Miranda v. Arizona
1966 U.S. Supreme Court case establishing the use of the Miranda warning
1966 United States Supreme Court case
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that law enforcement in the United States must warn a person of their constitutional rights before interrogating them, or else the person's statements cannot be used as evidence at their trial. Specifically, the Court held that under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the government cannot use a person's statements made in response to an interrogation while in police custody as evidence at the person's criminal trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the right to consult with a lawyer before and during questioning, and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights but also voluntarily waived them before answering questions.
"Miranda" was viewed by many as a radical change in American criminal law, since the Fifth Amendment was traditionally understood only to protect Americans against formal types of compulsion to confess, such as threats of contempt of court. It has had a significant impact on law enforcement in the United States, by making what became known as the "Miranda" warning part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights, which would become known as ""Miranda" rights". The concept of "Miranda warnings" quickly caught on across American law enforcement agencies, who came to call the practice "Mirandizing".
Pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court decision "Berghuis v. Thompkins" (2010), criminal suspects who are aware of their right to silence and to an attorney but choose not to "unambiguously" invoke them may find any subsequent voluntary statements treated as an implied waiver of their rights, and used as or as part of evidence.
Background.
Legal.
In 1951 "Legal Aid in the United States", a report in the Survey of the Legal Profession series, was published by the American Bar Association. It identified large gaps in the availability of legal services in both civil and criminal cases for those unable to afford a lawyer. By the early 1960s, in response to the report, efforts by various bar associations to expand legal aid for defendants had resulted in a substantial increase in services albeit still with large areas of the country underserved.
In the civil realm, it led to the creation of the Legal Services Corporation under the Great Society program of Lyndon B. Johnson. "Escobedo v. Illinois", a case which closely foreshadowed "Miranda," provided for the presence of counsel during police interrogation.
Factual.
On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested by the Phoenix Police Department officers Carroll Cooley and Wilfred Young, based on circumstantial evidence linking him to the kidnapping and rape of an 18-year-old woman 10 days earlier. After two hours of interrogation by police officers, Miranda signed a confession to the rape charge on forms that included the typed statement: "I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me."
However, at no time was Miranda told of his right to counsel. Before being presented with the form on which he was asked to write out the confession that he had already given orally, he was not advised of his right to remain silent, nor was he informed that his statements during the interrogation would be used against him. At trial, when prosecutors offered Miranda's written confession as evidence, his court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, objected that because of these facts, the confession was not truly voluntary and should be excluded. Moore's objection was overruled, and based on this confession and other evidence, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping. He was sentenced to 20–30 years of imprisonment on each charge, with sentences to run concurrently. Moore filed Miranda's appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming that Miranda's confession was not fully voluntary and should not have been admitted into the court proceedings. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the confession in "State v. Miranda", 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965). In affirmation, the Arizona Supreme Court heavily emphasized the fact that Miranda did not specifically request an attorney.
Attorney John Paul Frank, former law clerk to Justice Hugo Black, represented Miranda in his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Gary K. Nelson represented Arizona.
Supreme Court decision.
On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court issued a 5–4 decision in Miranda's favor that overturned his conviction and remanded his case back to Arizona for retrial.
Opinion of the Court.
Five justices formed the majority and joined an opinion written by Chief Justice Earl Warren. The Court ruled that because of the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation by police (Warren cited several police training manuals that had not been provided in the arguments), no confession could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect has been made aware of his rights and the suspect has then waived them:
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
Thus, Miranda's conviction was overturned. The Court also made clear what must happen if a suspect chooses to exercise their rights:
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.
Warren also pointed to the existing procedures of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which required informing a suspect of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, provided free of charge if the suspect was unable to pay. If the suspect requested counsel, "the interview is terminated." Warren included the FBI's four-page brief in his opinion.
Clark's concurrence in part, dissent in part.
In a separate concurrence in part, dissent in part, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that the Warren Court went "too far too fast." Instead, Justice Clark would use the "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated by Justice Goldberg in "Haynes v. Washington". Under this test, the court would:
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />consider in each case whether the police officer prior to custodial interrogation added the warning that the suspect might have counsel present at the interrogation and, further, that a court would appoint one at his request if he was too poor to employ counsel. In the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the State to prove that counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that in the totality of the circumstances, including the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly voluntary.
Harlan's dissent.
In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote that "nothing in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents squares with the heavy-handed and one-sided action that is so precipitously taken by the Court in the name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities." Harlan closed his remarks by quoting former Justice Robert H. Jackson: "This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added."
White's dissent.
Justice Byron White took issue with the court having announced a new constitutional right when it had no "factual and textual bases" in the Constitution or previous opinions of the Court for the rule announced in the opinion. He stated: "The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment." White did not believe the right had any basis in English common law.
White further warned of the dire consequences of the majority opinion:
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />I have no desire whatsoever to share the responsibility for any such impact on the present criminal process.
In some unknown number of cases, the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a loss, in human dignity.
Subsequent developments.
Retrial.
Miranda was retried in 1967 after the original case against him was thrown out. This time the prosecution, instead of using the confession, introduced other evidence and called witnesses. One witness was Twila Hoffman, a woman with whom Miranda was living at the time of the offense; she testified that he had told her of committing the crime. Miranda was convicted in 1967 and sentenced to serve 20 to 30 years. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court denied review. Miranda was paroled in 1972. After his release, he returned to his old neighborhood and made a modest living autographing police officers' "Miranda cards" that contained the text of the warning for reading to arrestees. Miranda was stabbed to death during an argument in a bar on January 31, 1976. A suspect was arrested, but due to a lack of evidence against him, he was released.
Another three defendants whose cases had been tied in with Miranda's – an armed robber, a stick-up man, and a bank robber – either made plea bargains to lesser charges or were found guilty again despite the exclusion of their confessions.
Reaction.
The "Miranda" decision was widely criticized when it came down, as many felt it was unfair to inform suspected criminals of their rights, as outlined in the decision. Richard Nixon and conservatives denounced "Miranda" for undermining the efficiency of the police, and argued the ruling would contribute to an increase in crime. Nixon, upon becoming president, promised to appoint judges who would reverse the philosophy that he viewed as "soft on crime." Many supporters of law enforcement were angered by the decision's negative view of police officers.
Miranda warning.
After the "Miranda" decision, the nation's police departments were required to inform arrested persons or suspects of their rights under the ruling prior to custodial interrogation or their answers would not be admissible in court. Such information is called a Miranda warning. Since it is usually required that the suspects be asked if they understand their rights, courts have also ruled that any subsequent waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Many American police departments have pre-printed Miranda waiver forms that a suspect must sign and date (after hearing and reading the warnings again) if an interrogation is to occur.
Data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports show a sharp reduction in the clearance rate of violent and property crimes after "Miranda". However, according to other studies from the 1960s and 1970s, "contrary to popular belief, Miranda had little, if any, effect on detectives' ability to solve crimes."
Legal developments.
The federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 purported to overrule "Miranda" for federal criminal cases and restore the "totality of the circumstances" test that had prevailed previous to "Miranda". The validity of this provision of the law, which is still codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501, was not ruled on for another 30 years because the Justice Department never attempted to rely on it to support the introduction of a confession into evidence at any criminal trial.
"Miranda" was undermined by several subsequent decisions that seemed to grant exceptions to the Miranda warnings, challenging the ruling's claim to be a necessary corollary of the Fifth Amendment. The exceptions and developments that occurred over the years included:
"United States v. Garibay" (1998) clarified an important matter regarding the scope of "Miranda". Defendant Jose Garibay barely spoke English and clearly showed a lack of understanding; indeed, "the agent admitted that he had to rephrase questions when the defendant appeared confused." Because of the defendant's low I.Q. and poor English-language skills, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that it was a "clear error" when the district court found that Garibay had "knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights." The court investigated his waiver and discovered that it was missing all items for which they were looking: he never signed a waiver, he only received his warnings verbally and in English, and no interpreter was provided although they were available. With an opinion that stressed "the requirement that a defendant 'knowingly and intelligently' waive his Miranda rights," the Court reversed Garibay's conviction and remanded his case.
"Miranda" survived a strong challenge in "Dickerson v. United States", 530 U.S. 428 (2000), when the validity of Congress's overruling of "Miranda" through § 3501 was tested. At issue was whether the Miranda warnings were actually compelled by the Constitution, or were rather merely measures enacted as a matter of judicial policy. In "Dickerson", the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld "Miranda" 7–2 and stated that "the warnings have become part of our national culture". In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that "Miranda" warnings were not constitutionally required. He cited several cases demonstrating a majority of the then-current court, counting himself, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, as well as Rehnquist (who had just delivered a contrary opinion), "[were] on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution."
Over time, interrogators began to devise techniques to honor the "letter" but not the "spirit" of Miranda. In the case of "Missouri v. Seibert", 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the Supreme Court halted one of the more controversial practices. Missouri police had been deliberately withholding Miranda warnings and questioning suspects until they obtained confessions, then providing the warnings, getting waivers, and eliciting confessions again. Justice Souter wrote for the plurality: "Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of "Miranda" cannot accomplish by training instructions what "Dickerson" held Congress could not do by statute."
"Berghuis v. Thompkins" (2010) was a ruling in which the Supreme Court held that a suspect's "ambiguous or equivocal" statement, or lack of statements, does not mean that police must end an interrogation. At least one scholar has argued that "Thompkins" effectively gutted "Miranda". In "The Right to Remain Silent", Charles Weisselberg wrote that "the majority in "Thompkins" rejected the fundamental underpinnings of "Miranda v. Arizona"'s prophylactic rule and established a new one that fails to protect the rights of suspects" and that
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />But in "Thompkins", neither Michigan nor the Solicitor General were able to cite any decision in which a court found that a suspect had given an implied waiver after lengthy questioning. Thompkins persevered for almost three hours before succumbing to his interrogators. In finding a waiver on these facts, "Thompkins" gives us an implied waiver doctrine on steroids.
In "Vega v. Tekoh" (2022), the Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that police officers could not be sued under a particular statutory cause of action for failing to administer the Miranda warning, ruling that not every "Miranda" violation is a deprivation of a constitutional right. In dissent, three justices held that the court had "repeatedly and emphatically" determined that the "Miranda" decision established a constitutional right, and would have allowed such lawsuits. According to pundits, the ruling "Vega v. Tekoh" "makes it easier for police to obtain coerced confessions – by continuing to ask questions even if someone doesn't want to speak" and "guts a major pathway for incentivizing police to provide a Miranda warning and ensuring their accountability."
Effect on law enforcement.
"Miranda"'s impact on law enforcement remains in dispute. Many legal scholars believe that police have adjusted their practices in response to "Miranda" and that its mandates have not hampered police investigations. Others argue that the "Miranda" rule has resulted in a lower rate of conviction, with a possible reduction in the rate of confessions of between four and sixteen percent. Some scholars argue that Miranda warnings have reduced the rate at which the police solve crimes, while others question their methodology and conclusions.
In popular culture.
The 2023 film Miranda's Victim directed by Michelle Danner explores the origins of the Miranda warning and the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court in favour of Miranda.
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Cornell CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

Ernesto Miranda
American criminal and subject of a United States Supreme Court case
Ernesto Arturo Miranda (March 9, 1941 – January 31, 1976) was an American laborer whose criminal conviction was set aside in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case "Miranda v. Arizona", which ruled that criminal suspects must be informed of their right against self-incrimination and their right to consult with an attorney before being questioned by police. This warning is known as a "Miranda" warning. Miranda had been convicted of kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery charges based on his confession under police interrogation.
After the Supreme Court decision invalidated Miranda's initial conviction, the state of Arizona tried him again. At the second trial, with his confession excluded from evidence, he was convicted. He was sentenced to 20–30 years in prison, but was paroled in 1972. After his release, he returned to his old neighborhood and made a modest living autographing police officers' "Miranda cards" that contained the text of the warning for reading to arrestees. Miranda was stabbed to death during an argument in a bar in Phoenix, Arizona on January 31, 1976. A Mexican man, Eseziquiel Moreno Perez, was charged with the murder of Miranda, but fled to Mexico and has never been located.
Early life.
Ernesto Arturo Miranda was born in Mesa, Arizona, on March 9, 1941. Miranda began getting in trouble when he was in grade school. Shortly after his mother died, his father remarried. Miranda and his father did not get along very well; he kept his distance from his brothers and stepmother as well. Miranda's first criminal conviction was during his eighth-grade year. The following year, he was convicted of burglary and sentenced to a year in reform school.
In 1956, about a month after his release from the Arizona State Industrial School for Boys (ASISB), he ran afoul of the law once more and was returned to ASISB. Upon his second release from reform school, he relocated to Los Angeles, California. Within months of his arrival in L.A., Miranda was arrested (but not convicted) on suspicion of armed robbery and for some sex offences. After two and a half years in custody, the 18-year-old Miranda was extradited back to Arizona.
He drifted through the southern U.S. for a few months, spending time in jail in Texas for living on the street without money or a place to live, and was arrested in Nashville, Tennessee, for driving a stolen car. Miranda was sentenced to one year and a day in the federal prison system because he had driven the stolen vehicle across state lines. He spent his sentence in Chillicothe, Ohio, and later in Lompoc, California.
For the next couple of years, Miranda kept out of jail, working at various jobs, until he became a laborer on the night loading dock for the Phoenix Produce Company. At that time he started living with Twila Hoffman, a 29-year-old mother of a boy and a girl by another man, from whom she could not afford to obtain a divorce.
Confession without rights; "Miranda v. Arizona".
On March 13, 1963, Miranda's truck was spotted and license plates recognized by the brother of an 18-year-old kidnapping and rape victim, Lois Ann Jameson (the victim had given the brother a description). With his description of the car and a partial license plate number, Phoenix Police Department officers Carroll Cooley and Wilfred Young confronted Miranda, who voluntarily accompanied them to the police station and participated in a police lineup. At the time, Miranda was a person of interest, but not formally in custody.
After the lineup, when Miranda asked how he did, the police implied that he was positively identified, at which point he was placed under arrest, and taken to an interrogation room. After two hours of interrogation, some of which regarded another offense for which Miranda was separately tried and convicted, Miranda hand-wrote a confession to the kidnapping and rape of Jameson. At the top of each sheet was the printed certification that "this statement has been made voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion or promises of immunity and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make can and will be used against me." After confessing to the officers, Miranda was taken to meet the victim for positive voice identification. Asked by officers in her presence whether this was the victim, he said: "That's the girl." The victim stated that the sound of Miranda's voice matched that of the culprit.
Despite the printed statement on top of the sheets that Miranda used to write his confession, "with full knowledge of my legal rights," he was not informed of his right to have an attorney present, nor of his right to remain silent when he was arrested or before his interrogation. 73-year-old Alvin Moore was assigned to represent him at his trial. The trial was conducted in mid-June 1963 before Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Yale McFate.
Moore objected to entering the confession by Miranda as evidence during the trial but was overruled. Mostly because of the confession, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison on both charges. Moore appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, but the conviction was upheld there.
Filing as a pauper, Miranda submitted his plea for a writ of "certiorari", or request for review of his case to the U.S. Supreme Court in June 1965. After Alvin Moore was unable to continue representing Miranda because of health reasons, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attorney Robert J. Corcoran asked John J. Flynn, a criminal defense attorney, to serve "pro bono", along with his partner, John P. Frank, and associates Paul G. Ulrich and Robert A. Jensen of the law firm Lewis & Roca in Phoenix to represent Miranda. They wrote a 2,500-word petition for "certiorari" arguing that Miranda's Fifth Amendment rights had been violated, and they submitted it to the United States Supreme Court.
"Miranda v. Arizona".
In November 1965, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Miranda's case, "Miranda v. Arizona", along with three other similar cases to clear all confusion created by the decision in "Escobedo v. Illinois". That previous case had ruled that:
Under the circumstances of this case, where a police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect in police custody who has been refused an opportunity to consult with his counsel and who has not been warned of his constitutional right to keep silent, the accused has been denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and no statement extracted by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a trial. "Crooker v. California", 357 U.S. 433, and "Cicenia v. Lagay", 357 U.S. 504, distinguished, and, to the extent that they may be inconsistent with the instant case, they are not controlling. 479–492.
In January 1966, Flynn and Frank submitted their argument stating that Miranda's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated by the Phoenix Police Department. Two weeks later the State of Arizona responded by asserting that Miranda's rights had not been violated. The first day of the case was on the last day of February 1966. Because of the three companion cases and other information, the case had a second day of oral arguments on March 1, 1966.
John Flynn for Miranda outlined the case and then stated that Miranda had not been advised of his right to remain silent when he had been arrested and questioned, adding the Fifth Amendment argument to his case. Flynn contended that an emotionally disturbed man like Miranda, who had a limited education, should not be expected to know his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself.
Gary Nelson represented the State of Arizona arguing that this was not a Fifth Amendment issue but just an attempt to expand the Sixth Amendment "Escobedo" decision. He urged the justices to clarify their position, but not to push the limits of "Escobedo" too far. He then told the court that forcing police to advise suspects of their rights would seriously obstruct public safety.
The second day concerned arguments from related cases. Thurgood Marshall, the former NAACP attorney, was the last to argue. In his capacity as the Solicitor General, he presented the Johnson administration's view of the case: that the government did not have the resources to appoint a lawyer for every indigent person who was accused of a crime.
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the opinion in "Miranda v. Arizona". The decision was in favor of Miranda. It stated that:
The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
The opinion was released on June 13, 1966. Because of the decision, police departments throughout the U.S. started to issue "Miranda" warning cards for their officers to recite. The Supreme Court did not mandate a specific wording and, although word choice is similar, the exact language used varies between jurisdictions. A generic admonition might look like this:
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />You have the right to remain silent. If you give up that right, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney and to have an attorney present during questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided to you.
Life after "Miranda v. Arizona".
The Supreme Court invalidated Miranda's conviction, which was tainted by the use of the confession that had been obtained through improper interrogation. The state of Arizona retried him. At the second trial, his confession was not introduced into evidence, but he was convicted again, on March 1, 1967, based on testimony given by his estranged common-law wife. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison.
Miranda was paroled in 1972. After his release, he started selling autographed "Miranda" warning cards for $1.50. Over the next few years, Miranda was arrested numerous times for minor driving offenses and eventually lost his license. He was arrested for the possession of a gun but the charges were dropped. However, because this violated his parole, he was sent back to Arizona State Prison for another year before being released.
Death.
On January 31, 1976, a fight erupted at the Amapola Bar at 233 South 2nd Street in downtown Phoenix in which Miranda was stabbed. He was pronounced dead on arrival at Banner Good Samaritan Medical Center. He was 34. Several Miranda cards were found on his person. Miranda was buried in the City of Mesa Cemetery in Mesa, Arizona. The person suspected of handing the knife to the man who murdered Miranda invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to talk to police. He was released and was not charged in Miranda's murder. The man suspected of murdering Miranda, then-23-year-old Eseziquiel Moreno Perez, was formally charged with murder on February 4, 1976. However, he has never been apprehended as he fled to Mexico following the murder and has never been found.
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />

Vega v. Tekoh
2022 United States Supreme Court case
Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held, 6–3, that an officer's failure to read "Miranda" warnings to a suspect in custody does not alone provide basis for a claim of civil liability under Section 1983 of United States Code. In the case, the Court reviewed its previous holding of "Miranda v. Arizona" (1966) to determine whether respondent Carlos Vega violated plaintiff Terence Tekoh's constitutional rights by failing to read Tekoh his "Miranda" rights prior to interrogation. Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the six-justice majority that Tekoh's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated, as "Miranda" rights are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution."
Background.
In the United States, "Miranda" warnings were established from the Supreme Court case "Miranda v. Arizona" and upheld in "Dickerson v. United States", establishing that under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, statements made by a suspect while both in police custody and directly being questioned cannot be used as evidence in trial unless they were notified of their rights to remain silent prior to questioning.
In March 2014, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department deputy Carlos Vega responded to a 911 call related to allegations that Terence Tekoh, a hospital employee, had sexually assaulted a patient. Tekoh confessed to the sexual assault shortly after Vega met him. He was tried on the sexual assault allegations and ultimately acquitted. Tekoh then sued Vega under  § 1983, asserting he violated his rights under "Miranda v. Arizona" by not warning him of his right to remain silent.
A federal district court jury found in favor of Vega based on the district court’s jury instructions regarding Miranda. Tekoh appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for another trial. The court denied rehearing "en banc" over the dissent of Judge Patrick J. Bumatay, who was joined by six other judges. Vega filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Supreme Court.
Certiorari was granted in the case on January 14, 2022. Oral arguments were heard on April 20, 2022. On June 23, 2022, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a 6–3 vote. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the majority, while Justice Elena Kagan wrote the dissent.
Opinion of the Court.
In his opinion, Justice Alito wrote that "Miranda" does not extend to claims made under  § 1983. He wrote that a violation of "Miranda" does not constitute a violation of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, as the rules set in Miranda are "prophylactic", he reiterated that the "Miranda" warnings were "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution". Therefore, he saw no reason to extend the right to sue under §1983.
Dissenting opinion.
In her dissent, Justice Kagan wrote that the majority opinion fails to give "redress" to individuals whose rights were violated by the police under Miranda. She noted that Miranda is "secured by the Constitution" and cited "Dickerson v. United States" as a reason. She wrote that Dickerson stated that "Miranda has all the substance of a constitutional rule" and that these "constitutional rules are enforceable in federal-court habeas proceedings, where a prisoner is entitled to claim he 'is in custody in violation of the Constitution.'" She contends that under Miranda if the accused had an "un-Mirandized" testimony, it should not be included in the trial, and since that was not the case, that gives the accused grounds to sue under §1983. She ended her dissent with a scathing statement: "The majority here, as elsewhere, injures the right by denying the remedy."
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Justia Oyez (oral argument audio) Supreme Court (slip opinion)

Hicks v. Miranda
1975 United States Supreme Court case
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act does apply to state criminal proceedings initiated after a federal complaint is filed but before there has been a "proceeding of substance on the merits" in federal court. The case involved the pornographic film "Deep Throat".
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Cornell Findlaw Justia

Carroll Cooley
American police detective
Carroll Cooley (August 25, 1935 – May 29, 2023) was an American police detective. He was known for arresting laborer Ernesto Miranda. The arrest led to failing to warn a person of their constitutional rights before interrogating them, becoming a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case named "Miranda v. Arizona".
Life and career.
Cooley was born in Bald Knob, Arkansas.
In 1958, Cooley joined the Phoenix Police Department. Over the next few years, he was promoted to the rank of detective.
On March 13, 1963, Cooley and fellow police officer Wilfred Young arrested laborer Ernesto Miranda. The arrest led to failing to warn a person of their constitutional rights before interrogating them, becoming a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case named "Miranda v. Arizona", which ruled that criminal suspects must be informed of their right against self-incrimination and their right to consult with an attorney before being questioned by police.
In 1978, Cooley retired from the police department. After retiring, he was an adjunct professor at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign.
Cooley died on May 29, 2023, at the age of 87.
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />

Dickerson v. United States
2000 United States Supreme Court case
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), upheld the requirement that the Miranda warning be read to criminal suspects and struck down a federal statute that purported to overrule "Miranda v. Arizona" (1966).
"Dickerson" is regarded as a significant example of a rare departure by the Court from the principle of party presentation. The Court noted that neither party in the case advocated on behalf of the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the specific statute at issue in the case. Accordingly, it invited Paul Cassell, a former law clerk to Antonin Scalia and Warren E. Burger, to argue that perspective. Cassell was then a professor at the University of Utah law school; he was later appointed to, and subsequently resigned from, a federal district court judgeship in that state.
Background.
In "Miranda v. Arizona", the Supreme Court held that statements of criminal suspects made while they are in custody and subject to interrogation by police may not be admitted in court unless the suspect first had certain warnings read to them beforehand. By now, these warnings are familiar to most Americans: that the suspect has the right to remain silent during the interrogation, that anything they say to the police may be used against them in a court of law, that they have the right to legal counsel, and that if they cannot afford legal counsel a lawyer will be provided for them.
In 1968, two years after the "Miranda" decision, Congress passed a law that purported to overrule it as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. This statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, directed federal trial judges to admit statements of criminal defendants if they were made voluntarily, without regard to whether they had received the "Miranda" warnings. Under § 3501, voluntariness depended on such things as (1) the time between arrest and arraignment, (2) whether the defendant knew the crime for which they had been arrested, (3) whether they had been told that they did not have to talk to the police and that any statement could be used against them, (4) whether the defendant knew prior to questioning that they had the right to the assistance of counsel, and (5) whether they actually had the assistance of counsel during questioning. However, the "presence or absence of any of" these factors "need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession." Because § 3501 was an act of Congress, it applied only to federal criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings in the District of Columbia.
Charles Dickerson had been arrested for bank robbery and for using a firearm during a crime of violence, both federal crimes. He moved to suppress statements he made to the FBI because he had not received the "Miranda" warnings before he spoke to the FBI. The district court suppressed the statements, and so the government appealed. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, reasoning that § 3501 had supplanted the requirement that the police give the "Miranda" warnings because "Miranda" was not a constitutional requirement and therefore Congress could overrule that decision by legislation. The Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case.
Opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, and began by briefly describing the historical backdrop against which the "Miranda" ruling had emerged. A suspect's confession had always been inadmissible if it had been the result of coercion or otherwise given involuntarily. This was true in England, from where American law inherited that rule.
However, as time went on, the Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment was an independent source of protection for statements made by criminal defendants in the course of police interrogation. "In "Miranda", we noted that the advent of modern custodial police interrogation brought with it an increased concern about confessions obtained by coercion." Custodial police interrogation by its very nature "isolates and pressures the individual" so that he might eventually be worn down and confess to crimes he did not commit in order to end the ordeal. In "Miranda", the Court had adopted the now-famous four warnings to protect against this particular evil.
Congress, in response, enacted § 3501. That statute clearly was designed to overrule "Miranda" because it expressly focused solely on voluntariness of the confession as a touchstone for admissibility. Did Congress have the authority to pass such a law? On the one hand, the Court's power to craft nonconstitutional supervisory rules over the federal courts exists only in the absence of a specific statute passed by Congress. However, if on the other hand the "Miranda" rule was constitutional, Congress could not overrule it, because the Court alone is the final arbiter of what the Constitution requires. As evidence of the fact that the "Miranda" rule was constitutional in nature, the Court pointed out that many of its subsequent decisions applying and limiting the requirement arose in decisions from state courts, over which the Court lacked the power to impose supervisory nonconstitutional rules. Furthermore, although the Court had previously invited legislative involvement in the effort to devise prophylactic measures for protecting criminal defendants against overbearing tactics of the police, it had consistently held that these measures must not take away from the protections "Miranda" had afforded.
Finally, 34 years after the original decision, the Court was loath to overrule "Miranda". Typically, the Court overrules constitutional decisions only when their doctrinal underpinnings have eroded. The Court felt that this was not the case in "Miranda". "If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the "Miranda" rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief." The "Miranda" rule did not displace the voluntariness inquiry.
Dissent.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, disagreed with the majority's decision not to overrule "Miranda". He disputed the notion that "Miranda" was a constitutional rule, pointing to several cases in which the Court had declined to exclude evidence despite the absence of warnings.
Justice Scalia described the majority's decision as an unprincipled compromise between justices who believed "Miranda" was a constitutional requirement and those who disagreed. He noted that the majority did not state outright that the Miranda warning is a constitutional requirement, but merely that it is "constitutionally based." Justice Scalia further criticized the majority for implying that Congress has no power to override judicially imposed safeguards of constitutional rights.
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Cornell CourtListener Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

Withrow v. Williams
1993 United States Supreme Court case
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that Fifth Amendment "Miranda v. Arizona" arguments can be raised again in federal habeas corpus proceedings, even if a criminal defendant had a fair chance to argue those claims in state court. The Court rejected the state's argument that "Stone v. Powell", a case holding the opposite in the context of Fourth Amendment claims on habeas review, applied in Williams' case.
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Findlaw Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

Oregon v. Elstad
1985 United States Supreme Court case
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), was a landmark Supreme Court of the United States case relating to "Miranda" warnings.
Background.
A house in the town of Salem, Polk County (most of Salem is located in Marion County), Oregon was burglarized. A witness to the burglary contacted the local sheriff's office and implicated an 18 year old neighbor, Michael Elstad. Two officers went to Elstad's home with a warrant for his arrest. When the police entered the house and asked Elstad about the burglary he admitted to the burglary. The officers then escorted Elstad to the sheriff's headquarters. About an hour later, the same officers began interrogating Elstad by reading him his "Miranda" rights for the first time. During this interrogation, the officers obtained a written admission of Elstad's involvement in the burglary. Subsequently, Elstad was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 5 years and $18,000 in restitution.
Case.
The issue presented was whether the self-incrimination clause of the 5th Amendment requires suppression of a confession made after Miranda warnings and a waiver, because police obtained an earlier admission without "Miranda" warnings.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that, while the pre-"Miranda" statements must be suppressed, the statements made after "Miranda" do not need to be suppressed as long as the statements were made knowingly and voluntarily.
Subsequent Developments.
In "Missouri" v. "Seibert" the police practice was to obtain a confession from suspects, then Mirandize the suspects and obtain a "valid" confession. Missouri developed this practice as a result of the holding in "Oregon" v. "Elstad". The Supreme Court condemned this practice and suppressed the statements.
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

Michigan v. Mosley
1975 United States Supreme Court case
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a criminal suspect's assertion of his right to remain silent after a "Miranda" warning does not preclude the police from re-Mirandizing him and questioning him about a different crime.
Background.
On April 8, 1971, Richard Bert Mosley was arrested in Michigan in connection with several robberies. Police Mirandized him and asked him questions about the robberies. He eventually asserted his right to remain silent and interrogation ceased. More than two hours later, while Mosley was still being held, another officer interrogated him regarding a homicide. The officer read Mosley a fresh "Miranda" warning and Mosley then made statements that incriminated him.
The incriminating statement was introduced in evidence against Mosley at trial. He was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, Mosley objected to the use of his incriminating statement as evidence. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the second officer's interrogation of Mosley was a violation of the "Miranda" principles.
The State of Michigan appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 20, 1975.
Opinion of the Court.
In a majority opinion delivered by Justice Stewart on December 9, 1975, the Supreme Court sided with Michigan and remanded the case. The Court held that the questioning on a different crime did not violate Mosley's right to remain silent. The Court reasoned that his Fifth Amendment rights were scrupulously honored when he ended questioning about the robberies. Given the significant time lapse and the fresh set of "Miranda" warnings, there was no violation of Mosley's Fifth Amendment rights.
Justice White wrote a concurrence, stating that the Court should “adopt voluntariness as the standard.” Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall dissented, arguing once an individual invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege, any statement taken after that “cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.”
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

Wainwright v. Greenfield
1986 United States Supreme Court case
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's finding and overturned the petitioner's conviction, on the grounds that it was fundamentally unfair for the prosecutor to comment during the court proceedings on the petitioner's silence invoked as a result of a Miranda warning.
Background.
After his arrest in Florida for sexual battery, Greenfield was given three separate Miranda warnings. Each time, he exercised his right to remain silent and requested to speak with an attorney before answering questions. At his trial in the Circuit Court for Sarasota County, the respondent pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. During closing arguments in the Florida trial court, the prosecutor reviewed the police officer's testimony, over defense counsel's objection, arguing that Greenfield's silence after receiving Miranda warnings was evidence of his sanity. The testimony described the occasions when respondent had exercised his right to remain silent. The prosecutor suggested that respondent's repeated refusals to answer questions without first consulting an attorney "demonstrated a degree of comprehension that was inconsistent with his claim of insanity".
Greenfield then unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court, by suing the Florida Department of Corrections and its secretary, Louie L. Wainwright, arguing that the prosecutor's use of his silence violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed in "Doyle v. Ohio" (1976). The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the general rule precluding a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent did not apply to a case in which an insanity plea was filed.
Decision.
The Court held that the prosecutor's use of respondent's post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of sanity violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Footnotes.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: CourtListener Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

Jenkins v. Anderson
1980 United States Supreme Court case
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court case regarding the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Holding.
The Supreme Court held that a defendant's silence prior to a Miranda warning can be used by the prosecution to imply an admission. In "Doyle v. Ohio", the Court held that silence "after" a Miranda warning cannot be used against the defendant to imply admission to guilt.
External links.
 is available from: CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

Yarborough v. Alvarado
2004 United States Supreme Court case
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court declined to overturn a state court's conclusion that a minor was not in custody for "Miranda" purposes during his police interview. Michael Alvarado helped his friend Paul Soto steal a truck in Santa Fe Springs, California. The truck owner was killed by Soto during the robbery and Alvarado was convicted of second-degree murder for his role in the crime. The evidence for Alvarado's conviction was primarily based on statements given by Alvarado during a two-hour police interrogation that occurred when Alvarado's parents brought him to the police station. Alvarado was 17 years old and was not read his "Miranda" rights before questioning. During Alvarado's murder trial in a state court, motions to suppress the statements given by Alvarado were denied on the ground that Alvarado was not in police custody at the time of the interrogation and thus did not have to be read his "Miranda" rights. Alvarado appealed his conviction, claiming that the determination that he was not in custody was incorrect because the courts did not take his age into account.
In a split decision, the Supreme Court declined to overturn the state court's conclusion about custody because it was not objectively incorrect. The Court noted that there was no precedent that required the use of age in determining whether someone is in police custody (this would change in 2011 with "J.D.B. v. North Carolina", which held that age is relevant to determining if someone is in custody). The case has been cited in subsequent Supreme Court decisions as precedent for providing state courts with latitude in making decisions about general or broad rules.
Background.
Crime and investigation.
The respondent Michael Alvarado agreed to help his friend Paul Soto steal a truck in the parking lot of a shopping mall in Santa Fe Springs, California. Soto pulled out a gun and approached the driver of the truck, demanding the keys, while Alvarado hid by the driver's side door. The driver refused and was shot and killed by Soto. Afterwards, Alvarado helped hide the gun. Los Angeles County Sheriff's detective Cheryl Comstock led the investigation of the crime. During the investigation Comstock contacted Alvarado's parents, saying that she wished to speak with Alvarado. Alvarado's parents brought him to the police station to be interviewed. Comstock brought Alvarado into an interview room and questioned him for two hours. Alvarado's parents asked to be present during the interview but were not allowed in by police. Alvarado admitted during questions that he had helped his friend try to steal the truck and that he had helped hide the gun.
Before custodial interrogations, police are required to give suspects a "Miranda" warning that informs suspects of their legal rights during interrogation. However, Alvarado was not given a "Miranda" warning at any time during questioning. This would form part of the basis for Alvarado's legal defense.
Trial and conviction.
The State of California charged Alvarado and his friend with first-degree murder and attempted robbery. Alvarado attempted to suppress his statements given during the Comstock interview on the basis that he was not read his "Miranda" rights. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that Alvarado was not in police custody at the time he gave his statement. Alvarado was subsequently convicted, primarily based on statements Alvarado made during his police interrogation. Alvarado's conviction was reduced by the trial judge to second-degree murder for his comparatively minor role in the offense. The California Courts of Appeal affirmed the conviction and agreed that Alvarado was not in custody. The Supreme Court of California declined discretionary review.
Much of Alvarado's trial focused on whether Alvarado was in custody or not during his police interview. According to "Thompson v. Keohane", to determine whether someone is in custody the courts apply a reasonable person test: whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or not.
Petition for habeas corpus.
After his conviction, Alvarado filed for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the custody analysis was incorrect because the court had not considered Alvarado's age in its reasonable person test. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court can grant habeas corpus to a person held due to a state court judgment if the state court judgement "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States". Alvarado's habeas corpus petition thus depended on demonstrating that the state court's custody determination was more than debatable, but objectively incorrect.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California agreed that the state court rulings were correct; however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that the state court made a mistake in not accounting for Alvarado's youth and inexperience when evaluating custody.
Oral argument.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted early in the oral argument that the case presented two questions. First, whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling was consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Second, whether the state courts' ruling was objectively unreasonable according to AEDPA. California Deputy Attorney General Deborah Chuang argued that the Ninth Circuit's ruling was not consistent with precedent because the Supreme Court had never addressed using age as a factor in custody analysis. Associate Justice Stephen Breyer remarked that he thought a Supreme Court precedent was not necessary because he thought it obvious that age affects whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. John P. Elwood, at the time assistant to the Solicitor General, argued that age doesn't make a legal difference for "Miranda" purposes because it is a rule uniformly applied to all people and that police officers should not be required to get inside the head of each suspect.
Tara K. Allen, arguing for Alvarado, claimed that the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable because they did not consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation as required by "Thompson v. Keohane". Specifically, the considered circumstances of custody were not total because Alvarado's age was not considered. Associate Justice Antonin Scalia responded by saying that, according to "Thompson v. Keohane", custody is an objective test and subjective factors like characteristics of the individual do not matter.
Opinion of the Court.
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion for the Court, which declined to overturn the state court's decision because fair-minded jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody. Kennedy noted that there were facts for and against the claim that Alvarado was in custody. Facts pointing towards custody included that the interview took place at a police station, the interview lasted for two hours, Alvarado was not told he was free to leave, and Alvarado's parents were not allowed to be present during the interview. Facts weighing against custody included that Alvarado was not transported to the police station by police, Alvarado was not threatened or told he would be placed under arrest, and the interview focused on the crimes of Alvarado's friend, not Alvarado's crimes. The Court was not tasked with conducting a separate inquiry into the issue of custody, rather, the Court was tasked with granting relief only if the lower court's decision is objectively unreasonable. Kennedy wrote that, given this standard, the state court's decision was reasonable because it was not clearly unreasonable.
Central to the reversal of the Ninth Circuit was the fact that the state court did not take into account Alvarado's age and experience with law enforcement in the custody analysis. The Court made several findings on this issue. The Court held that the use of age in custody analysis had not been explicitly required by previous rulings. Inexperience with law enforcement was rejected as well; the Court noted that previous opinions had rejected reliance on such factors.
O'Connor's concurrence.
Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a concurrence that agreed with the finding that the state court's decision was reasonable. However, O'Connor held that there could be cases in which age would be relevant to custody analysis. This would be affirmed by the Court in 2011 in "J.D.B. v. North Carolina".
Dissent.
Associate Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg joined. Breyer disagreed with the majority's holding that fair-minded jurists could disagree on whether Alvarado was in custody, holding that the facts compelled the single conclusion that Alvarado was in custody. Breyer held that the actions the police did not do, such as arrest Alvarado or threaten him, were not as important as what the police did do. Specifically, the police had Alvarado's parents bring him to the police station, brought Alvarado to an interrogation room, kept his parents out, and questioned him for two hours.
In the matter of Alvarado's age, Breyer found that it was relevant to the custody analysis. Further, Breyer held that nothing in the law prevents a judge from including age in the custody analysis. Breyer called the discussion of experience with law enforcement misleading; while experience with law enforcement can be difficult to determine, Breyer noted that Alvarado's age was a known objective fact.
Reception.
The case received both positive and negative reception in scholarly publications.
Support.
A note published in The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology supported the decision on procedural grounds, noting that using age in the custody analysis was not a precedent established by the Supreme Court. The note argued that establishing such broad legal precedent was outside the bounds of the authority of the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court was right to reverse. Instead, the note supported the state court who had applied the law as the Supreme Court had in the past.
Criticism.
Berry Feld, professor at University of Minnesota Law School, wrote: "the Court's decision ... treated juveniles as the functional equals of adults during interrogation. Over the past quarter-century, developmental psychological research consistently has emphasized adolescents' inability to understand or exercise "Miranda" rights". Paul Holland, professor at Seattle University School of Law, wrote that "the assumptions Justice Kennedy made in "Alvarado" are inapplicable to the schoolhouse context ... considering the age of a student-suspect questioned at school, would not present a significant risk of compromising the clarity the Court has sought to provide law enforcement. Officers questioning students at school are well aware of the students' status as minors".
Role in subsequent decisions.
Leeway granted to state courts.
"Yarborough v. Alvarado" has been cited in subsequent Supreme Court decisions as precedent for providing state courts leeway in reaching case by case determinations for general rules.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina.
Though the Court rejected the argument that its previous holdings supported using age in the custody analysis, the Court did not rule against the use of age. In 2011 the Court clarified in "J.D.B. v. North Carolina", ruling that a child's age is relevant to custody analysis. J.D.B. was a 13-year-old student who was interrogated at school by an investigator, a uniformed police officer, and school officials regarding a series of robberies. J.D.B. confessed to committing the robberies. He was not given a "Miranda" warning during the interrogation. Motions to suppress J.D.B.'s statements at trial were denied on the ground that J.D.B. was not in custody. Age was not used as a factor in the custody determination. The Supreme Court found that J.D.B.'s age should have been considered in the custody analysis and instructed the lower court to make a new finding on custody while taking age into account.
Notes.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
References.
<templatestyles src="Refbegin/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress OpenJurist Oyez (oral argument audio)

Duckworth v. Eagan
1989 United States Supreme Court case
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989), was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with police behavior when issuing the Miranda warning. The Court's decision was seen as weakening "Miranda's" protections.<ref name="Library/Abstracts"></ref>
Background.
After being questioned in regards to the stabbing of a woman, Gary Eagan was improperly read his Miranda Rights when police told him that he would be provided a lawyer "if and when you go to court." During the police investigation, Eagan did not make any incriminating statements, and waived his Miranda rights. The next day, Eagan was questioned again by police, and signed a waiver with the correct Miranda language. During the interrogation, Eagan confessed to the stabbing of the woman and revealed physical evidence of the crime committed. Later, Eagan claimed that the difference between the language in the first waiver he signed, and the second waiver he signed, made his confession inadmissible in a court of law.
Opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court.
The Supreme Court held that it was not necessary that the warnings be given in the exact form described in the Miranda decision, provided the warnings as a whole fully informed the suspect of his or her rights.
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

Thompson v. Keohane
1995 United States Supreme Court case
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply in custody rulings for Miranda.
Background.
Investigation and arrest.
In September 1986, the body of a dead woman was discovered by two hunters in Fairbanks, Alaska. The woman had been stabbed 29 times. To gain assistance identifying the body, the police issued a press release with a description of the woman. Carl Thompson called the police station and identified the body as Dixie Thompson, his former wife. The police asked Thompson to come into the station under the pretense of identifying personal items found with the body, but it was the intention of the police to question Thompson about the murder.
Thompson came to the police station and was questioned for two hours. Two plainclothes officers performed the interrogation in an interview room. Thompson was not read his Miranda rights and throughout the interrogation he was told that he was free to leave. The police told Thompson that they knew he killed his former wife and eventually Thompson confessed to the murder. Thompson was allowed to leave the police station, but then was arrested shortly thereafter.
Trial and conviction.
Thompson was charged with first-degree murder and put on trial. During the trial, an attempt was made to suppress Thompson's confession because he was not read his Miranda rights. The attempt was denied because the trial court ruled that Thompson was not in police custody and thus the police did not have to read Thompson his Miranda rights. The court concluded that Thompson was not in custody because he came to the police station freely and was told he was free to leave at any time. The prosecution was allowed to play Thompson's tape-recorded confession and the jury convicted Thompson of first-degree murder.
Appeals.
Thompson first attempted to appeal the ruling that he was not in police custody. The Alaska Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court and Alaska Supreme Court decided not to hear the case.
Thompson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. The district court deferred to the judgement of the state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which states that in most circumstances questions of fact are presumed correct by appeals courts. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling without publishing an opinion. The Supreme Court decided to hear the case and granted certiorari.
Opinion of the Court.
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for the majority. It held that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply in custody rulings for Miranda. As noted previously, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) states that federal courts assume state courts to be correct in factual questions. However the Court found that the question of custody for Miranda purposes was mixed question of both fact and law. The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit and instructed them to decide whether Thompson was in custody or not.
Notes.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
References.
<templatestyles src="Refbegin/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

Florida v. Powell
2010 United States Supreme Court case
Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on the language requirements for Miranda warnings. In the case, a suspect was advised of his right to consult with an attorney before questioning, as well as his right to consult with an attorney at any time during questioning. However, he was not advised of his right to the physical presence of an attorney during questioning.
Background.
On August 10, 2004, officers from the Tampa Police Department sought to apprehend the respondent, Kevin Dewayne Powell, in connection with an ongoing robbery investigation. Officers entered an apartment rented by Powell's girlfriend and spotted him coming from a bedroom. After searching the bedroom, officers recovered one 9-millimeter handgun, and Powell was subsequently arrested.
After he was transported to the headquarters of the Tampa Police Department, officers read Powell the standard departmental consent and release form. It stated:
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.
Powell acknowledged that he had been informed of his rights, that he understood them, and that he was willing to talk to the police. He signed the departmental consent and release form. He disclosed to police officers that he was aware of his inability (as a convicted felon) to possess a firearm, but that he nonetheless purchased and carried the firearm that police recovered at the apartment.
Powell was charged in a Florida state court with possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor. He moved to suppress his statements, contending that his "Miranda" warning was deficient as it did not advise him of the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning. The trial court denied, reasoning that officers had adequately notified Powell of his rights. A jury would later find him guilty of the gun-possession charge.
On appeal, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal held that Powell's statements should have been suppressed, contending that they did not adequately inform Powell of his right to the presence of an attorney throughout the interrogation. The Court of Appeal, recognizing the importance of the issue at hand, recommended the case to the Florida Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower appellate court's decision. It reasoned that both "Miranda" and the Florida Constitution "require that a suspect be clearly informed of the right to have a lawyer present during questioning", and that the warnings Powell received did not properly inform him of this right.
Supreme Court Opinions.
In a 7–2 decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the court held that it retained jurisdiction over this case, and that the warnings given to Powell before his questioning adequately informed him of his right to the presence of an attorney. Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion.
Ginsburg's Majority Opinion.
On the jurisdictional question, Justice Ginsburg concedes that the Florida Supreme Court rested in part on a provision of its own state constitution, in addition to "Miranda", in reaching its decision. However, the decision handed down by the Florida Supreme Court appeared to rest heavily on federal law, and that it was interwoven with federal law. Additionally, Ginsburg's opinion casts doubt on the extent to which the Florida law can be seen as independent from federal judicial review. As such, it presumes that the lower court's decision was primarily governed by federal law, and as such the case is federally justiciable.
The court also reversed the holding of the Florida Supreme Court. They agree that "Miranda" requires that suspects "be warned prior to any questioning" and "that he has the right to the presence of an attorney", but that it does not specify any precise language that must be used in giving these warnings. It simply must reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by "Miranda". Powell undoubtedly received such warnings.
In its reasoning, the court explains why it would not have been necessary for officers to directly inform Powell of his right to the presence of an attorney. Police had informed Powell that he had the right to consult an attorney before answering "any" of their questions, and not simply the first one. They additionally notified him of his ability to use this right at "any time" he wanted during the interrogation, not simply at the outset. For Powell, or any reasonable person, to reach the opposite conclusion ("i.e.", that he did not have the right to the presence of an attorney for the duration of the interview) would require dubious reasoning on the part of the suspect. He would have to think that, to consult an attorney, he could leave the room as he wished, consult an attorney, and then return. The court reasoned that a suspect (who had been arrested and taken into police custody) would not infer such a right, under the circumstances, to simply pop in and out as he pleased. Rather, he would come to the more plausible inference that a lawyer would be present with him the whole time.
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Google Scholar Justia Oyez (oral argument audio)

Doyle v. Ohio
1976 United States Supreme Court case
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), is a United States Supreme Court case regarding the Due Process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Holding.
The Supreme Court held that the criminal defendant's silence in response to a Miranda warning cannot be used to impeach them during cross examination.
In 1980 a similar case, "Jenkins v. Anderson", reached the Supreme Court, its ruling distinguishing it from "Doyle". The Court ruled that the prosecution is permitted to exploit as inculpatory evidence a defendant's failure to disclose an exculpatory testimony eventually presented in trial as defense, to government officials such as police in a prompt manner before the arrest. The petitioner in this case had committed murder and, weeks later, confessed to the crime but, in the process, embroidered the narrative by claiming self-defense as the justification.
The prosecution mooted this during trial as evidence of guilt and perjury. After habeas corpus relief, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, recognizing no breach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"Salinas v. Texas" (2013), a plurality opinion, held that mere silence during prearrest interrogations is inadequate to establish invocation of the right to remain silent, if the defendant has already chosen to speak. Specifically, if the defendant has elected to speak to police and then suddenly stops when confronted with inculpatory evidence, the defendant must explicitly invoke his right to remain silent in order for the silence not to be held against him.
References.
<templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" />
External links.
 is available from: Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

United States v. Mandujano
1976 United States Supreme Court case
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), was a United States Supreme Court case that