Whether the Federal Circuit has erred in holding that a claimed invention cannot be held "obvious", and thus unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § lO3(a), in the absence of some proven "'teaching, suggestion, or motivation' that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed."


Whether the private right of action for violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., encompasses redress for retaliation for complaints about unlawful sex discrimination.


Whether a defendant-who has fraudulently obtained a loan and thus owes restitution for the loan under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)-returns "any part" of the loan money by giving the lenders the collateral that secures the money?


Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt for money obtained by means of fraud (and certain other categories of debt) is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. This case presents a question that has divided the courts of appeals:
Whether an otherwise nondischargeable debt becomes dischargeable if the parties enter into a settlement agreement resolving the amount of the debt?


In Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), this Court held that the First Amendment forbids the government from attempting to level the playing field in elections by raising contribution limits for candidates who are outspent by self-financed opponents. Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act achieves a similar result by providing extra subsidies in the form of "matching funds" to publicly financed candidates who are outspent by independent expenditure groups and privately financed candidates. The questions presented are:
Whether the First Amendment forbids Arizona from providing additional government subsidies to publicly financed candidates that are triggered by independent expenditure groups' speech against such candidates?


Under well-established rules of agency law, an owner or corporate officer will not be held vicariously liable for the torts of his corporation or its other agents, merely by virtue of his office. Rather, liability must be founded upon the owner's or officer's own specific acts.
The question presented here is whether, as held by the Ninth Circuit, the criteria under the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.) are different, so that owners and officers of corporations are absolutely liable for an employee's or agent's violation of the Act, whether or not they personally directed, authorized, or were even aware of the particular acts that occurred.


QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
I.
Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the "IDEA")'s attorneys' fees shifting provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), authorize a court to award "expert" fees to  the parents of a child with a disability who is a prevailing party under the IDEA?


This Court has held that police officers who procure and execute warrants later determined invalid are entitled to qualified immunity, and evidence obtained should not be suppressed, so long as the warrant is not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920, 923 (1984); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,341,344-45 (1986). The Questions Presented are:
Under these standards, are officers entitled to qualified immunity where they obtained a facially valid warrant to search for firearms, firearm-related materials, and gang-related items in the residence of a gang member and felon who had threatened to kill his girlfriend and fired a sawed-off shotgun at her, and a district attorney approved the application, no factually on-point case law prohibited the search, and the alleged overbreadth in the warrant did not expand the scope of the search?


Whether a racial minority group that constitutes less than 50% of a proposed district’s population can state a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.


QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
1. Can a trial court’s unconstitutional exclusion of reliable evidence of third party guilt be deemed harmless error?
2. This Court’s decisions in Holmes v. South Carolina __U.S.___, 164 L.Ed.2d 503, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006), and House v. Bell, __U.S.__, 2006 U.S. Lexis 4675 (2006), were handed down after the decision of the Ninth Circuit below. Should this Court issue a GVR order in this case, directing the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its decision that the unconstitutional exclusion of reliable evidence of third party guilt can be harmless, in light of Holmes and House?
If constitutional error in a state trial is not recognized by the judiciary until the case ends up in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is the prejudicial impact of the error assessed under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), or that enunciated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)? Does it matter which harmless error standard is employed? And, if the Brecht standard applies, does the petitioner or the State bear the burden of persuasion on the question of prejudice?


Whether the Florida scheme for identifying mentally retarded defendants in capital cases violates Atkins v. Virginia.


Whether the Second Amendment forbids the District of Columbia from banning private possession of handguns while allowing possession of rifles and shotguns.
Whether the following provisions - D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02 - violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes?


Did Congress intend the Federal Railroad Safety Acts to preempt state law-based tort lawsuits?


Whether a large monument, 6 feet high and 3 feet wide, presenting the Ten Commandments, located on government property between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court, is an impermissible establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment.


Whether a private party who has not been the subject of an underlying civil action pursuant to CERCLA Sections 106 or 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 or 9607, may bring an action seeking contribution pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), to recover costs spent voluntarily to clean up properties contaminated by hazardous substances.


Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar retrial after the trial judge erroneously holds a particular fact to be an element of the offense and then grants a midtrial directed verdict of acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove that fact?


The Federal Impact Aid Program, 20 U.S.C. § 7709, was enacted to subsidize local State school districts which have a federal presence within the district such as military bases or, as in the present case, Indian Reservations. These local districts are not able to tax such federally impacted lands. The Impact Aid Program prohibits the State from counting these federal subsidies as part of an impacted district’s budget when the State allocates operational funds to the local districts, unless the State’s operational funding to districts throughout the State is “equalized” under an equalization formula under the Impact Aid Program. If the State’s operational funding is determined to be “equalized,” the State can reduce operational funding to an impacted district by the amount of the Impact Aid subsidy. In 1994, the equalization formula was statutorily created and effectively repealed the equalization formula previously created by the Secretary of the United States Department of Education by regulation. However, in 1996, the Secretary, by regulation, reinstated his repealed and conflicting equalization formula and refuses to follow Congress’ equalization formula. Under Congress’ formula, New Mexico is not “equalized” and the intended beneficiaries receive the Impact Aid. Under the Secretary’s formula, New Mexico is deemed “equalized” and the Impact Aid is taken from the impacted districts. The impacted districts are losing approximately $50,000,000 per year in Impact Aid. The Tenth Circuit was split 6 to 6 on the question, leaving the Secretary’s formula in effect.
Whether the Secretary has the authority to create and impose his formula over the one prescribed by Congress and through this process certify New Mexico’s operational funding for fiscal year 1999- 2000 as “equalized,” thereby diverting the Impact Aid subsidies to the State and whether this is one of the rare cases where this Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to correct a plain error that affects all State school districts that educate federally connected children.


The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (lMLA), 25 U.S.C. 396a et seq., and regulations thereunder, authorize an Indian Tribe, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary), to lease tribal lands for mining purposes. The question presented is:
Whether the court of appeals properly held that the United States is liable to the Navajo Nation for up to $600 million in damages for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Secretary's actions concerning an Indian mineral lease, without finding that the Secretary had violated any specific statutory or regulatory duty established pursuant to the IMLA.


Whether the Sixth Amendment, as construed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), is violated by the imposition of consecutive sentences based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.
Whether the Sixth Amendment, as construed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), requires that facts (other than prior convictions) necessary to imposing consecutive sentences be found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.


The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual directs a court to "use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced" unless "the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution." Eight courts of appeals have held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated where retroactive application of the Sentencing Guidelines creates a significant risk of a higher sentence. In the decision below, however, the Seventh Circuit has held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is never violated by retroactive application of the Sentencing Guidelines because the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory.
Does a sentencing court violate the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing rather than the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, if the newer Guidelines create a significant risk that the defendant will receive a longer sentence?


QUESTION PRESENTED:
Does it violate the Constitution for a state capital-sentencing statute to provide for the imposition of the death penalty when the sentencing jury determines that the mitigating and aggravating evidence is in equipoise?


At the end of ten years of capital federal habeas corpus proceedings in the district court, respondent suddenly complained about and sought replacement of his court-appointed public defender with a new appointed lawyer. The district court refused, explaining that "it appears Petitioner's counsel is doing a proper job" and that "[n]o conflict of interest or inadequacy of counsel is shown," and thereupon issued its ruling denying habeas corpus relief. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit appointed a replacement lawyer, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings to allow the new lawyer to raise additional claims for relief. The Ninth Circuit explained that no showing of ineffectiveness of counsel was required, for it was enough that Clair had expressed "dissatisfaction" and had alleged that the public defender was failing to pursue potentially important evidence.
Whether a condemned state prisoner in federal habeas corpus proceedings is entitled to replace his court-appointed counsel with another court appointed lawyer just because he expresses dissatisfaction and alleges that his counsel was failing to pursue potentially important evidence.


Does the anti-retaliation provision of section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act protect a worker from being dismissed because she cooperated with her employer's internal investigation of sexual harassment?


Whether, if a jury deadlocks on a lesser-included offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars reprosecution of a greater offense after a jury announces that it has voted against guilt on the greater offense.


Whether a foreign corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction, on causes of action not arising out of or related to any contacts between it and the forum state, merely because other entities distribute in the forum state products placed in the stream of commerce by the defendant.


Did the Seventh Circuit err when, in conflict with the First and Eleventh Circuits, it held that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 does not apply to all defendants sentenced after its enactment?


Whether to establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the objector must show that it is more likely than not the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias?


The Copyright Act expressly prescribes a three -year statute of limitations for civil copyright claims. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). The three-year period accrues separately for each act of infringement, even if it is one of a continuing series of acts of infringement. The federal courts of appeals have divided 3-2-1 over whether the nonstatutory defense of laches can bar a civil copyright suit brought within the express three-year statute of limitations.
Whether the nonstatutory defense of laches is available without restriction to bar all remedies for civil copyright claims filed within the three-year statute of limitations prescribed by Congress, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b).


This case involves the same issue raised by Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., No.97-288 (October Tenn, 1997), cert. granted, 522 U.S. 978 (1997), cert. dismissed, 523 U.S. 1113 (1998): whether common law tort claims that a boat was defectively designed because it lacked a propeller guard are preempted by federal law. In Lewis, the United States submitted an amicus curiae brief stating the federal government's view that such claims are not preempted. Lewis, however, settled after oral argument, before any decision was rendered. This case presents the first meaningful opportunity for the Court to consider this preemption issue since Lewis.
Whether the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (1988 & Supp. 1993), preempts state common law claims that a recreational motor boat was defectively designed because it lacked a propeller guard when: (1) the Act expressly provides that '[c]ompliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law' (46 U.S.C. § 4311(g)); (2) the U.S. Coast Guard has never adopted any standard or regulation with respect to propeller guards; and (3) the United States has taken the position that common law no-propeller-guard claims do not conflict with or otherwise frustrate any federal statutory or regulatory purpose?


Whether the erroneous denial of a criminal defendant’s peremptory challenge that resulted in the challenged juror being seated requires automatic reversal of a conviction because it undermines the trial structure for preserving the constitutional right to due process and an impartial jury.


To encourage development and expedite introduction of phamaceuticals, Congress amended the patent laws in 1984 to insulate drug research from charges of infringement so long as the research is "reasonably related to the development and submission of information" to the Food and Drug Administration.
Did the Federal Circuit err in concluding that this drug-research safe harbor does not protect animal studies of the sort that are essential to the development of new drugs, where the research will be presented to the FDA, and where barring the research until expiration of the patent could mean years of delay in the availability of life-saving new drugs?


Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d), or 42 U.S.C. § 1981?


Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(l)(C) Permits An Amended Complaint To "Relate Back", For Limitation Purposes, When The Amendment Corrects A, "Mistake Concerning The Proper Party's Identity". Other Circuit Courts of Appeal Construe The Rule As Applying To Substitution Of The Correct Defendant For A Related Corporation With A Similar Name. The Eleventh Circuit Has Concluded That There Can Be No Such "Mistake" Where The Plaintiff Had Imputed Knowledge Of The Identity Of The Added Defendant Prior To Filing Suit. Does The Eleventh Circuit Construction Of Rule 15(c)(l)(C) Undermine The Purpose Of The Rule And Is It Inconsistent With The Decisions In Other Circuits?


Whether a state forensic analyst’s laboratory report prepared for use in a criminal prosecution is “testimonial” evidence subject to the demands of the Confrontation Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).


The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employment practices that have an unjustified disparate impact on older workers, Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 22(2005), but also provides that it "shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). The questions presented are:
Whether an employee alleging disparate impact under the ADEA bears the burden of persuasion on the "reasonable factors other than age" defense, as held by the Second Circuit in this case in conflict with the decisions of other circuits and a regulation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.


In granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, did the Ninth Circuit deny the state court judgment the deference mandated by 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) and impermissibly enlarge the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel by elevating the value of expert-opinion testimony in a manner that would virtually always require defense counsel to produce such testimony rather than allowing him to rely instead on cross-examination or other methods designed to create reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt?


Does 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) make the Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy for claims arising from medical care and related functions provided by Public Health Service personnel, thus barring Bivens actions?


Whether Congress' decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act exceeded its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.
Whether Congress' decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.


Whether the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of evidence when officers conduct a search under an anticipatory warrant after the warrant's triggering condition is satisfied, but the triggering condition is not set forth either in the warrant itself or in an affidavit that is both incorporated into the warrant and shown to the person whose property is being searched.


Whether a state's parens patriae action is removable as a "mass action" under the Class Action Fairness Act when the state is the sole plaintiff, the claims arise under state law, and the state attorney general possesses statutory and common-law authority to assert all claims in the complaint.


Indian tribal courts inherently lack jurisdiction to hear claims between members and nonmembers. In Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981), this Court identified two narrow exceptions. The first relates to regulation of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or its members. The second relates to civil authority concerning activity that directly affects the tribe’s political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare. This Court, however, has never upheld tribal-court, civil-adjudicatory jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant under the first Montana exception, and expressly left this question open in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001). The question presented is:
Whether Indian tribal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims as an “other means” of regulating the conduct of a nonmember bank owning fee-land on a reservation that entered into a private commercial agreement with a member-owned corporation?


The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5, provides an express private right of action to "obtain appropriate relief against a government," id. § 2000cc-2. The statute defines "government" to include state and local governmental entities and any "official of [such] an entity." Id § 2000cc-5(4) (A). The Fifth Circuit held, in conflict with the decisions of other courts, that the Constitution prohibits Congress from authorizing damages claims against states, or against state officials in their individual or personal capacities, for violations of the statute. The question presented is:
Whether an individual may sue a state or state official in his official capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc et seq. (2000 ed.).


The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) provides that, "[o]n a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that, "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs-other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the prevailing party."
The first question presented is whether a prevailing defendant in an FDCPA case may be awarded costs where the lawsuit was not "brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment."


Whether a party that is potentially responsible for the cost of cleaning up property contaminated by hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., but that does not satisfy the requirements for bringing an action for contribution under Section 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9613(f), may bring an action against another potentially responsible party under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a).


Is an oral complaint of a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act protected conduct under the anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)?


Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that federal courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction" over "violations of [the Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a). The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that §27 provides federal jurisdiction over state-law claims seeking to establish liability based on violations the Act or its regulations or seeking to enforce duties created by the Act or its regulations. In acknowledged conflict with those decisions, the Third Circuit in this case joined the Second Circuit in holding that § 27 does not itself create federal jurisdiction over state-law claims that otherwise fall within its terms.
Whether § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 provides federal jurisdiction over state-Iaw claims seeking to establish liability based on violations of the Act or its regulations or seeking to enforce duties created by the Act or its regulations.


Whether a district court's denial of a criminal defendant's qualified right to be represented by counsel of choice requires automatic reversal of his conviction.


Whether the Attorney General has permissibly construed the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and its implementing regulations to prohibit the distribution of federally controlled substances for the purpose of facilitating an individual's suicide, regardless of a state law purporting to authorize such distribution.


This case presents a recurring question of proof in employment discrimination cases:
Whether a district court must admit “me, too” evidence - testimony, by nonparties, alleging discrimination at the hands of persons who played no role in the adverse employment decision challenged by the plaintiff.


Whether the bright-line rule announced in New York v. Belton is confined to situations in which the police initiate contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that person is in the vehicle?


In California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585-586 (2000), this Court specified how States could structure a top-two primary system that does not violate the associational rights of a political party. Pursuant to the Initiative power which the People of the State of Washington reserved to themselves in their State Constitution, the voters of the State of Washington enacted a top-two primary law that the Washington State Grange had drafted to comply with Jones. That law makes the State primary a contest to select the two most popular candidates for the November ballot - regardless of party nominations or party selection. That law also allows candidates for certain offices to disclose on the ballot the name of the party (if any) which that candidate personally prefers. The Ninth Circuit invalidated this top-two primary system in its entirety, holding that the First Amendment (applied to the States through the 14th Amendment) prohibits a State from so allowing a candidate to disclose the name of the party he or she personally prefers on the ballot.
Does the First Amendment prohibit top-two election systems that allow a candidate to disclose on the ballot the name of the party he or she personally prefers?


In the Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Congress acknowledged and apologized for the United States’ role in that overthrow.
The question here is whether this symbolic resolution strips Hawaii of its sovereign authority to sell, exchange, or transfer 1.2 million acres of state land—29 percent of the total land area of the State and almost all the land owned by the State—unless and until it reaches a political settlement with native Hawaiians about the status of that land.


Petitioner admitted that she tried to injure her husband's paramour by spreading toxic chemicals on the woman's car and mailbox. Instead of allowing local officials to handle this domestic dispute, the federal prosecutor indicted petitioner under a federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 229(a), enacted by Congress to implement the United States' obligations under a 1993 treaty addressing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Facing a sentence of six years in prison, petitioner challenged the statute and her resulting conviction as exceeding the federal government's enumerated powers and impermissible under the Tenth Amendment. Declining to reach petitioner's constitutional arguments, and in acknowledged conflict with decisions from other courts of appeals, the Third Circuit held that, when the state and its officers are not party to the proceedings, a private party has no standing to challenge the federal statute under which she is convicted as in excess of Congress's enumerated powers and in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
Whether a criminal defendant convicted under a federal statute has standing to challenge her conviction on grounds that, as applied to her, the statute is beyond the federal government's enumerated powers and inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.


Whether using a vehicle while knowingly or intentionally fleeing from a law enforcement officer after being ordered to stop constitutes a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).


The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (the Act), Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 1531), prohibits a physician from knowingly performing a "partial-birth abortion" (as defined in the statute) in or affecting interstate commerce. § 3, 117 Stat. 1206-1207. The Act contains an exception for cases in which the abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the mother, but no corresponding exception for the health of the mother. Congress, however, made extensive factual findings, including a finding that "partial-birth abortion is never medically indicated to preserve the health of the mother." § 2(14)(0), 117 Stat. 1206.
Whether, notwithstanding Congress's determination that a health exception was unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is invalid because it lacks a health exception or is otherwise unconstitutional on its face.


In disputes involving a multi-staged dispute resolution process, does a court or instead the arbitrator determine whether a precondition to arbitration has been satisfied?


Justice Brent Benjamin of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to recuse himself from the appeal of the $50 million jury verdict in this case, even though the CEO of the lead defendant spent $3 million supporting his campaign for a seat on the court--more than 60% of the total amount spent to support Justice Benjamin's campaign-- while preparing to appeal the verdict against his company. After winning election to the court, Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the court's 3-2 decision overturning that verdict.
The question presented is whether Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from participation in his principal financial supporter's case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C., §§ 1331-1356 (OCSLA), governs those who work on oil drilling platforms and other fixed structures beyond state maritime boundaries. Workers are eligible for compensation for "any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf." 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2006).
When an outer continental shelf worker is injured on land, is he (or his heir): (1) always eligible for compensation, because his employer's operations on the shelf are the but for cause of his injury (as the Third Circuit holds); or (2) never eligible for compensation, because the Act applies only to injuries occurring on the shelf (as the Fifth Circuit holds); (3) sometimes eligible for compensation, because eligibility for benefits depends on the nature and extent of the factual relationship between the injury and the operations on the shelf (as the Ninth Circuit holds)?


Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth three alternative standards for determining if a chapter 11 plan is "fair and equitable" with respect to an objecting class of secured creditors. Petitioners, the Debtors, proposed a chapter 11 plan involving the sale of assets free of liens that satisfies one of these standards by providing their secured lender with the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim pursuant to Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). In an appeal certified directly from the bankruptcy court, the Seventh Circuit held that the Debtors could only satisfy the statute by allowing their secured creditor to bid its claim in lieu of cash (i.e., credit bid) at the sale pursuant to Section 1129(b )(2)(A)(ii). This holding directly conflicts with the Third Circuit's decision in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010), and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Scotia Pacific Co., LLC v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re Pacific Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009). The question presented is:
Whether a debtor may pursue a chapter 11 plan that proposes to sell assets free of liens without allowing the secured creditor to credit bid, but instead providing it with the indubitable equivalent of its claim under Section 1129(b )(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code.


IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:  "DOES THE COURT HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT?"
Whether the Supreme Court of South Carolina erred in holding-in conflict with twenty-two federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort-that an indigent defendant has no constitutional right to appointed counsel at a civil contempt proceeding that results in his incarceration.


Whether the "actual innocence" exception to the procedural default rule concerning federal habeas corpus claims should apply to noncapital sentencing error.


Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to the most difficult inmates in the prison system in an effort to promote security and good behavior violate the First Amendment under the standards of Turner and Overton?


Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. 1881a (Supp. II 2008)-referred to here as Section 1881a - allows the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to authorize jointly the "targeting of [non-United States] persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States" to acquire "foreign intelligence information," normally with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's prior approval of targeting and other procedures. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(a), (b), (g)(2) and (i)(3); cf. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(c) (2). Respondents are United States persons who may not be targeted for surveillance under Section 1881a. Respondents filed this action on the day that Section 1881a was enacted, seeking both a declaration that Section 1881a is unconstitutional and an injunction permanently enjoining any foreign-intelligence surveillance from being conducted under Section 1881a. The question presented is:
Whether respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief because they proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire their international communications using Section 1881a-authorized surveillance and did not show that an injunction prohibiting Section 1881a-authorized surveillance would likely redress their purported injuries.


Under state law, the Michigan Liquor Control Commission generally bans out-of- state direct shipment of alcoholic liquor to consumers' doorsteps, but permits in- state licensed wineries to direct ship to consumers, and out-of-state wineries to import through in-state licensed wholesalers. Out-of-state wineries may also petition the State Liquor Control Commission for an order permitting them to ship wine directly to consumers in the State. Any denial of such a request may be appealed through the State court system. Section 2 of the 21st Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly prohibits importation of alcoholic beverages into any state for delivery or use, in violation of the laws of the State. The Court of Appeals declared Michigan's alcoholic liquor importation law facially unconstitutional in violation of the Commerce Clause. The question presented is:
Does Michigan's regulation of the importation of beverage alcohol under the 21st Amendment facially violate the Commerce Clause when it permits in-state licensed wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but requires out-of-state wineries to import its products through licensed in-state wholesalers and to sell its products through licensed retailers or request permission of the Liquor Control Commission to bypass this distribution system and ship directly to consumers?


The Ninth Circuit below vacated the jury’s verdict in favor of Petitioner Engquist and created a divisive split with the seven Circuits that apply the “rational basis” analysis to public employees who claim their termination was a result of unequal treatment, even if that treatment did not result from the employee’s membership in a suspect class. The first question presented is:
Whether traditional equal protection “rational basis” analysis under Village of Willowbrook v Olech, 528 US 562, 120 S Ct 1073, 145 L Ed 2d 1060 (2000) applies to public employers who intentionally treat similarly situated employees differently with no rational bases for arbitrary, vindictive or malicious reasons?


Whether a defendant’s failure to report for confinement “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” such that a conviction for escape based on that failure to report is a “violent felony” within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).


The statute in question, § 922(g)(1) of Title 18, United States Code, makes it unlawful: (g) ...for any person (1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year: ... to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm. In the instant matter, Petitioner's only conviction occurred in Okinawa, Japan, and it was this Japanese conviction that served as the predicate felony in this §922(g)(I) prosecution. The Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment arguing that foreign felonies were not intended to count as the term "in any court" means any court in the United States. The motion was denied. While the third Circuit's affirmance of the lower court is consistent with a 1989 decision of the Fourth Circuit and a 1986 decision of the Sixth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit in 2000 and the Second Circuit, on August 27, 2003, held that foreign convictions do not count. Consequently, a clear conflict exists among the five Circuit Courts which have addressed the issue.
Whether the term "convicted in any court" contained in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) includes convictions entered in foreign courts.


Does the Virginia statute that bans cross burning with intent to intimidate violate the First Amendment, even though the statute reaches all such intimidation and is not limited to any racial, religious or other content-focused category?


Whether taxpayers have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge on Establishment Clause grounds the actions of Executive Branch officials pursuant to an Executive Order, where the plaintiffs challenge no Act of Congress, the Executive Branch actions at issue are financed only indirectly through general appropriations, and no funds are disbursed to any entities or individuals outside the government.


After this Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found that its promulgation of motor vehicle greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards under Title II of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), compelled regulation of carbon dioxide and other GHGs under the CAA's Title I prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) and Title V stationary-source permitting programs. Even though EPA determined that including GHGs in these programs would vastly expand the programs contrary to Congress's intent, EPA adopted rules adding GHGs to the pollutants covered. The panel below held the CAA and Massachusetts compelled inclusion of GHGs and, based on that holding, dismissed all petitions to review the GHG permitting program rules on standing grounds. The questions presented are:
Whether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.


Did the Court of Appeals err in denying a certificate of appealability and in evaluating petitioner's claim under Batson v. Kentucky?


Did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals err when it held, in conflict with several other federal Courts of Appeals, that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) precludes a federal court from enforcing the parties’ clearly expressed agreement providing for more expansive judicial review of an arbitration award than the narrow standard of review otherwise provided for in the FAA?


Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code prescribes a penalty for an underpayment of federal income tax that is "attributable to" an overstatement of basis in property. 26 U.S.C. 6662(a), (b)(3), (e)(l)(A) and (h)(l). The question presented is as follows:
Whether the overstatement penalty applies to an underpayment resulting from a determination that a transaction lacks economic substance because the sole purpose of the transaction was to generate a tax loss by artificially inflating the taxpayer's basis in property.


Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit police from conducting a warrantless search of a person who is subject to a parole search condition, where there is no suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and the sole reason for the search is that the person is on parole?


Whether this Court's clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 holds that a prisoner is always "in custody" for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.


Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code, which was enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), authorizes federal tax-credit subsidies for health insurance coverage that is purchased through an "Exchange established by the State under section 1311" of the ACA.
The question presented is whether the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") may permissibly promulgate regulations to extend tax-credit subsidies to coverage purchased through Exchanges established by the federal government under section 1321 of the ACA.


1. Whether a habeas petitioner's claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the state court denied relief in an explained decision but did not expressly acknowledge a federal-law basis for the claim.

2. Whether, under § 2254, a federal habeas court (a) may grant relief on the ground that the petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to retain a biased juror on the panel and (b) may reject a state court’s finding of juror bias because it disagrees with the finding and the reasons stated for it, even where the finding was rationally supported by evidence in the state-court record.
Whether a habeas petitioner's claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the state court denied relief in an explained decision but did not expressly acknowledge a federal-law basis for the claim.


The question presented, over which there is a three-way split among six circuits, is:
Whether, and if so, under what circumstances, non-lawyer parents of a disabled child may prosecute an Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., case pro se in federal court.


Whether the Third Circuit erred in holding that state and local government employees may sue their employers for retaliation under the First Amendment's Petition Clause when they petitioned the government on matters of purely private concern, contrary to decisions by all ten other federal circuits and four state supreme courts that have ruled on the issue.


Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a lawful permanent resident who has been "convicted" of an "aggravated felony" is ineligible to seek cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). The courts of appeals have divided 4-2 on the following question presented by this case:
Whether a person convicted under state law for simple drug possession (a federal law misdemeanor) has been "convicted" of an "aggravated felony" on the theory that he could have been prosecuted for recidivist simple possession (a federal law felony), even though there was no charge or finding of a prior conviction in his prosecution for possession.


Whether a “theft offense,” which is an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(43)(G), includes aiding and abetting.


Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U .S.C. 2000bb et seq., requires the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession, and use of a Schedule I hallucinogenic controlled substance, where Congress has found that the substance has a high potential for abuse, it is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and its importation and distribution would violate an international treaty.


Whether an Indiana statute mandating that those seeking to vote in-person produce a government-issued photo identification violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.


In Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010), this Court made clear that "class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to arbitration." In this case, an arbitrator concluded that the parties affirmatively consented to class arbitration on the basis of a contract provision stating: "No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration." The question presented is:
Whether an arbitrator acts within his powers under the Federal Arbitration Act (as the Second and Third Circuits have held) or exceeds those powers (as the Fifth Circuit has held) by determining that parties affirmatively "agreed to authorize class arbitration," Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776, based solely on their use of broad contractual language precluding litigation and requiring arbitration of any dispute arising under their contract.


The First Circuit held that in order to receive the protections of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA" or "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq., a franchisee faced with an unlawful lease must either sign the lease and forego any potential claim that the lease violates the Act or refuse to sign the lease and then challenge the lease following receipt of a notice of nonrenewal. The Ninth Circuit rejected an interpretation of the PMPA that would require the franchisee to discontinue its business in order to preserve its rights under the Act. A single question is thus presented:
Whether the PMPA encompasses a claim for "constructive" nonrenewal of the franchise relationship where: (i) the petitioner-franchisees filed suit prior to receiving new lease agreements that violated the Act; (ii) the lease agreements were presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; (iii) respondent-franchisor stated it would terminate the franchises unless petitioners signed the lease agreements; and (iv) the franchisees signed the lease agreements, under protest, and pursued their legal claims against the franchisor.


Whether the three-judge district court erred in holding that the federal statutory prohibition on a corporation’s use of general treasury funds to finance “electioneering communications” is unconstitutional as applied to three broadcast advertisements that appellee proposed to run in 2004.


Whether Congress has the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.


The Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No.106-554, Div. B, Tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A-335, provides that a library that is otherwise eligible for special federal assistance for Internet access in the form of discount rates for educational purposes under the Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. 254(h) (Supp. V 1999), or grants under the Library Services and Technology Act, 20 U.S.C. 9121 et seq., may not receive that assistance unless the library has in place a policy that includes the operation of a "technology protection measure" on Internet-connected computers that protects against access by all persons to "visual depictions" that are "obscene" or "child pornography," and that protects against access by minors to "visual depictions" that are "harmful to minors." 47 U.S.C. 254(h)(6)(B) and (C) (Supp. V 1999); 20 U .S.C. 9134(f)(1).
The question presented is whether CIPA induces public libraries to violate the First Amendment, thereby exceeding Congress's power under the Spending Clause.


Does the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit a state legislature from removing the authority of state political subdivisions to make payroll deductions for political activities under a statute that is concededly valid as applied to state government employers?


18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) criminalizes the “use” of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense and imposes a mandatory consecutive sentence of at least five years’ imprisonment. In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), this Court held that “use” of a firearm under § 924(c) means “active employment.” Id. at 144. The question presented in this case is:
Whether mere receipt of an unloaded firearm as payment for drugs constitutes “use” of the firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A) and this Court’s decision in Bailey.


Whether merely hiding funds with no design to create the appearance of legitimate wealth is sufficient to support a money laundering conviction.


The California Burglary Statute Section 459 does not require as an element that a burglar enter or remain unlawfully in a building. The Ninth Circuit held that it could determine whether this missing element was shown to have been proven by applying the modified categorical approach. The issues presented are as follows:
Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Aguila-Montes De Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011), (En Banc) that a state conviction for burglary where the statute is missing an element of the generic crime, may be subject to the modified categorical approach, even though most other Circuit Courts of Appeal would not allow it.


Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. is a medical clinic formed as a professional corporation but which operates and has legal attributes of a partnership.
The question presented is whether a federal court should apply an economic realities test to determine if the Clinic's physician-shareholders are counted as 'employees' for the purpose of determining if the Clinic is a 'covered entity' subject to the ADA and other federal anti-discrimination statutes.


Whether a presidential foreign-affairs action that is otherwise exempt from environmental-review requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1), became subject to those requirements because an executive agency promulgated administrative rules concerning the implementation of the President's action.


Does this Court's decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), constitute a new rule of law that cannot be applied retroactively to award sentencing relief to a prisoner whose conviction became final before Mills was announced?


Bankruptcy Rules permit discharge of a student loan only through an adversary proceeding, commenced by filing a complaint and serving it and a summons on an appropriate agent of the creditor. Instead, debtor merely included a declaration of discharge in his Chapter 13 plan and mailed it to creditor's post office box. Does such procedure meet the rigorous demands of due process and entitle the resulting orders to respect under principles of res judicata?
Student loans are statutorily non-dischargeable in bankruptcy unless repayment would cause the debtor an "undue hardship." Debtor failed to prove undue hardship in an adversary proceeding as required by the Bankruptcy Rules, and instead, merely declared a discharge in his Chapter 13 plan. Are the orders confirming the plan and discharging debtor void?


I. Whether allegations of inadequacies in a monopolist's affirmative assistance to its rivals, including resellers--as newly provided by incumbent local telephone companies under the Telecommunications Act of 1996--state a claim for unlawful unilateral predatory conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
2. Whether antitrust and Communications Act standing extends to indirect purchasers, i.e., the customers of the defendant's customer, asserting injuries wholly derivative of the direct customer's injury, even when invoking only the direct customer's legal rights.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the District Court's dismissal of respondent's antitrust claims?


Whether the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the imprisonment of a juvenile for life without the possibility of parole as punishment for the juvenile's commission of a non-homicide.


Whether a permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation action, preventing all future speech about an admitted public figure, violates the First Amendment.


Whether Arthur Andersen LLP's conviction for witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. §1512(b) must be reversed because the jury instructions upheld by the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the elements of the offense, in conflict with decisions of this Court and the Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and D.C. Circuits


Whether the 30-day time limit in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) for filing a notice of appeal, or the 60-day time limit in Rule 4(a)(1)(B), applies to a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, where the United States has declined to intervene in that action.


Does the Fourth Amendment allow the States to collect and analyze DNA from people arrested and charged with serious crimes?


Proper interpretation of Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006), specifically whether a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or whether a defendant's previously-stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search is a continuing assertion of 4th Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a co-tenant.


The Fourth Circuit reversed a jury determination in favor of Albert Snyder ("Snyder") for the intentional harm perpetrated against him by Fred W. Phelps, Sr., Westboro Baptist Church, Incorporated, Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis and Shirley L. Phelps-Roper (collectively, "Phelps"). Snyder's claim arose out of Phelps' intentional acts at Snyder's son's funeral. Specifically the claims were: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) invasion of privacy and (3) civil conspiracy. These claims were dismissed by the Fourth Circuit notwithstanding that (a) Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell does not apply to private versus private individuals; (b) Snyder was a "captive" audience; (c) Phelps specifically targeted Snyder and his family; (d) Snyder proved that he was intentionally harmed by clear and convincing evidence;¹ and (e) Phelps disrupted Snyder's mourning process. The Fourth Circuit's decision gives no credence to Snyder's personal stake in honoring and mourning his son and ignores Snyder's right to bury his son with dignity and respect.
Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell apply to a private person versus another private person concerning a private matter?


Whether the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals appellate review for “unreasonableness” has preserved de facto mandatory Guidelines, contrary this Court’s ruling in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), by discouraging district courts from sentencing outside of the recommended guidelines ranges?
1) WAS THE DISTRICT COURT’S CHOICE OF WITHIN-GUIDELINES SENTENCE REASONABLE? 2) IN MAKING THAT DETERMINATION, IS IT CONSISTENT WITH UNITED STATES V. BOOKER, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), TO ACCORD A PRESUMPTION OF REASONABLENESS TO WITHIN-GUIDELINES SENTENCES? 3) IF SO, CAN THAT PRESUMPTION JUSTIFY A SENTENCE IMPOSED WITHOUT AN EXPLICIT ANALYSIS BY THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) FACTORS AND ANY OTHER FACTORS THAT MIGHT JUSTIFY A LESSER SENTENCE?


Prosecutors in the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office hid exculpatory evidence, violating John Thompson's rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Despite no history of similar violations, the office was found liable under § 1983 for failing to train prosecutors. Inadequate training may give rise to municipal liability if it shows "deliberate indifference" and actually causes a violation. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 658, 389-91 (1978); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-07 (1997). A pattern of violations is usually necessary to show culpability and causation, but in rare cases one violation may suffice. Bryan County, 520 U.S., at 409. The Court has hypothesized only one example justifying single-incident liability: a failure to train police officers on using deadly force. See Canton, 489 U.S., at 390 n.10.
Does imposing failure-to-train liability on a district attorney's office for a single Brady violation contravene the rigorous culpability and causation standards of Canton and Bryan County?


This Court has held that antitrust “per se rules are appropriate only for conduct that . . .  would always or almost always tend to restrict competition.” Modern economic analysis establishes that vertical minimum resale price maintenance does not meet this condition because the practice often has substantial competition-enhancing effects. QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
The question presented is whether vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements should be deemed per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, or whether they should instead be evaluated under the rule of reason.


WHETHER A COURT MAY CONSIDER A JUVENILE'S AGE IN A MIRANDA CUSTODY ANALYSIS IN EVALUATING THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND DETERMINING WHETHER A REASONABLE PERSON IN THE JUVENILE'S POSITION WOULD HAVE FELT HE OR SHE WAS NOT FREE TO TERMINATE POLICE QUESTIONING AND LEAVE?


Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070) to address the illegal immigration crisis in the State. The four provisions of S.B. 1070 enjoined by the courts below authorize and direct state law-enforcement officers to cooperate and communicate with federal officials regarding the enforcement of federal immigration law and impose penalties under state law for non-compliance with federal immigration requirements.
The question presented is whether the federal immigration laws preclude Arizona's efforts at cooperative law enforcement and impliedly preempt these four provisions of S.B. 1070 on their face.


Should this Court grant certiorari to resolve the conflict among federal and state courts on whether an occupant may give law enforcement valid consent to search the common areas of the premises shared with another, even though the other occupant is present and objects to the search?


In order for a United States citizen who has a child abroad with a non-U.S. citizen to transmit his or her citizenship to the foreign-born child, the U.S.-citizen parent must have been physically present in the United States for a particular period of time prior to the child's birth. The questions presented are:
Whether Congress's decision to impose a different physical-presence requirement on unwed citizen mothers of foreign-born children than on other citizen parents of foreign-born children through 8 U.S.C. 1401 and 1409 (1958) violates the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.


The deadlines for objecting to a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy are set by Bankruptcy Rule 4004. The Fifth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and a majority of the district and bankruptcy courts hold that the deadlines for objecting to discharge are jurisdictional and cannot be waived. On the other hand, the Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits and a minority of district and bankruptcy courts follow the view that such time limits are not jurisdictional and may be waived. Thus, the question presented is:
Whether the deadlines established by the bankruptcy rules for objecting to discharge are jurisdictional.


Whether an employer may be held liable for retaliatory discrimination under Title VII for any "materially adverse change in the terms of employment" (including a temporary suspension rescinded by the employer with full back pay or an inconvenient reassignment, as the court below held); for any adverse treatment that was "reasonably likely to deter" the plaintiff from engaging in protected activity (as the Ninth Circuit holds); or only for an "ultimate employment decision" (as two other courts of appeals hold).


This case involves a challenge to the FCC's jurisdiction to implement §332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, titled "Preservation of Local Zoning Authority." Section 332(c) (7) imposes certain limitations on State and local zoning authority over the placement of wireless service facilities, but authorizes the FCC to address only one of these limitations; it states that no other provision "in this Act" may ''limit'' or "affect" State and local authority over wireless facilities placement. The FCC concluded that other provisions "in this Act" authorize it to adopt national zoning standards to implement §332(c)(7). The Fifth Circuit deferred to the FCC's jurisdictional determination applying Chevron U. S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but acknowledged that "[the Supreme Court has not yet conclusively resolved the question of whether Chevron applies in the context of an agency's determination of its own statutory jurisdiction, and the circuit courts of appeals have adopted different approaches to this issue." The case presents two questions:
Whether, contrary to the decisions of at least two other circuits, and in light of this Court's guidance, a court should apply Chevron to review an agency's determination of its own jurisdiction.


Whether a securities fraud plaintiff invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory must demonstrate loss causation by pleading and proving a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the investment's subsequent decline in price.


Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff's claims.


As the Tenth Circuit acknowledged in its decision below, the circuits are openly divided over the elements required to convict a defendant of federal bank fraud. The question presented is:
Whether the Government must prove that the defendant intended to defraud a bank and expose it to risk of loss in every prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1344.


Did the court of appeals err 1) in creating a new, heightened preemption test under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution ("the Elections Clause") that is contrary to this Court's authority and conflicts with other circuit court decisions, and 2) in holding that under that test the National Voter Registration Act preempts an Arizona law that requests persons who are registering to vote to show evidence that they are eligible to vote?


Congress effected a sweeping and comprehensive restructuring of the Nation's health-insurance markets in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 109 (2010) (collectively, the "ACA” or "Act"). But the Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth Circuit now have issued directly conflicting final judgments about the facial constitutionality of the ACA's mandate that virtually every individual American must obtain health insurance. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. Moreover, despite the fact that the mandate is a "requirement" that Congress itself deemed "essential" to the Act's new insurance regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I), the Eleventh Circuit held that the mandate is severable from the remainder of the Act.
Whether the ACA must be invalidated in its entirety because it is non-severable from the individual mandate that exceeds Congress' limited and enumerated powers under the Constitution.


Whether the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a, prohibits retaliation against employees who complain of age discrimination.