the original. A comparison with existing work highlights the better performance of the presented methods. Possible implications for society and further research are discussed.

Deceptive patterns in digital interfaces manipulate users into making unintended decisions, exploiting cognitive biases and psychological vulnerabilities. These patterns have become ubiquitous on various digital platforms. While efforts to mitigate deceptive patterns have emerged from legal and technical perspectives, a significant gap remains in creating usable and scalable solutions. We introduce our AutoBot framework to address this gap and help web stakeholders navigate and mitigate online deceptive patterns. AutoBot accurately identifies and localizes deceptive patterns from a screenshot of a website without relying on the underlying HTML code. AutoBot employs a two-stage pipeline that leverages the capabilities of specialized vision models to analyze website screenshots, identify interactive elements, and extract textual features. Next, using a large language model, AutoBot understands the context surrounding these elements to determine the presence of deceptive patterns. We also use AutoBot, to create a synthetic dataset to distill knowledge from 'teacher' LLMs to smaller language models. Through extensive evaluation, we demonstrate AutoBot's effectiveness in detecting deceptive patterns on the web, achieving an F1-score of 0.93 when detecting deceptive patterns, underscoring its potential as an essential tool for mitigating online deceptive patterns. We implement AutoBot, across three downstream applications targeting different web stakeholders: (1) a local browser extension providing users with real-time feedback, (2) a Lighthouse audit to inform developers of potential deceptive patterns on their sites, and (3) as a measurement tool designed for researchers and regulators.

We have witnessed lately a rapid proliferation of advanced Large Language Models (LLMs) capable of generating high-quality text. While these LLMs have revolutionized text generation across various domains, they also pose significant risks to the information ecosystem, such as the potential for generating convincing propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation at scale. This paper offers a review of AI-generated text forensic systems, an emerging field addressing the challenges of LLM misuses. We present an overview of the existing efforts in AI-generated text forensics by introducing a detailed taxonomy, focusing on three primary pillars: detection, attribution, and characterization. These pillars enable a practical understanding of AI-generated text, from identifying AI-generated content (detection), determining the specific AI model involved (attribution), and grouping the underlying intents of the text (characterization). Furthermore, we explore available resources for AI-generated text forensics research and discuss the evolving challenges and future directions of forensic systems in an AI era.

We demonstrate how AI agents can coordinate to deceive oversight systems using automated interpretability of neural networks. Using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) as our experimental framework, we show that language models (Llama, DeepSeek R1, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet) can generate deceptive explanations that evade detection. Our agents employ steganographic methods to hide information in seemingly innocent explanations, successfully fooling oversight models while achieving explanation quality comparable to reference labels. We further find that models can scheme to develop deceptive strategies when they believe the detection of harmful features might lead to negative consequences for themselves. All tested LLM agents were capable of deceiving the overseer while achieving high interpretability scores comparable to those of reference labels. We conclude by proposing mitigation strategies, emphasizing the critical need for robust understanding and defenses against deception.

Over the years, adversarial attempts against critical services have become more effective and sophisticated in launching low-profile attacks. This trend has always been concerning. However, an even more alarming trend is the increasing difficulty of collecting relevant evidence about these attacks and the involved threat actors in the early stages before significant damage is done. This issue puts defenders at a significant disadvantage, as it becomes exceedingly difficult to understand the attack details and formulate an appropriate response. Developing robust forensics tools to collect evidence about modern threats has never been easy. One main challenge is to provide a robust trade-off between achieving sufficient visibility while leaving minimal detectable artifacts. This paper will introduce LASE, an open-source Low-Artifact Forensics Engine to perform threat analysis and forensics in Windows operating system. LASE augments current analysis tools by providing detailed, system-wide monitoring capabilities while minimizing detectable artifacts. We designed multiple deployment scenarios, showing LASE's potential in evidence gathering and threat reasoning in a real-world setting. By making LASE and its execution trace data available to the broader research community, this work encourages further exploration in the field by reducing the engineering costs for threat analysis and building a longitudinal behavioral analysis catalog for diverse security domains.

Websites use third-party ads and tracking services to deliver targeted ads and collect information about users that visit them. These services put users' privacy at risk, and that is why users' demand for blocking these services is growing. Most of the blocking solutions rely on crowd-sourced filter lists manually maintained by a large community of users. In this work, we seek to simplify the update of these filter lists by combining different websites through a large-scale graph connecting all resource requests made over a large set of sites. The features of this graph are extracted and used to train a machine learning algorithm with the aim of detecting ads and tracking resources. As our approach combines different information sources, it is more robust toward evasion techniques that use obfuscation or changing the usage patterns. We evaluate our work over the Alexa top-10K websites and find its accuracy to be 96.1% biased and 90.9% unbiased with high precision and recall. It can also block new ads and tracking services, which would necessitate being blocked by further crowd-sourced existing filter lists. Moreover, the approach followed in this paper sheds light on the ecosystem of third-party tracking and advertising.

This research explores the integration of large language models (LLMs) into scientific data assimilation, focusing on combustion science as a case study. Leveraging foundational models integrated with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) framework, the study introduces an approach to process diverse combustion research data, spanning experimental studies, simulations, and literature. The multifaceted nature of combustion research emphasizes the critical role of knowledge processing in navigating and extracting valuable information from a vast and diverse pool of sources. The developed approach minimizes computational and economic expenses while optimizing data privacy and accuracy. It incorporates prompt engineering and offline open-source LLMs, offering user autonomy in selecting base models. The study provides a thorough examination of text segmentation strategies, conducts comparative studies between LLMs, and explores various optimized prompts to demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework. By incorporating an external database, the framework outperforms a conventional LLM in generating accurate responses and constructing robust arguments. Additionally, the study delves into the investigation of optimized prompt templates for the purpose of efficient extraction of scientific literature. The research addresses concerns related to hallucinations and false research articles by introducing a custom workflow developed with a detection algorithm to filter out inaccuracies. Despite identified areas for improvement, the framework consistently delivers accurate domain-specific responses with minimal human oversight. The prompt-agnostic approach introduced holds promise for future deliberations. The study underscores the significance of integrating LLMs and knowledge processing techniques in scientific research, providing a foundation for advancements in data assimilation and utilization.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

In recent years there has been a shift from heuristics-based malware detection towards machine learning, which proves to be more robust in the current heavily adversarial threat landscape. While we acknowledge machine learning to be better equipped to mine for patterns in the increasingly high amounts of similar-looking files, we also note a remarkable scarcity of the data available for similarity-targeted research. Moreover, we observe that the focus in the few related works falls on quantifying similarity in malware, often overlooking the clean data. This one-sided quantification is especially dangerous in the context of detection bypass. We propose to address the deficiencies in the space of similarity research on binary files, starting from EMBER - one of the largest malware classification data sets. We enhance EMBER with similarity information as well as malware class tags, to enable further research in the similarity space. Our contribution is threefold: (1) we publish EMBERSim, an augmented version of EMBER, that includes similarity-informed tags; (2) we enrich EMBERSim with automatically determined malware class tags using the open-source tool AVClass on VirusTotal data and (3) we describe and share the implementation for our class scoring technique and leaf similarity method.

Crime generates significant losses, both human and economic. Every year, billions of dollars are lost due to attacks, crimes, and scams. Surveillance video camera networks are generating vast amounts of data, and the surveillance staff can not process all the information in real-time. The human sight has its limitations, where the visual focus is among the most critical ones when dealing with surveillance. A crime can occur in a different screen segment or on a distinct monitor, and the staff may not notice it. Our proposal focuses on shoplifting crimes by analyzing special situations that an average person will consider as typical conditions, but may lead to a crime. While other approaches identify the crime itself, we instead model suspicious behavior -- the one that may occur before a person commits a crime -- by detecting precise segments of a video with a high probability to contain a shoplifting crime. By doing so, we provide the staff with more opportunities to act and prevent crime. We implemented a 3DCNN model as a video feature extractor and tested its performance on a dataset composed of daily-action and shoplifting samples. The results are encouraging since it correctly identifies 75% of the cases where a crime is about to happen.

While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9% with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4% and invalidates 99% poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield.

Recent agentic Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) such as GPT-o3 have achieved near-ceiling scores on various existing benchmarks, motivating a demand for more challenging test tasks. These MLLMs have been reported to excel in a few expert-level tasks for humans, e.g., GeoGuesser, reflecting their potential as a detective who can notice minuscule cues in an image and weave them into coherent, situational explanations, leading to a reliable answer. But can they match the performance of excellent human detectives? To answer this question, we investigate some hard scenarios where GPT-o3 can still handle, and find a common scenario where o3's performance drops to nearly zero, which we name CaughtCheating. It is inspired by the social media requests that ask others to detect suspicious clues from photos shared by the poster's partner. We conduct extensive experiments and analysis to understand why existing MLLMs lack sufficient capability to solve this kind of task. CaughtCheating provides a class of challenging visual perception and reasoning tasks with great value and practical usage. Success in these tasks paves the way for MLLMs to acquire human-level detective perception and reasoning capabilities.

The detection and grounding of manipulated content in multimodal data has emerged as a critical challenge in media forensics. While existing benchmarks demonstrate technical progress, they suffer from misalignment artifacts that poorly reflect real-world manipulation patterns: practical attacks typically maintain semantic consistency across modalities, whereas current datasets artificially disrupt cross-modal alignment, creating easily detectable anomalies. To bridge this gap, we pioneer the detection of semantically-coordinated manipulations where visual edits are systematically paired with semantically consistent textual descriptions. Our approach begins with constructing the first Semantic-Aligned Multimodal Manipulation (SAMM) dataset, generated through a two-stage pipeline: 1) applying state-of-the-art image manipulations, followed by 2) generation of contextually-plausible textual narratives that reinforce the visual deception. Building on this foundation, we propose a Retrieval-Augmented Manipulation Detection and Grounding (RamDG) framework. RamDG commences by harnessing external knowledge repositories to retrieve contextual evidence, which serves as the auxiliary texts and encoded together with the inputs through our image forgery grounding and deep manipulation detection modules to trace all manipulations. Extensive experiments demonstrate our framework significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving 2.06\% higher detection accuracy on SAMM compared to state-of-the-art approaches. The dataset and code are publicly available at https://github.com/shen8424/SAMM-RamDG-CAP.

Previous fake speech datasets were constructed from a defender's perspective to develop countermeasure (CM) systems without considering diverse motivations of attackers. To better align with real-life scenarios, we created LlamaPartialSpoof, a 130-hour dataset contains both fully and partially fake speech, using a large language model (LLM) and voice cloning technologies to evaluate the robustness of CMs. By examining information valuable to both attackers and defenders, we identify several key vulnerabilities in current CM systems, which can be exploited to enhance attack success rates, including biases toward certain text-to-speech models or concatenation methods. Our experimental results indicate that current fake speech detection system struggle to generalize to unseen scenarios, achieving a best performance of 24.44% equal error rate.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is being used to search for indicators of attacks that might have compromised an enterprise network for a long time without being discovered. To have a more effective analysis, CTI open standards have incorporated descriptive relationships showing how the indicators or observables are related to each other. However, these relationships are either completely overlooked in information gathering or not used for threat hunting. In this paper, we propose a system, called POIROT, which uses these correlations to uncover the steps of a successful attack campaign. We use kernel audits as a reliable source that covers all causal relations and information flows among system entities and model threat hunting as an inexact graph pattern matching problem. Our technical approach is based on a novel similarity metric which assesses an alignment between a query graph constructed out of CTI correlations and a provenance graph constructed out of kernel audit log records. We evaluate POIROT on publicly released real-world incident reports as well as reports of an adversarial engagement designed by DARPA, including ten distinct attack campaigns against different OS platforms such as Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows. Our evaluation results show that POIROT is capable of searching inside graphs containing millions of nodes and pinpoint the attacks in a few minutes, and the results serve to illustrate that CTI correlations could be used as robust and reliable artifacts for threat hunting.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

Background. The recent surge in phishing attacks keeps undermining the effectiveness of the traditional anti-phishing blacklist approaches. On-device anti-phishing solutions are gaining popularity as they offer faster phishing detection locally. Aim. We aim to eliminate the delay in recognizing and recording phishing campaigns in databases via on-device solutions that identify phishing sites immediately when encountered by the user rather than waiting for a web crawler's scan to finish. Additionally, utilizing operating system-specific resources and frameworks, we aim to minimize the impact on system performance and depend on local processing to protect user privacy. Method. We propose a phishing detection solution that uses a combination of computer vision and on-device machine learning models to analyze websites in real time. Our reference-based approach analyzes the visual content of webpages, identifying phishing attempts through layout analysis, credential input areas detection, and brand impersonation criteria combination. Results. Our case study shows it's feasible to perform background processing on-device continuously, for the case of the web browser requiring the resource use of 16% of a single CPU core and less than 84MB of RAM on Apple M1 while maintaining the accuracy of brand logo detection at 46.6% (comparable with baselines), and of Credential Requiring Page detection at 98.1% (improving the baseline by 3.1%), within the test dataset. Conclusions. Our results demonstrate the potential of on-device, real-time phishing detection systems to enhance cybersecurity defensive technologies and extend the scope of phishing detection to more similar regions of interest, e.g., email clients and messenger windows.

In this paper, we explore strategies to detect and evaluate counterfactual sentences. We describe our system for SemEval-2020 Task 5: Modeling Causal Reasoning in Language: Detecting Counterfactuals. We use a BERT base model for the classification task and build a hybrid BERT Multi-Layer Perceptron system to handle the sequence identification task. Our experiments show that while introducing syntactic and semantic features does little in improving the system in the classification task, using these types of features as cascaded linear inputs to fine-tune the sequence-delimiting ability of the model ensures it outperforms other similar-purpose complex systems like BiLSTM-CRF in the second task. Our system achieves an F1 score of 85.00% in Task 1 and 83.90% in Task 2.

False claims that have been previously fact-checked can still spread on social media. To mitigate their continual spread, detecting previously fact-checked claims is indispensable. Given a claim, existing works focus on providing evidence for detection by reranking candidate fact-checking articles (FC-articles) retrieved by BM25. However, these performances may be limited because they ignore the following characteristics of FC-articles: (1) claims are often quoted to describe the checked events, providing lexical information besides semantics; (2) sentence templates to introduce or debunk claims are common across articles, providing pattern information. Models that ignore the two aspects only leverage semantic relevance and may be misled by sentences that describe similar but irrelevant events. In this paper, we propose a novel reranker, MTM (Memory-enhanced Transformers for Matching) to rank FC-articles using key sentences selected with event (lexical and semantic) and pattern information. For event information, we propose a ROUGE-guided Transformer which is finetuned with regression of ROUGE. For pattern information, we generate pattern vectors for matching with sentences. By fusing event and pattern information, we select key sentences to represent an article and then predict if the article fact-checks the given claim using the claim, key sentences, and patterns. Experiments on two real-world datasets show that MTM outperforms existing methods. Human evaluation proves that MTM can capture key sentences for explanations. The code and the dataset are at https://github.com/ICTMCG/MTM.

Current application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. These LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injection vulnerabilities. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building a detector that can monitor inputs to the LLM and detect attacks, we find that many detectors are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we design the PromptShield benchmark for evaluating practical prompt injection detectors. We also construct a new detector, the PromptShield detector, which achieves significantly better performance at detecting prompt injection attacks than any prior scheme. Our work suggests that larger models, more training data, appropriate metrics, and careful curation of training data can contribute to strong detector performance.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Stealthy hardware Trojans (HTs) inserted during the fabrication of integrated circuits can bypass the security of critical infrastructures. Although researchers have proposed many techniques to detect HTs, several limitations exist, including: (i) a low success rate, (ii) high algorithmic complexity, and (iii) a large number of test patterns. Furthermore, the most pertinent drawback of prior detection techniques stems from an incorrect evaluation methodology, i.e., they assume that an adversary inserts HTs randomly. Such inappropriate adversarial assumptions enable detection techniques to claim high HT detection accuracy, leading to a "false sense of security." Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, despite more than a decade of research on detecting HTs inserted during fabrication, there have been no concerted efforts to perform a systematic evaluation of HT detection techniques. In this paper, we play the role of a realistic adversary and question the efficacy of HT detection techniques by developing an automated, scalable, and practical attack framework, ATTRITION, using reinforcement learning (RL). ATTRITION evades eight detection techniques across two HT detection categories, showcasing its agnostic behavior. ATTRITION achieves average attack success rates of 47times and 211times compared to randomly inserted HTs against state-of-the-art HT detection techniques. We demonstrate ATTRITION's ability to evade detection techniques by evaluating designs ranging from the widely-used academic suites to larger designs such as the open-source MIPS and mor1kx processors to AES and a GPS module. Additionally, we showcase the impact of ATTRITION-generated HTs through two case studies (privilege escalation and kill switch) on the mor1kx processor. We envision that our work, along with our released HT benchmarks and models, fosters the development of better HT detection techniques.

Machine learning and data mining algorithms play important roles in designing intrusion detection systems. Based on their approaches toward the detection of attacks in a network, intrusion detection systems can be broadly categorized into two types. In the misuse detection systems, an attack in a system is detected whenever the sequence of activities in the network matches with a known attack signature. In the anomaly detection approach, on the other hand, anomalous states in a system are identified based on a significant difference in the state transitions of the system from its normal states. This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion on some of the existing schemes of intrusion detection based on misuse detection, anomaly detection and hybrid detection approaches. Some future directions of research in the design of algorithms for intrusion detection are also identified.

AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. To help us understand this change, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a specific vulnerability), and Patch (patching a specific vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \10 to 30,485, and cover 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a specific vulnerability. We evaluate 5 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI, and custom agents with GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Claude Code (5% on Detect, mapping to \1,350), Custom Agent with Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (5% on Detect, mapping to 1,025; 67.5% on Exploit), and OpenAI Codex CLI (5% on Detect, mapping to \2,400; 90% on Patch, mapping to 14,422). OpenAI Codex CLI and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90% and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 32.5% and 57.5% respectively; in contrast, the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 40-67.5% and Patch scores of 45-60%.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will increasingly be used to cause harm as they grow more capable. In fact, AI systems are already starting to be used to automate fraudulent activities, violate human rights, create harmful fake images, and identify dangerous toxins. To prevent some misuses of AI, we argue that targeted interventions on certain capabilities will be warranted. These restrictions may include controlling who can access certain types of AI models, what they can be used for, whether outputs are filtered or can be traced back to their user, and the resources needed to develop them. We also contend that some restrictions on non-AI capabilities needed to cause harm will be required. Though capability restrictions risk reducing use more than misuse (facing an unfavorable Misuse-Use Tradeoff), we argue that interventions on capabilities are warranted when other interventions are insufficient, the potential harm from misuse is high, and there are targeted ways to intervene on capabilities. We provide a taxonomy of interventions that can reduce AI misuse, focusing on the specific steps required for a misuse to cause harm (the Misuse Chain), and a framework to determine if an intervention is warranted. We apply this reasoning to three examples: predicting novel toxins, creating harmful images, and automating spear phishing campaigns.

Moderators and automated methods enforce bans on malicious users who engage in disruptive behavior. However, malicious users can easily create a new account to evade such bans. Previous research has focused on other forms of online deception, like the simultaneous operation of multiple accounts by the same entities (sockpuppetry), impersonation of other individuals, and studying the effects of de-platforming individuals and communities. Here we conduct the first data-driven study of ban evasion, i.e., the act of circumventing bans on an online platform, leading to temporally disjoint operation of accounts by the same user. We curate a novel dataset of 8,551 ban evasion pairs (parent, child) identified on Wikipedia and contrast their behavior with benign users and non-evading malicious users. We find that evasion child accounts demonstrate similarities with respect to their banned parent accounts on several behavioral axes - from similarity in usernames and edited pages to similarity in content added to the platform and its psycholinguistic attributes. We reveal key behavioral attributes of accounts that are likely to evade bans. Based on the insights from the analyses, we train logistic regression classifiers to detect and predict ban evasion at three different points in the ban evasion lifecycle. Results demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in predicting future evaders (AUC = 0.78), early detection of ban evasion (AUC = 0.85), and matching child accounts with parent accounts (MRR = 0.97). Our work can aid moderators by reducing their workload and identifying evasion pairs faster and more efficiently than current manual and heuristic-based approaches. Dataset is available https://github.com/srijankr/ban_evasion{here}.

Despite considerable progress in the development of machine-text detectors, it has been suggested that the problem is inherently hard, and therefore, that stakeholders should proceed under the assumption that machine-generated text cannot be reliably detected as such. We examine a recent such claim by Nicks et al. (2024) regarding the ease with which language models can be optimized to degrade the performance of machine-text detectors, including detectors not specifically optimized against. We identify a feature spacex2013the stylistic feature spacex2013that is robust to such optimization, and show that it may be used to reliably detect samples from language models optimized to prevent detection. Furthermore, we show that even when models are explicitly optimized against stylistic detectors, detection performance remains surprisingly unaffected. We then seek to understand if stylistic detectors are inherently more robust. To study this question, we explore a new paraphrasing approach that simultaneously aims to close the gap between human writing and machine writing in stylistic feature space while avoiding detection using traditional features. We show that when only a single sample is available for detection, this attack is universally effective across all detectors considered, including those that use writing style. However, as the number of samples available for detection grows, the human and machine distributions become distinguishable. This observation encourages us to introduce AURA, a metric that estimates the overlap between human and machine-generated distributions by analyzing how detector performance improves as more samples become available. Overall, our findings underscore previous recommendations to avoid reliance on machine-text detection.

Recent image manipulation localization and detection techniques typically leverage forensic artifacts and traces that are produced by a noise-sensitive filter, such as SRM or Bayar convolution. In this paper, we showcase that different filters commonly used in such approaches excel at unveiling different types of manipulations and provide complementary forensic traces. Thus, we explore ways of combining the outputs of such filters to leverage the complementary nature of the produced artifacts for performing image manipulation localization and detection (IMLD). We assess two distinct combination methods: one that produces independent features from each forensic filter and then fuses them (this is referred to as late fusion) and one that performs early mixing of different modal outputs and produces combined features (this is referred to as early fusion). We use the latter as a feature encoding mechanism, accompanied by a new decoding mechanism that encompasses feature re-weighting, for formulating the proposed MMFusion architecture. We demonstrate that MMFusion achieves competitive performance for both image manipulation localization and detection, outperforming state-of-the-art models across several image and video datasets. We also investigate further the contribution of each forensic filter within MMFusion for addressing different types of manipulations, building on recent AI explainability measures.

To detect the deployment of large language models for malicious use cases (e.g., fake content creation or academic plagiarism), several approaches have recently been proposed for identifying AI-generated text via watermarks or statistical irregularities. How robust are these detection algorithms to paraphrases of AI-generated text? To stress test these detectors, we first train an 11B parameter paraphrase generation model (DIPPER) that can paraphrase paragraphs, optionally leveraging surrounding text (e.g., user-written prompts) as context. DIPPER also uses scalar knobs to control the amount of lexical diversity and reordering in the paraphrases. Paraphrasing text generated by three large language models (including GPT3.5-davinci-003) with DIPPER successfully evades several detectors, including watermarking, GPTZero, DetectGPT, and OpenAI's text classifier. For example, DIPPER drops the detection accuracy of DetectGPT from 70.3% to 4.6% (at a constant false positive rate of 1%), without appreciably modifying the input semantics. To increase the robustness of AI-generated text detection to paraphrase attacks, we introduce a simple defense that relies on retrieving semantically-similar generations and must be maintained by a language model API provider. Given a candidate text, our algorithm searches a database of sequences previously generated by the API, looking for sequences that match the candidate text within a certain threshold. We empirically verify our defense using a database of 15M generations from a fine-tuned T5-XXL model and find that it can detect 80% to 97% of paraphrased generations across different settings, while only classifying 1% of human-written sequences as AI-generated. We will open source our code, model and data for future research.

The generations of large language models are commonly controlled through prompting techniques, where a user's query to the model is prefixed with a prompt that aims to guide the model's behaviour on the query. The prompts used by companies to guide their models are often treated as secrets, to be hidden from the user making the query. They have even been treated as commodities to be bought and sold. However, there has been anecdotal evidence showing that the prompts can be extracted by a user even when they are kept secret. In this paper, we present a framework for systematically measuring the success of prompt extraction attacks. In experiments with multiple sources of prompts and multiple underlying language models, we find that simple text-based attacks can in fact reveal prompts with high probability.

Motivated by ethical and legal concerns, the scientific community is actively developing methods to limit the misuse of Text-to-Image diffusion models for reproducing copyrighted, violent, explicit, or personal information in the generated images. Simultaneously, researchers put these newly developed safety measures to the test by assuming the role of an adversary to find vulnerabilities and backdoors in them. We use compositional property of diffusion models, which allows to leverage multiple prompts in a single image generation. This property allows us to combine other concepts, that should not have been affected by the inhibition, to reconstruct the vector, responsible for target concept generation, even though the direct computation of this vector is no longer accessible. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence why the proposed attacks are possible and discuss the implications of these findings for safe model deployment. We argue that it is essential to consider all possible approaches to image generation with diffusion models that can be employed by an adversary. Our work opens up the discussion about the implications of concept arithmetics and compositional inference for safety mechanisms in diffusion models. Content Advisory: This paper contains discussions and model-generated content that may be considered offensive. Reader discretion is advised. Project page: https://cs-people.bu.edu/vpetsiuk/arc

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) incidents stemming from the exploitation of smart contract vulnerabilities have culminated in financial damages exceeding 3 billion US dollars. Existing defense mechanisms typically focus on detecting and reacting to malicious transactions executed by attackers that target victim contracts. However, with the emergence of private transaction pools where transactions are sent directly to miners without first appearing in public mempools, current detection tools face significant challenges in identifying attack activities effectively. Based on the fact that most attack logic rely on deploying one or more intermediate smart contracts as supporting components to the exploitation of victim contracts, in this paper, we propose a new direction for detecting DeFi attacks that focuses on identifying adversarial contracts instead of adversarial transactions. Our approach allows us to leverage common attack patterns, code semantics and intrinsic characteristics found in malicious smart contracts to build the LookAhead system based on Machine Learning (ML) classifiers and a transformer model that is able to effectively distinguish adversarial contracts from benign ones, and make just-in-time predictions of potential zero-day attacks. Our contributions are three-fold: First, we construct a comprehensive dataset consisting of features extracted and constructed from recent contracts deployed on the Ethereum and BSC blockchains. Secondly, we design a condensed representation of smart contract programs called Pruned Semantic-Control Flow Tokenization (PSCFT) and use it to train a combination of ML models that understand the behaviour of malicious codes based on function calls, control flows and other pattern-conforming features. Lastly, we provide the complete implementation of LookAhead and the evaluation of its performance metrics for detecting adversarial contracts.

Background: Some developer activity traditionally performed manually, such as making code commits, opening, managing, or closing issues is increasingly subject to automation in many OSS projects. Specifically, such activity is often performed by tools that react to events or run at specific times. We refer to such automation tools as bots and, in many software mining scenarios related to developer productivity or code quality it is desirable to identify bots in order to separate their actions from actions of individuals. Aim: Find an automated way of identifying bots and code committed by these bots, and to characterize the types of bots based on their activity patterns. Method and Result: We propose BIMAN, a systematic approach to detect bots using author names, commit messages, files modified by the commit, and projects associated with the ommits. For our test data, the value for AUC-ROC was 0.9. We also characterized these bots based on the time patterns of their code commits and the types of files modified, and found that they primarily work with documentation files and web pages, and these files are most prevalent in HTML and JavaScript ecosystems. We have compiled a shareable dataset containing detailed information about 461 bots we found (all of whom have more than 1000 commits) and 13,762,430 commits they created.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to a variety of risks, from non-faithful output to biased and toxic generations. Due to several limiting factors surrounding LLMs (training cost, API access, data availability, etc.), it may not always be feasible to impose direct safety constraints on a deployed model. Therefore, an efficient and reliable alternative is required. To this end, we present our ongoing efforts to create and deploy a library of detectors: compact and easy-to-build classification models that provide labels for various harms. In addition to the detectors themselves, we discuss a wide range of uses for these detector models - from acting as guardrails to enabling effective AI governance. We also deep dive into inherent challenges in their development and discuss future work aimed at making the detectors more reliable and broadening their scope.

Content moderation is the process of screening and monitoring user-generated content online. It plays a crucial role in stopping content resulting from unacceptable behaviors such as hate speech, harassment, violence against specific groups, terrorism, racism, xenophobia, homophobia, or misogyny, to mention some few, in Online Social Platforms. These platforms make use of a plethora of tools to detect and manage malicious information; however, malicious actors also improve their skills, developing strategies to surpass these barriers and continuing to spread misleading information. Twisting and camouflaging keywords are among the most used techniques to evade platform content moderation systems. In response to this recent ongoing issue, this paper presents an innovative approach to address this linguistic trend in social networks through the simulation of different content evasion techniques and a multilingual Transformer model for content evasion detection. In this way, we share with the rest of the scientific community a multilingual public tool, named "pyleetspeak" to generate/simulate in a customizable way the phenomenon of content evasion through automatic word camouflage and a multilingual Named-Entity Recognition (NER) Transformer-based model tuned for its recognition and detection. The multilingual NER model is evaluated in different textual scenarios, detecting different types and mixtures of camouflage techniques, achieving an overall weighted F1 score of 0.8795. This article contributes significantly to countering malicious information by developing multilingual tools to simulate and detect new methods of evasion of content on social networks, making the fight against information disorders more effective.

Online misinformation poses a global risk with significant real-world consequences. To combat misinformation, current research relies on professionals like journalists and fact-checkers for annotating and debunking misinformation, and develops automated machine learning methods for detecting misinformation. Complementary to these approaches, recent research has increasingly concentrated on utilizing the power of ordinary social media users, a.k.a. "crowd", who act as eyes-on-the-ground proactively questioning and countering misinformation. Notably, recent studies show that 96% of counter-misinformation responses originate from them. Acknowledging their prominent role, we present the first systematic and comprehensive survey of research papers that actively leverage the crowds to combat misinformation. We first identify 88 papers related to crowd-based efforts, following a meticulous annotation process adhering to the PRISMA framework. We then present key statistics related to misinformation, counter-misinformation, and crowd input in different formats and topics. Upon holistic analysis of the papers, we introduce a novel taxonomy of the roles played by the crowds: (i)annotators who actively identify misinformation; (ii)evaluators who assess counter-misinformation effectiveness; (iii)creators who create counter-misinformation. This taxonomy explores the crowd's capabilities in misinformation detection, identifies prerequisites for effective counter-misinformation, and analyzes crowd-generated counter-misinformation. Then, we delve into (i)distinguishing individual, collaborative, and machine-assisted labeling for annotators; (ii)analyzing the effectiveness of counter-misinformation through surveys, interviews, and in-lab experiments for evaluators; and (iii)characterizing creation patterns and creator profiles for creators. Finally, we outline potential future research in this field.

Smartphones and smartwatches are ever-present in daily life, and provide a rich source of information on their users' behaviour. In particular, digital traces derived from the phone's embedded movement sensors present an opportunity for a forensic investigator to gain insight into a person's physical activities. In this work, we present a machine learning-based approach to translate digital traces into likelihood ratios (LRs) for different types of physical activities. Evaluating on a new dataset, NFI\_FARED, which contains digital traces from four different types of iPhones labelled with 19 activities, it was found that our approach could produce useful LR systems to distinguish 167 out of a possible 171 activity pairings. The same approach was extended to analyse likelihoods for multiple activities (or groups of activities) simultaneously and create activity timelines to aid in both the early and latter stages of forensic investigations. The dataset and all code required to replicate the results have also been made public to encourage further research on this topic.

Online content is filled with logos, from ads and social media posts to website branding and product placements. Consequently, these logos are prevalent in the extensive web-scraped datasets used to pretrain Vision-Language Models, which are used for a wide array of tasks (content moderation, object classification). While these models have been shown to learn harmful correlations in various tasks, whether these correlations include logos remains understudied. Understanding this is especially important due to logos often being used by public-facing entities like brands and government agencies. To that end, we develop SLANT: A Spurious Logo ANalysis Toolkit. Our key finding is that some logos indeed lead to spurious incorrect predictions, for example, adding the Adidas logo to a photo of a person causes a model classify the person as greedy. SLANT contains a semi-automatic mechanism for mining such "spurious" logos. The mechanism consists of a comprehensive logo bank, CC12M-LogoBank, and an algorithm that searches the bank for logos that VLMs spuriously correlate with a user-provided downstream recognition target. We uncover various seemingly harmless logos that VL models correlate 1) with negative human adjectives 2) with the concept of `harmlessness'; causing models to misclassify harmful online content as harmless, and 3) with user-provided object concepts; causing lower recognition accuracy on ImageNet zero-shot classification. Furthermore, SLANT's logos can be seen as effective attacks against foundational models; an attacker could place a spurious logo on harmful content, causing the model to misclassify it as harmless. This threat is alarming considering the simplicity of logo attacks, increasing the attack surface of VL models. As a defense, we include in our Toolkit two effective mitigation strategies that seamlessly integrate with zero-shot inference of foundation models.

Probabilistic text generators have been used to produce fake scientific papers for more than a decade. Such nonsensical papers are easily detected by both human and machine. Now more complex AI-powered generation techniques produce texts indistinguishable from that of humans and the generation of scientific texts from a few keywords has been documented. Our study introduces the concept of tortured phrases: unexpected weird phrases in lieu of established ones, such as 'counterfeit consciousness' instead of 'artificial intelligence.' We combed the literature for tortured phrases and study one reputable journal where these concentrated en masse. Hypothesising the use of advanced language models we ran a detector on the abstracts of recent articles of this journal and on several control sets. The pairwise comparisons reveal a concentration of abstracts flagged as 'synthetic' in the journal. We also highlight irregularities in its operation, such as abrupt changes in editorial timelines. We substantiate our call for investigation by analysing several individual dubious articles, stressing questionable features: tortured writing style, citation of non-existent literature, and unacknowledged image reuse. Surprisingly, some websites offer to rewrite texts for free, generating gobbledegook full of tortured phrases. We believe some authors used rewritten texts to pad their manuscripts. We wish to raise the awareness on publications containing such questionable AI-generated or rewritten texts that passed (poor) peer review. Deception with synthetic texts threatens the integrity of the scientific literature.

The powerful ability to understand, follow, and generate complex language emerging from large language models (LLMs) makes LLM-generated text flood many areas of our daily lives at an incredible speed and is widely accepted by humans. As LLMs continue to expand, there is an imperative need to develop detectors that can detect LLM-generated text. This is crucial to mitigate potential misuse of LLMs and safeguard realms like artistic expression and social networks from harmful influence of LLM-generated content. The LLM-generated text detection aims to discern if a piece of text was produced by an LLM, which is essentially a binary classification task. The detector techniques have witnessed notable advancements recently, propelled by innovations in watermarking techniques, zero-shot methods, fine-turning LMs methods, adversarial learning methods, LLMs as detectors, and human-assisted methods. In this survey, we collate recent research breakthroughs in this area and underscore the pressing need to bolster detector research. We also delve into prevalent datasets, elucidating their limitations and developmental requirements. Furthermore, we analyze various LLM-generated text detection paradigms, shedding light on challenges like out-of-distribution problems, potential attacks, and data ambiguity. Conclusively, we highlight interesting directions for future research in LLM-generated text detection to advance the implementation of responsible artificial intelligence (AI). Our aim with this survey is to provide a clear and comprehensive introduction for newcomers while also offering seasoned researchers a valuable update in the field of LLM-generated text detection. The useful resources are publicly available at: https://github.com/NLP2CT/LLM-generated-Text-Detection.

E-commerce platforms increasingly rely on Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to detect illicit or misleading product content. However, these models remain vulnerable to evasive content: inputs (text or images) that superficially comply with platform policies while covertly conveying prohibited claims. Unlike traditional adversarial attacks that induce overt failures, evasive content exploits ambiguity and context, making it far harder to detect. Existing robustness benchmarks provide little guidance for this demanding, real-world challenge. We introduce EVADE, the first expert-curated, Chinese, multimodal benchmark specifically designed to evaluate foundation models on evasive content detection in e-commerce. The dataset contains 2,833 annotated text samples and 13,961 images spanning six demanding product categories, including body shaping, height growth, and health supplements. Two complementary tasks assess distinct capabilities: Single-Violation, which probes fine-grained reasoning under short prompts, and All-in-One, which tests long-context reasoning by merging overlapping policy rules into unified instructions. Notably, the All-in-One setting significantly narrows the performance gap between partial and full-match accuracy, suggesting that clearer rule definitions improve alignment between human and model judgment. We benchmark 26 mainstream LLMs and VLMs and observe substantial performance gaps: even state-of-the-art models frequently misclassify evasive samples. By releasing EVADE and strong baselines, we provide the first rigorous standard for evaluating evasive-content detection, expose fundamental limitations in current multimodal reasoning, and lay the groundwork for safer and more transparent content moderation systems in e-commerce. The dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/koenshen/EVADE-Bench.

Automatic security inspection using computer vision technology is a challenging task in real-world scenarios due to various factors, including intra-class variance, class imbalance, and occlusion. Most of the previous methods rarely solve the cases that the prohibited items are deliberately hidden in messy objects due to the lack of large-scale datasets, restricted their applications in real-world scenarios. Towards real-world prohibited item detection, we collect a large-scale dataset, named as PIDray, which covers various cases in real-world scenarios for prohibited item detection, especially for deliberately hidden items. With an intensive amount of effort, our dataset contains 12 categories of prohibited items in 47,677 X-ray images with high-quality annotated segmentation masks and bounding boxes. To the best of our knowledge, it is the largest prohibited items detection dataset to date. Meanwhile, we design the selective dense attention network (SDANet) to construct a strong baseline, which consists of the dense attention module and the dependency refinement module. The dense attention module formed by the spatial and channel-wise dense attentions, is designed to learn the discriminative features to boost the performance. The dependency refinement module is used to exploit the dependencies of multi-scale features. Extensive experiments conducted on the collected PIDray dataset demonstrate that the proposed method performs favorably against the state-of-the-art methods, especially for detecting the deliberately hidden items.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, it is critical to assess the security threats and vulnerabilities that may arise both during their training phase and after models have been deployed. This survey seeks to define and categorize the various attacks targeting LLMs, distinguishing between those that occur during the training phase and those that affect already trained models. A thorough analysis of these attacks is presented, alongside an exploration of defense mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats. Defenses are classified into two primary categories: prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Furthermore, our survey summarizes possible attacks and their corresponding defense strategies. It also provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the known defense mechanisms for the different security threats. Our survey aims to offer a structured framework for securing LLMs, while also identifying areas that require further research to improve and strengthen defenses against emerging security challenges.

Conspiracy Theory Identication task is a new shared task proposed for the first time at the Evalita 2023. The ACTI challenge, based exclusively on comments published on conspiratorial channels of telegram, is divided into two subtasks: (i) Conspiratorial Content Classification: identifying conspiratorial content and (ii) Conspiratorial Category Classification about specific conspiracy theory classification. A total of fifteen teams participated in the task for a total of 81 submissions. We illustrate the best performing approaches were based on the utilization of large language models. We finally draw conclusions about the utilization of these models for counteracting the spreading of misinformation in online platforms.

With information consumption via online video streaming becoming increasingly popular, misinformation video poses a new threat to the health of the online information ecosystem. Though previous studies have made much progress in detecting misinformation in text and image formats, video-based misinformation brings new and unique challenges to automatic detection systems: 1) high information heterogeneity brought by various modalities, 2) blurred distinction between misleading video manipulation and ubiquitous artistic video editing, and 3) new patterns of misinformation propagation due to the dominant role of recommendation systems on online video platforms. To facilitate research on this challenging task, we conduct this survey to present advances in misinformation video detection research. We first analyze and characterize the misinformation video from three levels including signals, semantics, and intents. Based on the characterization, we systematically review existing works for detection from features of various modalities to techniques for clue integration. We also introduce existing resources including representative datasets and widely used tools. Besides summarizing existing studies, we discuss related areas and outline open issues and future directions to encourage and guide more research on misinformation video detection. Our corresponding public repository is available at https://github.com/ICTMCG/Awesome-Misinfo-Video-Detection.

In this study, we focus on two main tasks, the first for detecting legal violations within unstructured textual data, and the second for associating these violations with potentially affected individuals. We constructed two datasets using Large Language Models (LLMs) which were subsequently validated by domain expert annotators. Both tasks were designed specifically for the context of class-action cases. The experimental design incorporated fine-tuning models from the BERT family and open-source LLMs, and conducting few-shot experiments using closed-source LLMs. Our results, with an F1-score of 62.69\% (violation identification) and 81.02\% (associating victims), show that our datasets and setups can be used for both tasks. Finally, we publicly release the datasets and the code used for the experiments in order to advance further research in the area of legal natural language processing (NLP).

We introduce a new method for extracting structured threat behaviors from threat intelligence text. Our method is based on a multi-stage ranking architecture that allows jointly optimizing for efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, we believe this problem formulation better aligns with the real-world nature of the task considering the large number of adversary techniques and the extensive body of threat intelligence created by security analysts. Our findings show that the proposed system yields state-of-the-art performance results for this task. Results show that our method has a top-3 recall performance of 81\% in identifying the relevant technique among 193 top-level techniques. Our tests also demonstrate that our system performs significantly better (+40\%) than the widely used large language models when tested under a zero-shot setting.

With the rise of prolific ChatGPT, the risk and consequences of AI-generated text has increased alarmingly. To address the inevitable question of ownership attribution for AI-generated artifacts, the US Copyright Office released a statement stating that 'If a work's traditional elements of authorship were produced by a machine, the work lacks human authorship and the Office will not register it'. Furthermore, both the US and the EU governments have recently drafted their initial proposals regarding the regulatory framework for AI. Given this cynosural spotlight on generative AI, AI-generated text detection (AGTD) has emerged as a topic that has already received immediate attention in research, with some initial methods having been proposed, soon followed by emergence of techniques to bypass detection. This paper introduces the Counter Turing Test (CT^2), a benchmark consisting of techniques aiming to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the robustness of existing AGTD techniques. Our empirical findings unequivocally highlight the fragility of the proposed AGTD methods under scrutiny. Amidst the extensive deliberations on policy-making for regulating AI development, it is of utmost importance to assess the detectability of content generated by LLMs. Thus, to establish a quantifiable spectrum facilitating the evaluation and ranking of LLMs according to their detectability levels, we propose the AI Detectability Index (ADI). We conduct a thorough examination of 15 contemporary LLMs, empirically demonstrating that larger LLMs tend to have a higher ADI, indicating they are less detectable compared to smaller LLMs. We firmly believe that ADI holds significant value as a tool for the wider NLP community, with the potential to serve as a rubric in AI-related policy-making.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved human-level fluency in text generation, making it difficult to distinguish between human-written and LLM-generated texts. This poses a growing risk of misuse of LLMs and demands the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. However, existing detectors lack robustness against attacks: they degrade detection accuracy by simply paraphrasing LLM-generated texts. Furthermore, a malicious user might attempt to deliberately evade the detectors based on detection results, but this has not been assumed in previous studies. In this paper, we propose OUTFOX, a framework that improves the robustness of LLM-generated-text detectors by allowing both the detector and the attacker to consider each other's output. In this framework, the attacker uses the detector's prediction labels as examples for in-context learning and adversarially generates essays that are harder to detect, while the detector uses the adversarially generated essays as examples for in-context learning to learn to detect essays from a strong attacker. Experiments in the domain of student essays show that the proposed detector improves the detection performance on the attacker-generated texts by up to +41.3 points in F1-score. Furthermore, the proposed detector shows a state-of-the-art detection performance: up to 96.9 points in F1-score, beating existing detectors on non-attacked texts. Finally, the proposed attacker drastically degrades the performance of detectors by up to -57.0 points F1-score, massively outperforming the baseline paraphrasing method for evading detection.

This paper proposes a simple method to distill and detect backdoor patterns within an image: Cognitive Distillation (CD). The idea is to extract the "minimal essence" from an input image responsible for the model's prediction. CD optimizes an input mask to extract a small pattern from the input image that can lead to the same model output (i.e., logits or deep features). The extracted pattern can help understand the cognitive mechanism of a model on clean vs. backdoor images and is thus called a Cognitive Pattern (CP). Using CD and the distilled CPs, we uncover an interesting phenomenon of backdoor attacks: despite the various forms and sizes of trigger patterns used by different attacks, the CPs of backdoor samples are all surprisingly and suspiciously small. One thus can leverage the learned mask to detect and remove backdoor examples from poisoned training datasets. We conduct extensive experiments to show that CD can robustly detect a wide range of advanced backdoor attacks. We also show that CD can potentially be applied to help detect potential biases from face datasets. Code is available at https://github.com/HanxunH/CognitiveDistillation.

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) built for specific competitive situations, and general-purpose AI systems (such as large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI systems. Finally, we outline several potential solutions to the problems posed by AI deception: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

Large Language Models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse tasks, yet they frequently generate hallucinations outputs that are fluent but factually incorrect or unsupported. We propose Counterfactual Probing, a novel approach for detecting and mitigating hallucinations in LLM outputs. Our method dynamically generates counterfactual statements that appear plausible but contain subtle factual errors, then evaluates the model's sensitivity to these perturbations. We hypothesize that genuine knowledge exhibits robustness to counterfactual variations, while hallucinated content shows inconsistent confidence patterns when confronted with plausible alternatives. Our comprehensive evaluation on TruthfulQA, factual statement datasets, and curated hallucination examples demonstrates that counterfactual probing achieves superior detection performance compared to baseline methods, while our adaptive mitigation strategies reduce hallucination scores by an average of 24.5%. The approach requires no model retraining and can be integrated into existing LLM pipelines as a realtime verification mechanism.

When working on digital devices, people often face distractions that can lead to a decline in productivity and efficiency, as well as negative psychological and emotional impacts. To address this challenge, we introduce a novel Artificial Intelligence (AI) assistant that elicits a user's intention, assesses whether ongoing activities are in line with that intention, and provides gentle nudges when deviations occur. The system leverages a large language model to analyze screenshots, application titles, and URLs, issuing notifications when behavior diverges from the stated goal. Its detection accuracy is refined through initial clarification dialogues and continuous user feedback. In a three-week, within-subjects field deployment with 22 participants, we compared our assistant to both a rule-based intent reminder system and a passive baseline that only logged activity. Results indicate that our AI assistant effectively supports users in maintaining focus and aligning their digital behavior with their intentions. Our source code is publicly available at https://intentassistant.github.io

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

Terms of service of on-line platforms too often contain clauses that are potentially unfair to the consumer. We present an experimental study where machine learning is employed to automatically detect such potentially unfair clauses. Results show that the proposed system could provide a valuable tool for lawyers and consumers alike.

With the rapid proliferation and increased sophistication of malicious software (malware), detection methods no longer rely only on manually generated signatures but have also incorporated more general approaches like machine learning detection. Although powerful for conviction of malicious artifacts, these methods do not produce any further information about the type of threat that has been detected neither allows for identifying relationships between malware samples. In this work, we address the information gap between machine learning and signature-based detection methods by learning a representation space for malware samples in which files with similar malicious behaviors appear close to each other. We do so by introducing a deep learning based tagging model trained to generate human-interpretable semantic descriptions of malicious software, which, at the same time provides potentially more useful and flexible information than malware family names. We show that the malware descriptions generated with the proposed approach correctly identify more than 95% of eleven possible tag descriptions for a given sample, at a deployable false positive rate of 1% per tag. Furthermore, we use the learned representation space to introduce a similarity index between malware files, and empirically demonstrate using dynamic traces from files' execution, that is not only more effective at identifying samples from the same families, but also 32 times smaller than those based on raw feature vectors.

Large language models have catalyzed an unprecedented wave in code generation. While achieving significant advances, they blur the distinctions between machine- and human-authored source code, causing integrity and authenticity issues of software artifacts. Previous methods such as DetectGPT have proven effective in discerning machine-generated texts, but they do not identify and harness the unique patterns of machine-generated code. Thus, its applicability falters when applied to code. In this paper, we carefully study the specific patterns that characterize machine- and human-authored code. Through a rigorous analysis of code attributes such as lexical diversity, conciseness, and naturalness, we expose unique patterns inherent to each source. We particularly notice that the syntactic segmentation of code is a critical factor in identifying its provenance. Based on our findings, we propose DetectCodeGPT, a novel method for detecting machine-generated code, which improves DetectGPT by capturing the distinct stylized patterns of code. Diverging from conventional techniques that depend on external LLMs for perturbations, DetectCodeGPT perturbs the code corpus by strategically inserting spaces and newlines, ensuring both efficacy and efficiency. Experiment results show that our approach significantly outperforms state-of-the-art techniques in detecting machine-generated code.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

The increasing capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised concerns about their misuse in AI-generated plagiarism and social engineering. While various AI-generated text detectors have been proposed to mitigate these risks, many remain vulnerable to simple evasion techniques such as paraphrasing. However, recent detectors have shown greater robustness against such basic attacks. In this work, we introduce Adversarial Paraphrasing, a training-free attack framework that universally humanizes any AI-generated text to evade detection more effectively. Our approach leverages an off-the-shelf instruction-following LLM to paraphrase AI-generated content under the guidance of an AI text detector, producing adversarial examples that are specifically optimized to bypass detection. Extensive experiments show that our attack is both broadly effective and highly transferable across several detection systems. For instance, compared to simple paraphrasing attack--which, ironically, increases the true positive at 1% false positive (T@1%F) by 8.57% on RADAR and 15.03% on Fast-DetectGPT--adversarial paraphrasing, guided by OpenAI-RoBERTa-Large, reduces T@1%F by 64.49% on RADAR and a striking 98.96% on Fast-DetectGPT. Across a diverse set of detectors--including neural network-based, watermark-based, and zero-shot approaches--our attack achieves an average T@1%F reduction of 87.88% under the guidance of OpenAI-RoBERTa-Large. We also analyze the tradeoff between text quality and attack success to find that our method can significantly reduce detection rates, with mostly a slight degradation in text quality. Our adversarial setup highlights the need for more robust and resilient detection strategies in the light of increasingly sophisticated evasion techniques.

With the rapid technological advancement, security has become a major issue due to the increase in malware activity that poses a serious threat to the security and safety of both computer systems and stakeholders. To maintain stakeholders, particularly, end users security, protecting the data from fraudulent efforts is one of the most pressing concerns. A set of malicious programming code, scripts, active content, or intrusive software that is designed to destroy intended computer systems and programs or mobile and web applications is referred to as malware. According to a study, naive users are unable to distinguish between malicious and benign applications. Thus, computer systems and mobile applications should be designed to detect malicious activities towards protecting the stakeholders. A number of algorithms are available to detect malware activities by utilizing novel concepts including Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Deep Learning. In this study, we emphasize Artificial Intelligence (AI) based techniques for detecting and preventing malware activity. We present a detailed review of current malware detection technologies, their shortcomings, and ways to improve efficiency. Our study shows that adopting futuristic approaches for the development of malware detection applications shall provide significant advantages. The comprehension of this synthesis shall help researchers for further research on malware detection and prevention using AI.

The recent advances in natural language processing have yielded many exciting developments in text analysis and language understanding models; however, these models can also be used to track people, bringing severe privacy concerns. In this work, we investigate what individuals can do to avoid being detected by those models while using social media platforms. We ground our investigation in two exposure-risky tasks, stance detection and geotagging. We explore a variety of simple techniques for modifying text, such as inserting typos in salient words, paraphrasing, and adding dummy social media posts. Our experiments show that the performance of BERT-based models fined tuned for stance detection decreases significantly due to typos, but it is not affected by paraphrasing. Moreover, we find that typos have minimal impact on state-of-the-art geotagging models due to their increased reliance on social networks; however, we show that users can deceive those models by interacting with different users, reducing their performance by almost 50%.

The autonomous AI agents using large language models can create undeniable values in all span of the society but they face security threats from adversaries that warrants immediate protective solutions because trust and safety issues arise. Considering the many-shot jailbreaking and deceptive alignment as some of the main advanced attacks, that cannot be mitigated by the static guardrails used during the supervised training, points out a crucial research priority for real world robustness. The combination of static guardrails in dynamic multi-agent system fails to defend against those attacks. We intend to enhance security for LLM-based agents through the development of new evaluation frameworks which identify and counter threats for safe operational deployment. Our work uses three examination methods to detect rogue agents through a Reverse Turing Test and analyze deceptive alignment through multi-agent simulations and develops an anti-jailbreaking system by testing it with GEMINI 1.5 pro and llama-3.3-70B, deepseek r1 models using tool-mediated adversarial scenarios. The detection capabilities are strong such as 94\% accuracy for GEMINI 1.5 pro yet the system suffers persistent vulnerabilities when under long attacks as prompt length increases attack success rates (ASR) and diversity metrics become ineffective in prediction while revealing multiple complex system faults. The findings demonstrate the necessity of adopting flexible security systems based on active monitoring that can be performed by the agents themselves together with adaptable interventions by system admin as the current models can create vulnerabilities that can lead to the unreliable and vulnerable system. So, in our work, we try to address such situations and propose a comprehensive framework to counteract the security issues.

We present the results and the main findings of SemEval-2020 Task 11 on Detection of Propaganda Techniques in News Articles. The task featured two subtasks. Subtask SI is about Span Identification: given a plain-text document, spot the specific text fragments containing propaganda. Subtask TC is about Technique Classification: given a specific text fragment, in the context of a full document, determine the propaganda technique it uses, choosing from an inventory of 14 possible propaganda techniques. The task attracted a large number of participants: 250 teams signed up to participate and 44 made a submission on the test set. In this paper, we present the task, analyze the results, and discuss the system submissions and the methods they used. For both subtasks, the best systems used pre-trained Transformers and ensembles.

Anti-forensics seeks to eliminate or conceal traces of tampering artifacts. Typically, anti-forensic methods are designed to deceive binary detectors and persuade them to misjudge the authenticity of an image. However, to the best of our knowledge, no attempts have been made to deceive forgery detectors at the pixel level and mis-locate forged regions. Traditional adversarial attack methods cannot be directly used against forgery localization due to the following defects: 1) they tend to just naively induce the target forensic models to flip their pixel-level pristine or forged decisions; 2) their anti-forensics performance tends to be severely degraded when faced with the unseen forensic models; 3) they lose validity once the target forensic models are retrained with the anti-forensics images generated by them. To tackle the three defects, we propose SEAR (Self-supErvised Anti-foRensics), a novel self-supervised and adversarial training algorithm that effectively trains deep-learning anti-forensic models against forgery localization. SEAR sets a pretext task to reconstruct perturbation for self-supervised learning. In adversarial training, SEAR employs a forgery localization model as a supervisor to explore tampering features and constructs a deep-learning concealer to erase corresponding traces. We have conducted largescale experiments across diverse datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that, through the combination of self-supervised learning and adversarial learning, SEAR successfully deceives the state-of-the-art forgery localization methods, as well as tackle the three defects regarding traditional adversarial attack methods mentioned above.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

In recent years, the rise of machine learning (ML) in cybersecurity has brought new challenges, including the increasing threat of backdoor poisoning attacks on ML malware classifiers. For instance, adversaries could inject malicious samples into public malware repositories, contaminating the training data and potentially misclassifying malware by the ML model. Current countermeasures predominantly focus on detecting poisoned samples by leveraging disagreements within the outputs of a diverse set of ensemble models on training data points. However, these methods are not suitable for scenarios where Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) is used or when users aim to remove backdoors from a model after it has been trained. Addressing this scenario, we introduce PBP, a post-training defense for malware classifiers that mitigates various types of backdoor embeddings without assuming any specific backdoor embedding mechanism. Our method exploits the influence of backdoor attacks on the activation distribution of neural networks, independent of the trigger-embedding method. In the presence of a backdoor attack, the activation distribution of each layer is distorted into a mixture of distributions. By regulating the statistics of the batch normalization layers, we can guide a backdoored model to perform similarly to a clean one. Our method demonstrates substantial advantages over several state-of-the-art methods, as evidenced by experiments on two datasets, two types of backdoor methods, and various attack configurations. Notably, our approach requires only a small portion of the training data -- only 1\% -- to purify the backdoor and reduce the attack success rate from 100\% to almost 0\%, a 100-fold improvement over the baseline methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/judydnguyen/pbp-backdoor-purification-official.

Large language models (LLMs) are now deployed to everyday use and positioned to produce large quantities of text in the coming decade. Machine-generated text may displace human-written text on the internet and has the potential to be used for malicious purposes, such as spearphishing attacks and social media bots. Watermarking is a simple and effective strategy for mitigating such harms by enabling the detection and documentation of LLM-generated text. Yet, a crucial question remains: How reliable is watermarking in realistic settings in the wild? There, watermarked text might be mixed with other text sources, paraphrased by human writers or other language models, and used for applications in a broad number of domains, both social and technical. In this paper, we explore different detection schemes, quantify their power at detecting watermarks, and determine how much machine-generated text needs to be observed in each scenario to reliably detect the watermark. We especially highlight our human study, where we investigate the reliability of watermarking when faced with human paraphrasing. We compare watermark-based detection to other detection strategies, finding overall that watermarking is a reliable solution, especially because of its sample complexity - for all attacks we consider, the watermark evidence compounds the more examples are given, and the watermark is eventually detected.

In the face of a new era of generative models, the detection of artificially generated content has become a matter of utmost importance. In particular, the ability to create credible minute-long synthetic music in a few seconds on user-friendly platforms poses a real threat of fraud on streaming services and unfair competition to human artists. This paper demonstrates the possibility (and surprising ease) of training classifiers on datasets comprising real audio and artificial reconstructions, achieving a convincing accuracy of 99.8%. To our knowledge, this marks the first publication of a AI-music detector, a tool that will help in the regulation of synthetic media. Nevertheless, informed by decades of literature on forgery detection in other fields, we stress that getting a good test score is not the end of the story. We expose and discuss several facets that could be problematic with such a deployed detector: robustness to audio manipulation, generalisation to unseen models. This second part acts as a position for future research steps in the field and a caveat to a flourishing market of artificial content checkers.

Emails and SMSs are the most popular tools in today communications, and as the increase of emails and SMSs users are increase, the number of spams is also increases. Spam is any kind of unwanted, unsolicited digital communication that gets sent out in bulk, spam emails and SMSs are causing major resource wastage by unnecessarily flooding the network links. Although most spam mail originate with advertisers looking to push their products, some are much more malicious in their intent like phishing emails that aims to trick victims into giving up sensitive information like website logins or credit card information this type of cybercrime is known as phishing. To countermeasure spams, many researches and efforts are done to build spam detectors that are able to filter out messages and emails as spam or ham. In this research we build a spam detector using BERT pre-trained model that classifies emails and messages by understanding to their context, and we trained our spam detector model using multiple corpuses like SMS collection corpus, Enron corpus, SpamAssassin corpus, Ling-Spam corpus and SMS spam collection corpus, our spam detector performance was 98.62%, 97.83%, 99.13% and 99.28% respectively. Keywords: Spam Detector, BERT, Machine learning, NLP, Transformer, Enron Corpus, SpamAssassin Corpus, SMS Spam Detection Corpus, Ling-Spam Corpus.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can comply with harmful instructions, raising serious safety concerns despite their impressive capabilities. Recent work has leveraged probing-based approaches to study the separability of malicious and benign inputs in LLMs' internal representations, and researchers have proposed using such probing methods for safety detection. We systematically re-examine this paradigm. Motivated by poor out-of-distribution performance, we hypothesize that probes learn superficial patterns rather than semantic harmfulness. Through controlled experiments, we confirm this hypothesis and identify the specific patterns learned: instructional patterns and trigger words. Our investigation follows a systematic approach, progressing from demonstrating comparable performance of simple n-gram methods, to controlled experiments with semantically cleaned datasets, to detailed analysis of pattern dependencies. These results reveal a false sense of security around current probing-based approaches and highlight the need to redesign both models and evaluation protocols, for which we provide further discussions in the hope of suggesting responsible further research in this direction. We have open-sourced the project at https://github.com/WangCheng0116/Why-Probe-Fails.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

In this work, we study the risks of collective financial fraud in large-scale multi-agent systems powered by large language model (LLM) agents. We investigate whether agents can collaborate in fraudulent behaviors, how such collaboration amplifies risks, and what factors influence fraud success. To support this research, we present MultiAgentFraudBench, a large-scale benchmark for simulating financial fraud scenarios based on realistic online interactions. The benchmark covers 28 typical online fraud scenarios, spanning the full fraud lifecycle across both public and private domains. We further analyze key factors affecting fraud success, including interaction depth, activity level, and fine-grained collaboration failure modes. Finally, we propose a series of mitigation strategies, including adding content-level warnings to fraudulent posts and dialogues, using LLMs as monitors to block potentially malicious agents, and fostering group resilience through information sharing at the societal level. Notably, we observe that malicious agents can adapt to environmental interventions. Our findings highlight the real-world risks of multi-agent financial fraud and suggest practical measures for mitigating them. Code is available at https://github.com/zheng977/MutiAgent4Fraud.

RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) systems and web agents are increasingly evaluated on multi-hop deep search tasks, yet current practice suffers from two major limitations. First, most benchmarks leak the reasoning path in the question text, allowing models to follow surface cues rather than discover reasoning chains autonomously. Second, evaluation is typically reduced to a single pass rate, which collapses diverse behaviours into one score and obscures whether failures stem from inadequate search, poor knowledge use, or inappropriate refusal. To address these issues, we present WebDetective, a benchmark of hint-free multi-hop questions paired with a controlled Wikipedia sandbox that ensures full traceability of model actions, and a holistic evaluation framework that separates search sufficiency, knowledge utilisation, and refusal behaviour. Our evaluation of 25 state-of-the-art models reveals systematic weaknesses across all architectures: models struggle with knowledge utilisation despite having sufficient evidence and demonstrate near-absent appropriate refusal when evidence is lacking. These patterns expose a fundamental gap: today's systems excel at executing given reasoning paths but fail when required to discover them. We develop an agentic workflow, EvidenceLoop, that explicitly targets the challenges our benchmark identifies, incorporating verification loops and systematic evidence tracking that improve both search and synthesis capabilities. This baseline demonstrates that WebDetective's diagnostic framework can guide concrete architectural improvements, establishing our benchmark as a critical tool for developing genuinely autonomous reasoning systems rather than pattern-following agents.

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) and their increased accessibility have made it easier than ever for students to automatically generate texts, posing new challenges for educational institutions. To enforce norms of academic integrity and ensure students' learning, learning analytics methods to automatically detect LLM-generated text appear increasingly appealing. This paper benchmarks the performance of different state-of-the-art detectors in educational contexts, introducing a novel dataset, called Generative Essay Detection in Education (GEDE), containing over 900 student-written essays and over 12,500 LLM-generated essays from various domains. To capture the diversity of LLM usage practices in generating text, we propose the concept of contribution levels, representing students' contribution to a given assignment. These levels range from purely human-written texts, to slightly LLM-improved versions, to fully LLM-generated texts, and finally to active attacks on the detector by "humanizing" generated texts. We show that most detectors struggle to accurately classify texts of intermediate student contribution levels, like LLM-improved human-written texts. Detectors are particularly likely to produce false positives, which is problematic in educational settings where false suspicions can severely impact students' lives. Our dataset, code, and additional supplementary materials are publicly available at https://github.com/lukasgehring/Assessing-LLM-Text-Detection-in-Educational-Contexts.

Understanding the dynamic behavior of computer programs during normal working conditions is an important task, which has multiple security benefits such as the development of behavior-based anomaly detection, vulnerability discovery, and patching. Existing works achieved this goal by collecting and analyzing various data including network traffic, system calls, instruction traces, etc. In this paper, we explore the use of a new type of data, performance counters, to analyze the dynamic behavior of programs. Using existing primitives, we develop a tool named perfextract to capture data from different performance counters for a program during its startup time, thus forming multiple time series to represent the dynamic behavior of the program. We analyze the collected data and develop a semi-supervised clustering algorithm that allows us to classify each program using its performance counter time series into a specific group and to identify the intrinsic behavior of that group. We carry out extensive experiments with 18 real-world programs that belong to 4 groups including web browsers, text editors, image viewers, and audio players. The experimental results show that the examined programs can be accurately differentiated based on their performance counter data regardless of whether programs are run in physical or virtual environments.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, widely used to improve the factual grounding of large language models (LLMs), are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject manipulated content into the retriever's corpus. While prior research has predominantly focused on single-attacker settings, real-world scenarios often involve multiple, competing attackers with conflicting objectives. In this work, we introduce PoisonArena, the first benchmark to systematically study and evaluate competing poisoning attacks in RAG. We formalize the multi-attacker threat model, where attackers vie to control the answer to the same query using mutually exclusive misinformation. PoisonArena leverages the Bradley-Terry model to quantify each method's competitive effectiveness in such adversarial environments. Through extensive experiments on the Natural Questions and MS MARCO datasets, we demonstrate that many attack strategies successful in isolation fail under competitive pressure. Our findings highlight the limitations of conventional evaluation metrics like Attack Success Rate (ASR) and F1 score and underscore the need for competitive evaluation to assess real-world attack robustness. PoisonArena provides a standardized framework to benchmark and develop future attack and defense strategies under more realistic, multi-adversary conditions.

With a rise in false, inaccurate, and misleading information in propaganda, news, and social media, real-world Question Answering (QA) systems face the challenges of synthesizing and reasoning over contradicting information to derive correct answers. This urgency gives rise to the need to make QA systems robust to misinformation, a topic previously unexplored. We study the risk of misinformation to QA models by investigating the behavior of the QA model under contradicting contexts that are mixed with both real and fake information. We create the first large-scale dataset for this problem, namely Contra-QA, which contains over 10K human-written and model-generated contradicting pairs of contexts. Experiments show that QA models are vulnerable under contradicting contexts brought by misinformation. To defend against such a threat, we build a misinformation-aware QA system as a counter-measure that integrates question answering and misinformation detection in a joint fashion.

In this paper we present TruFor, a forensic framework that can be applied to a large variety of image manipulation methods, from classic cheapfakes to more recent manipulations based on deep learning. We rely on the extraction of both high-level and low-level traces through a transformer-based fusion architecture that combines the RGB image and a learned noise-sensitive fingerprint. The latter learns to embed the artifacts related to the camera internal and external processing by training only on real data in a self-supervised manner. Forgeries are detected as deviations from the expected regular pattern that characterizes each pristine image. Looking for anomalies makes the approach able to robustly detect a variety of local manipulations, ensuring generalization. In addition to a pixel-level localization map and a whole-image integrity score, our approach outputs a reliability map that highlights areas where localization predictions may be error-prone. This is particularly important in forensic applications in order to reduce false alarms and allow for a large scale analysis. Extensive experiments on several datasets show that our method is able to reliably detect and localize both cheapfakes and deepfakes manipulations outperforming state-of-the-art works. Code is publicly available at https://grip-unina.github.io/TruFor/

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

Recent advancements in Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the creation of highly realistic synthetic content, raising concerns about the potential for malicious use, such as misinformation and manipulation. Moreover, detecting Machine-Generated Text (MGT) remains challenging due to the lack of robust benchmarks that assess generalization to real-world scenarios. In this work, we present a pipeline to test the resilience of state-of-the-art MGT detectors (e.g., Mage, Radar, LLM-DetectAIve) to linguistically informed adversarial attacks. To challenge the detectors, we fine-tune language models using Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to shift the MGT style toward human-written text (HWT). This exploits the detectors' reliance on stylistic clues, making new generations more challenging to detect. Additionally, we analyze the linguistic shifts induced by the alignment and which features are used by detectors to detect MGT texts. Our results show that detectors can be easily fooled with relatively few examples, resulting in a significant drop in detection performance. This highlights the importance of improving detection methods and making them robust to unseen in-domain texts.

Social media influence campaigns pose significant challenges to public discourse and democracy. Traditional detection methods fall short due to the complexity and dynamic nature of social media. Addressing this, we propose a novel detection method using Large Language Models (LLMs) that incorporates both user metadata and network structures. By converting these elements into a text format, our approach effectively processes multilingual content and adapts to the shifting tactics of malicious campaign actors. We validate our model through rigorous testing on multiple datasets, showcasing its superior performance in identifying influence efforts. This research not only offers a powerful tool for detecting campaigns, but also sets the stage for future enhancements to keep up with the fast-paced evolution of social media-based influence tactics.

The proliferation of online misinformation has posed significant threats to public interest. While numerous online users actively participate in the combat against misinformation, many of such responses can be characterized by the lack of politeness and supporting facts. As a solution, text generation approaches are proposed to automatically produce counter-misinformation responses. Nevertheless, existing methods are often trained end-to-end without leveraging external knowledge, resulting in subpar text quality and excessively repetitive responses. In this paper, we propose retrieval augmented response generation for online misinformation (RARG), which collects supporting evidence from scientific sources and generates counter-misinformation responses based on the evidences. In particular, our RARG consists of two stages: (1) evidence collection, where we design a retrieval pipeline to retrieve and rerank evidence documents using a database comprising over 1M academic articles; (2) response generation, in which we align large language models (LLMs) to generate evidence-based responses via reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). We propose a reward function to maximize the utilization of the retrieved evidence while maintaining the quality of the generated text, which yields polite and factual responses that clearly refutes misinformation. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, we study the case of COVID-19 and perform extensive experiments with both in- and cross-domain datasets, where RARG consistently outperforms baselines by generating high-quality counter-misinformation responses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Large Language Models (LLMs) are constrained by outdated information and a tendency to generate incorrect data, commonly referred to as "hallucinations." Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) addresses these limitations by combining the strengths of retrieval-based methods and generative models. This approach involves retrieving relevant information from a large, up-to-date dataset and using it to enhance the generation process, leading to more accurate and contextually appropriate responses. Despite its benefits, RAG introduces a new attack surface for LLMs, particularly because RAG databases are often sourced from public data, such as the web. In this paper, we propose to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks on retrieval parts (RAG database) and their indirect attacks on generative parts (LLMs). Specifically, we identify that poisoning several customized content passages could achieve a retrieval backdoor, where the retrieval works well for clean queries but always returns customized poisoned adversarial queries. Triggers and poisoned passages can be highly customized to implement various attacks. For example, a trigger could be a semantic group like "The Republican Party, Donald Trump, etc." Adversarial passages can be tailored to different contents, not only linked to the triggers but also used to indirectly attack generative LLMs without modifying them. These attacks can include denial-of-service attacks on RAG and semantic steering attacks on LLM generations conditioned by the triggers. Our experiments demonstrate that by just poisoning 10 adversarial passages can induce 98.2\% success rate to retrieve the adversarial passages. Then, these passages can increase the reject ratio of RAG-based GPT-4 from 0.01\% to 74.6\% or increase the rate of negative responses from 0.22\% to 72\% for targeted queries.

Although membership inference attacks (MIAs) and machine-generated text detection target different goals, identifying training samples and synthetic texts, their methods often exploit similar signals based on a language model's probability distribution. Despite this shared methodological foundation, the two tasks have been independently studied, which may lead to conclusions that overlook stronger methods and valuable insights developed in the other task. In this work, we theoretically and empirically investigate the transferability, i.e., how well a method originally developed for one task performs on the other, between MIAs and machine text detection. For our theoretical contribution, we prove that the metric that achieves the asymptotically highest performance on both tasks is the same. We unify a large proportion of the existing literature in the context of this optimal metric and hypothesize that the accuracy with which a given method approximates this metric is directly correlated with its transferability. Our large-scale empirical experiments, including 7 state-of-the-art MIA methods and 5 state-of-the-art machine text detectors across 13 domains and 10 generators, demonstrate very strong rank correlation (rho > 0.6) in cross-task performance. We notably find that Binoculars, originally designed for machine text detection, achieves state-of-the-art performance on MIA benchmarks as well, demonstrating the practical impact of the transferability. Our findings highlight the need for greater cross-task awareness and collaboration between the two research communities. To facilitate cross-task developments and fair evaluations, we introduce MINT, a unified evaluation suite for MIAs and machine-generated text detection, with implementation of 15 recent methods from both tasks.

Large language models and AI chatbots have been at the forefront of democratizing artificial intelligence. However, the releases of ChatGPT and other similar tools have been followed by growing concerns regarding the difficulty of controlling large language models and their outputs. Currently, we are witnessing a cat-and-mouse game where users attempt to misuse the models with a novel attack called prompt injections. In contrast, the developers attempt to discover the vulnerabilities and block the attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we provide an overview of these emergent threats and present a categorization of prompt injections, which can guide future research on prompt injections and act as a checklist of vulnerabilities in the development of LLM interfaces. Moreover, based on previous literature and our own empirical research, we discuss the implications of prompt injections to LLM end users, developers, and researchers.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) has created an urgent need for robust tools to detect LLM-generated text, especially in light of paraphrasing techniques that often evade existing detection methods. To address this challenge, we present a novel semantic-enhanced framework for detecting LLM-generated text (SEFD) that leverages a retrieval-based mechanism to fully utilize text semantics. Our framework improves upon existing detection methods by systematically integrating retrieval-based techniques with traditional detectors, employing a carefully curated retrieval mechanism that strikes a balance between comprehensive coverage and computational efficiency. We showcase the effectiveness of our approach in sequential text scenarios common in real-world applications, such as online forums and Q\&A platforms. Through comprehensive experiments across various LLM-generated texts and detection methods, we demonstrate that our framework substantially enhances detection accuracy in paraphrasing scenarios while maintaining robustness for standard LLM-generated content.

As synthetic media becomes progressively more realistic and barriers to using it continue to lower, the technology has been increasingly utilized for malicious purposes, from financial fraud to nonconsensual pornography. Today, the principal defense against being misled by synthetic media relies on the ability of the human observer to visually and auditorily discern between real and fake. However, it remains unclear just how vulnerable people actually are to deceptive synthetic media in the course of their day to day lives. We conducted a perceptual study with 1276 participants to assess how accurate people were at distinguishing synthetic images, audio only, video only, and audiovisual stimuli from authentic. To reflect the circumstances under which people would likely encounter synthetic media in the wild, testing conditions and stimuli emulated a typical online platform, while all synthetic media used in the survey was sourced from publicly accessible generative AI technology. We find that overall, participants struggled to meaningfully discern between synthetic and authentic content. We also find that detection performance worsens when the stimuli contains synthetic content as compared to authentic content, images featuring human faces as compared to non face objects, a single modality as compared to multimodal stimuli, mixed authenticity as compared to being fully synthetic for audiovisual stimuli, and features foreign languages as compared to languages the observer is fluent in. Finally, we also find that prior knowledge of synthetic media does not meaningfully impact their detection performance. Collectively, these results indicate that people are highly susceptible to being tricked by synthetic media in their daily lives and that human perceptual detection capabilities can no longer be relied upon as an effective counterdefense.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

Recent advances in data collection technology, accompanied by the ever-rising volume and velocity of streaming data, underscore the vital need for time series analytics. In this regard, time-series anomaly detection has been an important activity, entailing various applications in fields such as cyber security, financial markets, law enforcement, and health care. While traditional literature on anomaly detection is centered on statistical measures, the increasing number of machine learning algorithms in recent years call for a structured, general characterization of the research methods for time-series anomaly detection. This survey groups and summarizes anomaly detection existing solutions under a process-centric taxonomy in the time series context. In addition to giving an original categorization of anomaly detection methods, we also perform a meta-analysis of the literature and outline general trends in time-series anomaly detection research.

Mental manipulation severely undermines mental wellness by covertly and negatively distorting decision-making. While there is an increasing interest in mental health care within the natural language processing community, progress in tackling manipulation remains limited due to the complexity of detecting subtle, covert tactics in conversations. In this paper, we propose Intent-Aware Prompting (IAP), a novel approach for detecting mental manipulations using large language models (LLMs), providing a deeper understanding of manipulative tactics by capturing the underlying intents of participants. Experimental results on the MentalManip dataset demonstrate superior effectiveness of IAP against other advanced prompting strategies. Notably, our approach substantially reduces false negatives, helping detect more instances of mental manipulation with minimal misjudgment of positive cases. The code of this paper is available at https://github.com/Anton-Jiayuan-MA/Manip-IAP.

The recent success of large language models for text generation poses a severe threat to academic integrity, as plagiarists can generate realistic paraphrases indistinguishable from original work. However, the role of large autoregressive transformers in generating machine-paraphrased plagiarism and their detection is still developing in the literature. This work explores T5 and GPT-3 for machine-paraphrase generation on scientific articles from arXiv, student theses, and Wikipedia. We evaluate the detection performance of six automated solutions and one commercial plagiarism detection software and perform a human study with 105 participants regarding their detection performance and the quality of generated examples. Our results suggest that large models can rewrite text humans have difficulty identifying as machine-paraphrased (53% mean acc.). Human experts rate the quality of paraphrases generated by GPT-3 as high as original texts (clarity 4.0/5, fluency 4.2/5, coherence 3.8/5). The best-performing detection model (GPT-3) achieves a 66% F1-score in detecting paraphrases.

Counterfactual statements describe events that did not or cannot take place. We consider the problem of counterfactual detection (CFD) in product reviews. For this purpose, we annotate a multilingual CFD dataset from Amazon product reviews covering counterfactual statements written in English, German, and Japanese languages. The dataset is unique as it contains counterfactuals in multiple languages, covers a new application area of e-commerce reviews, and provides high quality professional annotations. We train CFD models using different text representation methods and classifiers. We find that these models are robust against the selectional biases introduced due to cue phrase-based sentence selection. Moreover, our CFD dataset is compatible with prior datasets and can be merged to learn accurate CFD models. Applying machine translation on English counterfactual examples to create multilingual data performs poorly, demonstrating the language-specificity of this problem, which has been ignored so far.

Perturbative availability poisons (PAPs) add small changes to images to prevent their use for model training. Current research adopts the belief that practical and effective approaches to countering PAPs do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is time to abandon this belief. We present extensive experiments showing that 12 state-of-the-art PAP methods are vulnerable to Image Shortcut Squeezing (ISS), which is based on simple compression. For example, on average, ISS restores the CIFAR-10 model accuracy to 81.73%, surpassing the previous best preprocessing-based countermeasures by 37.97% absolute. ISS also (slightly) outperforms adversarial training and has higher generalizability to unseen perturbation norms and also higher efficiency. Our investigation reveals that the property of PAP perturbations depends on the type of surrogate model used for poison generation, and it explains why a specific ISS compression yields the best performance for a specific type of PAP perturbation. We further test stronger, adaptive poisoning, and show it falls short of being an ideal defense against ISS. Overall, our results demonstrate the importance of considering various (simple) countermeasures to ensure the meaningfulness of analysis carried out during the development of PAP methods.

Surveillance videos are an essential component of daily life with various critical applications, particularly in public security. However, current surveillance video tasks mainly focus on classifying and localizing anomalous events. Existing methods are limited to detecting and classifying the predefined events with unsatisfactory semantic understanding, although they have obtained considerable performance. To address this issue, we propose a new research direction of surveillance video-and-language understanding, and construct the first multimodal surveillance video dataset. We manually annotate the real-world surveillance dataset UCF-Crime with fine-grained event content and timing. Our newly annotated dataset, UCA (UCF-Crime Annotation), contains 23,542 sentences, with an average length of 20 words, and its annotated videos are as long as 110.7 hours. Furthermore, we benchmark SOTA models for four multimodal tasks on this newly created dataset, which serve as new baselines for surveillance video-and-language understanding. Through our experiments, we find that mainstream models used in previously publicly available datasets perform poorly on surveillance video, which demonstrates the new challenges in surveillance video-and-language understanding. To validate the effectiveness of our UCA, we conducted experiments on multimodal anomaly detection. The results demonstrate that our multimodal surveillance learning can improve the performance of conventional anomaly detection tasks. All the experiments highlight the necessity of constructing this dataset to advance surveillance AI. The link to our dataset is provided at: https://xuange923.github.io/Surveillance-Video-Understanding.

The proliferation of face forgery techniques has raised significant concerns within society, thereby motivating the development of face forgery detection methods. These methods aim to distinguish forged faces from genuine ones and have proven effective in practical applications. However, this paper introduces a novel and previously unrecognized threat in face forgery detection scenarios caused by backdoor attack. By embedding backdoors into models and incorporating specific trigger patterns into the input, attackers can deceive detectors into producing erroneous predictions for forged faces. To achieve this goal, this paper proposes Poisoned Forgery Face framework, which enables clean-label backdoor attacks on face forgery detectors. Our approach involves constructing a scalable trigger generator and utilizing a novel convolving process to generate translation-sensitive trigger patterns. Moreover, we employ a relative embedding method based on landmark-based regions to enhance the stealthiness of the poisoned samples. Consequently, detectors trained on our poisoned samples are embedded with backdoors. Notably, our approach surpasses SoTA backdoor baselines with a significant improvement in attack success rate (+16.39\% BD-AUC) and reduction in visibility (-12.65\% L_infty). Furthermore, our attack exhibits promising performance against backdoor defenses. We anticipate that this paper will draw greater attention to the potential threats posed by backdoor attacks in face forgery detection scenarios. Our codes will be made available at https://github.com/JWLiang007/PFF

Creating high-quality and realistic images is now possible thanks to the impressive advancements in image generation. A description in natural language of your desired output is all you need to obtain breathtaking results. However, as the use of generative models grows, so do concerns about the propagation of malicious content and misinformation. Consequently, the research community is actively working on the development of novel fake detection techniques, primarily focusing on low-level features and possible fingerprints left by generative models during the image generation process. In a different vein, in our work, we leverage human semantic knowledge to investigate the possibility of being included in frameworks of fake image detection. To achieve this, we collect a novel dataset of partially manipulated images using diffusion models and conduct an eye-tracking experiment to record the eye movements of different observers while viewing real and fake stimuli. A preliminary statistical analysis is conducted to explore the distinctive patterns in how humans perceive genuine and altered images. Statistical findings reveal that, when perceiving counterfeit samples, humans tend to focus on more confined regions of the image, in contrast to the more dispersed observational pattern observed when viewing genuine images. Our dataset is publicly available at: https://github.com/aimagelab/unveiling-the-truth.

To combat the misuse of Large Language Models (LLMs), many recent studies have presented LLM-generated-text detectors with promising performance. When users instruct LLMs to generate texts, the instruction can include different constraints depending on the user's need. However, most recent studies do not cover such diverse instruction patterns when creating datasets for LLM detection. In this paper, we reveal that even task-oriented constraints -- constraints that would naturally be included in an instruction and are not related to detection-evasion -- cause existing powerful detectors to have a large variance in detection performance. We focus on student essay writing as a realistic domain and manually create task-oriented constraints based on several factors for essay quality. Our experiments show that the standard deviation (SD) of current detector performance on texts generated by an instruction with such a constraint is significantly larger (up to an SD of 14.4 F1-score) than that by generating texts multiple times or paraphrasing the instruction. We also observe an overall trend where the constraints can make LLM detection more challenging than without them. Finally, our analysis indicates that the high instruction-following ability of LLMs fosters the large impact of such constraints on detection performance.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are widely used in vision-language reasoning tasks. However, their vulnerability to adversarial prompts remains a serious concern, as safety mechanisms often fail to prevent the generation of harmful outputs. Although recent jailbreak strategies report high success rates, many responses classified as "successful" are actually benign, vague, or unrelated to the intended malicious goal. This mismatch suggests that current evaluation standards may overestimate the effectiveness of such attacks. To address this issue, we introduce a four-axis evaluation framework that considers input on-topicness, input out-of-distribution (OOD) intensity, output harmfulness, and output refusal rate. This framework identifies truly effective jailbreaks. In a substantial empirical study, we reveal a structural trade-off: highly on-topic prompts are frequently blocked by safety filters, whereas those that are too OOD often evade detection but fail to produce harmful content. However, prompts that balance relevance and novelty are more likely to evade filters and trigger dangerous output. Building on this insight, we develop a recursive rewriting strategy called Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). The approach restructures malicious prompts into semantically aligned sub-tasks, while introducing subtle OOD signals and visual cues that make the inputs harder to detect. BSD was tested across 13 commercial and open-source MLLMs, where it consistently led to higher attack success rates, more harmful outputs, and fewer refusals. Compared to previous methods, it improves success rates by 67% and harmfulness by 21%, revealing a previously underappreciated weakness in current multimodal safety systems.

Spear-phishing attacks present a significant security challenge, with large language models (LLMs) escalating the threat by generating convincing emails and facilitating target reconnaissance. To address this, we propose a detection approach based on a novel document vectorization method that utilizes an ensemble of LLMs to create representation vectors. By prompting LLMs to reason and respond to human-crafted questions, we quantify the presence of common persuasion principles in the email's content, producing prompted contextual document vectors for a downstream supervised machine learning model. We evaluate our method using a unique dataset generated by a proprietary system that automates target reconnaissance and spear-phishing email creation. Our method achieves a 91\% F1 score in identifying LLM-generated spear-phishing emails, with the training set comprising only traditional phishing and benign emails. Key contributions include a novel document vectorization method utilizing LLM reasoning, a publicly available dataset of high-quality spear-phishing emails, and the demonstrated effectiveness of our method in detecting such emails. This methodology can be utilized for various document classification tasks, particularly in adversarial problem domains.